Salazar vs. Romaquin

In original actions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court where the People of the Philippines is a party, the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People; service of the petition on the People through the Provincial Prosecutor is inefficacious and warrants dismissal. A claim that a judge is disqualified by relationship must be established by preponderant evidence.

Benito C. Salazar, a lawyer, businessman, and former President of the Food Terminal, Inc., was charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, in Criminal Case No. 6002. The prosecution was initiated by the Aklan Provincial Prosecutor, and the case was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge Tomas R. Romaquin. The dispute concerns the proper representation of the People of the Philippines in appellate proceedings and the evidentiary burden for claiming a judge's disqualification.

On April 26, 2001, at about 8:30 a.m., Raymundo Rodriguez was shot and killed in Barangay Dumaguit, New Washington, Aklan. On May 12, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan filed an Information in the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, charging Benito C. Salazar with murder, alleging treachery and use of superior strength, and stating that the victim's family suffered P100,000.00 actual damages. The prosecutor recommended no bail, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6002.

Barely three hours after filing the Information, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, claiming urgency because the motive was political, election day was May 14, 2001, and lives were in danger. Executive Judge Sheila Martelino-Cortes granted the motion and issued a warrant for Salazar's arrest on May 12, 2001. Salazar could not be found, and the warrant was not served. The case was later raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge Tomas R. Romaquin.

On May 15, 2001, Salazar received a copy of the Joint Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause for murder. The next day, he filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Lift Warrant of Arrest, alleging that he had filed a Petition for Review of the Joint Resolution with the Secretary of Justice. He cited Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court and Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, and asserted his innocence, good moral standing, and intention to submit to the court's jurisdiction. The Provincial Prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that the Petition for Review did not justify suspension of the warrant, that Roberts was inapplicable, that Salazar had not been arrested so the court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person, and that the motion did not constitute voluntary appearance.

On May 29, 2001, Salazar supplemented his motion, alleging that Executive Judge Martelino-Cortes was disqualified because she was the aunt of Vivien Bontogon-Rodriguez, the deceased's wife; Vivien was the daughter of the Executive Judge's first cousin, Angela Yap-Bontogon, making them related within the fifth degree of consanguinity. The Provincial Prosecutor replied that Salazar had not proved the relationship, that the matter of inhibition should have been addressed to the judge, and that even if she were disqualified, the warrant and order remained valid. On August 10, 2001, Judge Romaquin granted the motion to suspend proceedings but denied the motion to lift the warrant. Salazar's motion for partial reconsideration was denied, and the trial court declared the issues moot because the Secretary of Justice had denied his Petition for Review and affirmed the finding of probable cause.

On November 5, 2001, Salazar filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC orders, but he failed to submit proof of service on the RTC, the People of the Philippines, and Jodel Rentillo. On November 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition for failure to show proof of service. On November 20, 2001, the appellate court received Salazar's Manifestation and Submission, filed by registered mail on November 5, 2001, alleging that copies had been served on the respondents through registered mail, supported by an affidavit of service executed by Danilo B. Elardo. Salazar moved for reconsideration, but on December 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the motion because he had failed to serve a copy of his petition on the Solicitor General, the counsel of the People of the Philippines. The Supreme Court later found that Salazar had failed to adduce preponderant evidence in the trial court to prove the alleged relationship of the Executive Judge to the deceased and his wife, and had not appended documents to prove such relationship in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The fact that the prosecutor did not specifically deny the allegation did not relieve Salazar of his burden to prove it with the requisite quantum of evidence.

• Authority of the Solicitor General: Petitioner argued that the exclusive authority of the Solicitor General to represent the People in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code arises only when the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the case, which occurs upon service on the State of the court's order or resolution indicating initial action, or by voluntary submission under Rule 46, Section 4.
• Service Through Provincial Prosecutor: Petitioner maintained that before appellate jurisdiction attaches, service of the petition on the People may be made through the Provincial Prosecutor who appeared as counsel in the trial court, conformably to Rule 13, Section 2.
• Dismissal Despite Substantive Issues: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings and decided a question of substance not in accord with Section 1, Rule 6, Section 4, Rule 46, Section 35(1) of the Administrative Code, and applicable decisions when it ignored the substantive legal issues and refused to set aside the dismissal even after finding service on the Provincial Prosecutor.
• Disqualification of Executive Judge: Petitioner argued that the order of Executive Judge Martelino-Cortes dated May 12, 2001 and the warrant of arrest she issued were null and void because she was the aunt of Vivien Bontogon-Rodriguez, the deceased's wife, and was therefore disqualified to act on the motion.
• Excuse of Procedural Lapse: Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to brush aside his procedural lapse and order the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and act on his Petition for Certiorari.

