Salazar vs. People

When a demurrer to evidence is granted and the accused is acquitted, the trial court may not render judgment on the civil aspect of the case without first affording the accused the opportunity to present evidence thereon, unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. A judgment on the civil aspect rendered under such circumstances is a nullity for violation of the accused's constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner Anamer Salazar was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for endorsing and negotiating a Prudential Bank check issued by her co-accused, Nena Jaucian Timario, as payment for 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, as the private offended party neither waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately, nor filed a civil action prior to the criminal action. Timario remained at large and was never met by the private complainant.

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation through its representative, Jerson Yao. As payment, Salazar gave Yao Prudential Bank Check No. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000, issued by one Nena Jaucian Timario. Yao accepted the check upon Salazar's assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner.

Upon presentment to the drawee bank, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Salazar was informed of the dishonor and replaced the Prudential Bank check with Solid Bank Check No. 365704, which was returned with the notation "DAUD" (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). According to the petitioner, "DAUD" meant that the account had sufficient funds but was restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.

On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against Salazar and Timario with the RTC of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7474. The Information alleged that the two accused conspired and confederated to defraud J.Y. Brothers, with Timario drawing and issuing the check and Salazar endorsing and negotiating it, knowing that Timario did not have sufficient funds. Upon arraignment, Salazar, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

After the prosecution rested its case, Salazar filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court, alleging that she was merely an indorser and not the issuer of the check, that Article 315(2)(d) penalizes only the issuer, that there was no sufficient evidence of conspiracy with Timario, and that the first transaction was effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. The prosecution filed its comment/opposition. On November 19, 2001, the trial court granted the demurrer, acquitted Salazar on the ground that conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that as a mere indorser her breach of warranty was not synonymous with the fraudulent act under Article 315(2)(d), but simultaneously ordered her to pay P214,000 to J.Y. Brothers. Salazar moved for reconsideration on the civil aspect with a plea to be allowed to present evidence, but the motion was denied on January 14, 2002.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process because she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.
• Applicability of Rule 33: Petitioner invoked Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
• Mere Indorser: Petitioner maintained that she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and that Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Petitioner argued that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that she conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant.
• Novation: Petitioner contended that after the first check was dishonored, she replaced it with a second one, so the first transaction was effectively novated by the issuance of the second check, which was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds but for "DAUD."

• Due Process in Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the trial court violated the petitioner's right to due process by rendering judgment on the civil aspect of the case upon granting her demurrer to evidence and acquitting her, without first affording her the opportunity to present evidence on the civil aspect.

• Due Process in Demurrer to Evidence: Yes. The trial court's judgment on the civil aspect was a nullity, the petitioner having been denied the opportunity to present evidence thereon after the demurrer was granted, in violation of her constitutional right to due process.

• Due Process in Demurrer to Evidence: The civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives it, reserves the right to institute it separately, or files a civil action prior to the criminal action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In this case, none of these exceptions obtained. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution rests, the accused has the option to file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119, or to adduce evidence. When a demurrer is filed with leave of court and is granted, the accused has not yet adduced evidence on either the criminal or civil aspect — the only evidence on record is that of the prosecution. The accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court renders judgment not only granting the demurrer and acquitting the accused but also adjudging civil liability, said judgment on the civil aspect is a nullity because the constitutional right of the accused to due process is violated. The proper procedure is for the trial court to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer and acquitting the accused, and to set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect, followed by rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, as provided in Section 11, Rule 119. In this case, the trial court granted the demurrer, acquitted the petitioner, and ordered her to pay P214,000 — all without allowing her to present evidence on the civil aspect. The petitioner was thus denied her right to due process, rendering the civil aspect judgment a nullity.

• Demurrer to Evidence and Civil Liability — When a demurrer to evidence is granted and the accused is acquitted, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court renders judgment granting the demurrer, acquitting the accused, and simultaneously adjudging civil liability without giving the accused the opportunity to present evidence, the judgment on the civil aspect is a nullity for violation of due process. The proper procedure is for the court to issue an order or partial judgment acquitting the accused and set the case for continuation of trial for reception of evidence on the civil aspect, with the accused presenting evidence-in-chief, the private complainant presenting rebuttal evidence, and the parties presenting sur-rebuttal evidence, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• Extinction of Civil Action Upon Acquittal — The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The civil action based on the delict is deemed extinguished only if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or that the accused did not commit the acts or omissions imputed to him. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, as only preponderance of evidence is required for civil liability; (b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; or (c) the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

• Dual Purpose of Criminal Action — The criminal action has a dual purpose: the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective is the punishment of the offender, as criminal actions primarily vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the State. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused, intended solely to indemnify the private complainant. The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while on the civil aspect it is preponderance of evidence.

• "If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the precise rule governing the interplay between a granted demurrer, acquittal, and civil liability, and the consequence of its violation.

• "What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." — This passage prescribes the correct procedural remedy the trial court must follow upon granting a demurrer, establishing the proper sequence of trial on the civil aspect.

• "The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted." — This passage enumerates the recognized exceptions allowing civil liability to survive an acquittal, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the civil aspect of criminal cases.

• Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245 (1998) — Cited as controlling authority for the constitutional and jurisprudential requirements of due process in criminal proceedings. The Court relied on this case for the principle that procedural due process requires a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial," and that the accused must be given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.

• Section 1, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the institution of criminal and civil actions; provides that the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Applied to establish that the civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in this case.

• Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action, and that the civil action based on the delict is deemed extinguished only if there is a finding in a final judgment that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist. Applied to explain when civil liability survives acquittal.

• Section 23, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs demurrer to evidence; provides that after the prosecution rests, the court may dismiss on insufficiency of evidence upon demurrer filed by the accused with or without leave of court, and that filing without leave waives the right to present evidence. Applied to distinguish the consequences of filing with versus without leave of court.

• Section 2, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the contents of judgment; requires that a judgment of acquittal state whether the prosecution's evidence absolutely failed to prove guilt or merely failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and determine if the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. Applied to establish the proper scope of a judgment of acquittal.

• Section 11, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the order of trial; provides the sequence of presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the accused, rebuttal, and sur-rebuttal. Applied to prescribe the proper procedure for continuation of trial on the civil aspect after a demurrer is granted.

• Section 14(1) and (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees due process and the right of the accused to be heard and to present evidence in his behalf. Applied as the constitutional basis for nullifying the trial court's judgment on the civil aspect.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes estafa by issuing a check without sufficient funds. Applied in the trial court's ruling that as a mere indorser, the petitioner's act did not constitute the fraudulent act penalized under this provision.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.