Salazar vs. Felias

A claim that property is exempt from execution as a family home is not self-executing; the claimant must allege and prove that the family home was duly constituted, jointly by the spouses or by an unmarried head of family, actually resided in by the family, part of the community or conjugal property, and valued within statutory limits. A bare allegation without evidentiary support cannot defeat the execution of a final and executory judgment.

Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera, sought recovery of ownership and possession of four parcels of land in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan from Spouses Romualdo and Felisa Lastimosa. Felicitas Salazar is the daughter of Romualdo Lastimosa, one of the original defendants, and claims an aliquot share over the subject property as an heir. The subject property had been adjudged by the RTC as belonging to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s, a ruling that became final and executory.

On February 28, 1990, Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against Spouses Romualdo and Felisa Lastimosa before the RTC Branch 55 in Alaminos, Pangasinan, seeking to recover four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan. During the trial, on March 3, 1997, Romualdo died. Consequently, on July 6, 1998, his wife Felisa and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto Lastimosa, Rizalina Ramirez, Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa filed a Motion for Substitution. Notably absent from the list of substituted heirs was Felicitas Salazar, Romualdo's daughter.

On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision declaring the Heirs of Nivera as absolute owners of the subject parcels of land, ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate and surrender possession, and to pay actual damages of ₱270,000.00 for 1975 to 1995 plus ₱10,000.00 annually from 1996 until possession was restored, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱21,000.00. The Heirs of Lastimosa did not appeal this ruling, and it became final and executory.

Felicitas, along with Recto and Rizalina, subsequently filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on June 22, 2006 with the CA, seeking to nullify the RTC's March 16, 2004 Decision and the corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition. She claimed she was deprived of due process for not having been impleaded as a party defendant. On June 5, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the failure to include Felicitas was due to the fault of the Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to include her in their Motion to Substitute, and that since the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the original defendants, the outcome was binding on all their heirs. This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 3, 2009, and became final on October 5, 2009.

Thereafter, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed an Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making Demolition on April 24, 2010, premised on the fact that Felicitas had an aliquot share over the property that had not yet been partitioned. Simultaneously, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and Demolition on May 28, 2010, anchored on the finality of the March 16, 2004 Decision. On July 9, 2010, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution and Demolition and denied the Motion to Desist. The Heirs of Lastimosa appealed to the CA, which dismissed the appeal on December 6, 2013, on the grounds that the wrong remedy was availed of, that the non-inclusion issue was barred by res judicata, and that execution was proper given the finality of the RTC ruling. Felicitas's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 7, 2014. Felicitas then filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Wrong Party: Petitioner argued that the Writ of Execution and Demolition was issued against the wrong party, as she was not impleaded in the case for recovery of ownership and possession, and thus the decision cannot bind her.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that she was deprived of her property as an heir without due process, having been left out of the proceedings and "completely unable to protect her rights."
• Family Home Exemption: Petitioner contended that execution cannot proceed because the property sought to be demolished is her family home, which under Article 155 of the Family Code is exempt from execution.

• Dilatory Tactic: Respondent countered that the petition for review on certiorari is nothing but a dilatory tactic employed to overthrow and delay the execution of the judgment rendered as early as March 16, 2004.
• Res Judicata: Respondent argued that petitioner's claim of deprivation of property without due process has already been settled with finality in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, which was dismissed by both the CA and the Supreme Court.
• Failure to Prove Family Home: Respondent averred that petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove her claim that the property is her family home, and that petitioner herself admitted in her pleadings that she does not reside in the subject property in Alaminos but actually lives in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.
• Prior Ownership: Respondent maintained that the subject property belonged to the Heirs of Nivera as early as the 1950s, thereby negating petitioner's claim that it is her family home.

• Execution Against Wrong Party: Whether the Writ of Execution and Demolition was improperly issued against petitioner, who was not impleaded in the original case for recovery of ownership and possession.
• Family Home Exemption: Whether the execution of the final judgment was barred by the claim that the subject property is petitioner's family home exempt from execution.