• Suspension of Proceedings: The Provincial Prosecutor opposed the motion to suspend proceedings, contending that the filing of a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice was not a justification for suspending enforcement of the warrant of arrest.
• Inapplicability of Roberts: The Provincial Prosecutor argued that Salazar could not rely on Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals because the facts were different.
• Jurisdiction Over Person: The Provincial Prosecutor averred that Salazar had not yet been arrested, so the court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person, and his motion to lift the warrant did not constitute voluntary appearance.
• Disqualification Not Proven: The Provincial Prosecutor disagreed that the Executive Judge was disqualified, asserting that Salazar failed to prove the relationship, that the matter of inhibition should have been addressed to her, and that even with her disqualification, the warrant and order she issued were valid.

• Service on the People in Appellate Court: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Salazar's Petition for Certiorari for failure to serve a copy on the People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General instead of the Provincial Prosecutor.
• Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor: Whether the Provincial Prosecutor's authority to represent the People of the Philippines extends to proceedings before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
• Acquisition of Appellate Jurisdiction: Whether service on the Provincial Prosecutor was sufficient because the appellate court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the respondent under Rule 46, Section 4.
• Excuse of Procedural Lapse: Whether the procedural lapse in service should be excused and the Court of Appeals ordered to act on the Petition for Certiorari.
• Disqualification of the Executive Judge: Whether the Executive Judge was disqualified by relationship and whether her order and the warrant of arrest were null and void, and whether Salazar proved the alleged relationship by preponderant evidence.

• Service on the People in Appellate Court: No. The Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court; service through the Provincial Prosecutor is inefficacious and a ground for dismissal under Rule 46, Section 3.
• Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor: No. The Provincial Prosecutor's authority to represent the People is confined to the trial court under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Acquisition of Appellate Jurisdiction: No. The rule that appellate jurisdiction over the respondent is acquired upon service of the court's order or resolution does not authorize service on the Provincial Prosecutor; service on the People must still be through the Office of the Solicitor General.
• Excuse of Procedural Lapse: No. Failure to serve the Office of the Solicitor General is a sufficient ground for dismissal, and the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
• Disqualification of the Executive Judge: Not established. Salazar failed to prove by preponderant evidence the alleged relationship; bare allegations do not suffice.

• Service on the People in Appellate Court: Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires service of a copy of the petition on the respondent. In original actions in the appellate court where the People is a party, the petition must be served on the People through the Office of the Solicitor General. Service on the Provincial Prosecutor is inefficacious because he is not authorized to represent the People in the appellate court. The purpose of service is to apprise the respondent of the petition and enable it to file an appropriate pleading or comment; service on an unauthorized prosecutor does not achieve this purpose, and any pleading he files may be expunged. The failure to serve the Office of the Solicitor General is a sufficient ground for dismissal under the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
• Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor: Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor, but the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for the People is confined to the trial court. Pleadings of the accused and copies of trial court orders are served on the People through the Provincial Prosecutor at that level. Once the case reaches the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People. Thus, the Provincial Prosecutor had no authority to receive service for the People in the appellate court.
• Acquisition of Appellate Jurisdiction: Salazar invoked Rule 46, Section 4, arguing that the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the respondent only upon service of its order or resolution indicating initial action, or by voluntary submission, and that before then service on the Provincial Prosecutor was proper under Rule 13, Section 2. The Court rejected this argument. The rule on acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent does not dispense with the requirement that service on the People in an original appellate action be made through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Provincial Prosecutor's appearance in the trial court did not authorize him to represent the People in the appellate court.
• Excuse of Procedural Lapse: The Court declined to brush aside the procedural lapse. The requirement of service on the Office of the Solicitor General is mandatory, and the Court of Appeals had no recourse but to dismiss the petition when it was not complied with. The appellate court's dismissal was not a departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings; it applied Rule 46, Section 3.
• Disqualification of the Executive Judge: Salazar alleged that Executive Judge Martelino-Cortes was disqualified because she was the aunt of Vivien Bontogon-Rodriguez, the deceased's wife, as Vivien's mother, Angela Yap-Bontogon, was the Executive Judge's first cousin. The Court reviewed the pleadings and found that Salazar failed to adduce preponderant evidence in the trial court to prove the relationship and did not append documents to prove it in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The fact that the Provincial Prosecutor or private prosecutor did not specifically and categorically deny the allegation did not relieve Salazar of his burden to prove it with the requisite quantum of evidence. The allegation should have been proven during the hearing of his motion and supplement. Without proof, the claim of disqualification could not nullify the order and warrant.

• Sole Representation of the People by the Office of the Solicitor General in Appellate Courts — In appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, whether by writ of error, petition for review, automatic appeal, or in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People. A copy of the petition in such an action must be served on the People through the Office of the Solicitor General. Service through the Provincial Prosecutor is inefficacious and is a sufficient ground for dismissal under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
• Limited Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor — The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines is confined to proceedings before the trial court. Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, pleadings of the accused and copies of trial court orders or resolutions are served on the People through the Provincial Prosecutor at the trial level; this authority does not extend to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
• Burden of Proving Judicial Disqualification — A party alleging that a judge is disqualified by relationship must prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. A bare allegation, even if not specifically denied by the opposing party, does not relieve the proponent of the burden of proof. The allegation must be established during the appropriate hearing with the requisite quantum of evidence.
• Purpose of Service on the Respondent in an Original Appellate Action — Service of a copy of the petition on the respondent in an original action in the appellate court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the respondent's person is intended to apprise the respondent of the filing of the petition and its averments, enabling the respondent to file an appropriate pleading or comment even before the appellate court acts. Service on a lawyer not authorized to represent the respondent in the appellate court is inefficacious, and any pleading filed by that lawyer may be expunged from the records.

• "The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and represent the respondent People of the Philippines is confined only to the proceedings before the trial court." — This states the limited role of the Provincial Prosecutor and supports the ruling that service on him in the appellate court was ineffective.
• "However, in appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via Petition for Review; (c) on automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the Office of the Solicitor General's exclusive representation of the People in appellate courts.
• "The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The petitioners failure to have a copy of his petition served on the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court." — This is the ratio decidendi for denying due course to Salazar's petition.
• "The barefaced fact that the provincial prosecutor or the private prosecutor did not specifically and categorically deny the petitioners allegations in his supplement to his motion for reconsideration, that the Executive Judge and the deceased and his wife are related, did not relieve the petitioner of his burden to prove the same with the requisite quantum of evidence." — This defines the evidentiary burden for a claim of judicial disqualification and explains why Salazar's disqualification argument failed.

• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) — Cited by Salazar to support suspension of proceedings pending review by the Secretary of Justice; the Provincial Prosecutor argued it was inapplicable because the facts differed. The Supreme Court did not rely on it in resolving the petition.
• City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Estrella, 364 SCRA 257 (2001) — Cited in footnote 11 in support of the rule that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in appellate courts.
• Soriano vs. Angeles, 339 SCRA 366 (2000) — Cited in footnote 11 for the same rule on the Office of the Solicitor General's representation.
• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254 (2000) — Cited in footnote 11 for the same rule on the Office of the Solicitor General's representation.

• Section 5, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides who must prosecute criminal actions and confines the Provincial Prosecutor's authority to the trial court; pleadings of the accused and trial court orders are served on the People through the Provincial Prosecutor at that level.
• Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, 1987 Administrative Code — Provides that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, and in civil actions and special proceedings where the Government or its officers are parties.
• Section 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Court — Requires service of a copy of the petition on the respondent; failure to serve the People through the Office of the Solicitor General is a sufficient ground for dismissal.
• Section 4, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked it to argue that appellate jurisdiction over the respondent is acquired only upon service of the court's order or resolution indicating initial action, or by voluntary submission; the Court rejected its use to justify service on the Provincial Prosecutor.
• Section 2, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked it to argue that service on the Provincial Prosecutor was proper because he appeared as counsel in the trial court; the Court held the Provincial Prosecutor was not authorized in the appellate court.

Quisumbing (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Puno (Chairman), J., on official leave.