• Execution Against Wrong Party: No. The issue of petitioner's non-inclusion in the proceedings has long been settled with finality in the prior Petition for Annulment of Judgment, which was dismissed by the CA and affirmed by the Supreme Court. As an heir of the original defendants, petitioner is bound by the judgment rendered against her predecessors-in-interest.
• Family Home Exemption: No. A claim of family home exemption must be set up and proved; petitioner adduced no evidence to substantiate her claim. Her own admissions established that she resides in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, and the RTC's final ruling established that the property belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.

• Execution Against Wrong Party: The matter of whether Felicitas was deprived of due process for not having been impleaded was squarely passed upon by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 95592, which held that the failure to include her was attributable not to the Heirs of Nivera but to the Heirs of Lastimosa themselves, who neglected to include her in their Motion to Substitute. That ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 3, 2009, and became final on October 5, 2009. A judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable and has become the law of the case. Additionally, as an heir of the original defendants, Felicitas is bound by the decision rendered against her predecessors-in-interest, as the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Romualdo and Felisa Lastimosa, making the outcome binding on all heirs or persons claiming rights under them.

• Family Home Exemption: While the family home is indeed a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment, the claim of exemption is not self-executing. It is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that the property is a family home; the claim must be set up and proved. The requisites are: (i) the home was duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the family or any of its beneficiaries, (iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual value not exceeding ₱300,000.00 in urban areas and ₱200,000.00 in rural areas. Residence must be actual, not merely presumptive or constructive. Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim; she admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment of Judgment that she has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, and the address in her petition for review is likewise Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Moreover, the RTC's final ruling established that the subject property had belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s, automatically negating the claim that it is her family home.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when the judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case, regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the prior ruling on Felicitas's non-inclusion, having attained finality, could no longer be relitigated.

• Exceptions to Execution of Final Judgment — A court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, nor may parties object to execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except when: (i) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (ii) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (iii) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (iv) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (v) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation; or (vi) it appears that the writ has been improvidently issued, or is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. The Court found that none of these exceptions availed for Felicitas.

• Family Home Exemption from Execution — The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. However, the claim that property is exempt from execution for being a family home is not self-executing. The claimant must prove the following requisites: (i) the home was duly constituted as a family home; (ii) it was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family; (iii) it is actually resided in by the family or any of its beneficiaries; (iv) it forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family; and (v) its actual value does not exceed ₱300,000.00 in urban areas and ₱200,000.00 in rural areas. Residence must be actual — real or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, presumptive, or constructive. The Court found that Felicitas failed to prove any of these requisites.

• "The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision, encapsulating the core ruling that a family home exemption claim requires affirmative proof and cannot be used as a dilatory device against execution of a final judgment.

• "Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when the judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries." — This passage articulates the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, the foundational principle underlying the Court's refusal to entertain Felicitas's belated challenge to the RTC ruling.

• "it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved." — This formulation establishes the evidentiary burden required for a family home exemption claim, distinguishing bare allegation from substantiated proof.

• Ramos, et al. vs. Pangilinan, et al., 639 Phil. 192 (2010) — Cited as controlling authority for the requisites of a valid family home exemption from execution. The Court relied on this case, which in turn cited Spouses Kelley, Jr. vs. Planters Products, Inc., et al., to lay down the rules relative to levy on execution of the family home, including the requirement that the family home be duly constituted and actually resided in.

• Mayor Vargas, et al. vs. Cajucom, 761 Phil. 43 (2015) — Cited for the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the rule that a court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment. The Court used this case to enumerate the exceptions to execution of final judgments.

• Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Borreta, 519 Phil. 637 (2006) — Cited within Mayor Vargas for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule that parties may not object to execution by raising new issues of fact or law.

• Honrado vs. CA, 512 Phil. 657 (2005) — Cited for the proposition that the claim for family home exemption must be set up and proved, whether premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code.

• Manacop vs. CA, 342 Phil. 735 (1997) — Cited for the requirement that occupancy of the family home must be actual, as opposed to something merely possible, presumptive, or constructive.

• Jose vs. Santos, 592 Phil. 438 (2008) — Cited for the principle that the family home cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

• Article 155, Family Code — Provides that the family home shall be exempt from execution. The Court cited this provision in addressing Felicitas's claim that the subject property was her family home, but clarified that the exemption is not self-executing and must be proven with evidence.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.