Salazar vs. Achacoso

The governing principle is that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, only a judge may issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the Court held that the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of Labor under Article 38(c) of the Labor Code to cause arrest, search, and seizure is unconstitutional and void.

Petitioner Hortencia Salazar was charged with illegal recruitment in a sworn complaint filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Upon verification that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, the POEA Administrator issued a Closure and Seizure Order. A team subsequently implemented the order at petitioner's residence, confiscating assorted costumes from a dance studio operated therein.

• On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed a sworn statement with the POEA, accusing petitioner Hortencia Salazar of illegal recruitment for withholding her PECC Card and failing to deploy her for overseas employment.
• On November 3, 1987, POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 against petitioner, finding she had no valid license and was committing prohibited acts under the Labor Code.
• On January 26, 1988, a POEA team, accompanied by police and media, implemented the order at petitioner's residence. They found and entered the "Hannalie Dance Studio," confiscated assorted costumes, and receipted for them.
• Petitioner alleged the seizure was unlawful, violated due process, and constituted an unreasonable search and seizure of her private residence.

• Petitioner maintained that the Closure and Seizure Order was issued without prior notice or hearing, violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
• Petitioner argued that the implementation of the order constituted an unreasonable search and seizure of her private residence, contravening Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• Petitioner contended that the POEA's actions, lacking a judicial warrant, amounted to robbery and violation of domicile under the Revised Penal Code.

• The Solicitor General, representing respondents, relied on the statutory authority then embodied in Article 38(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018, which empowered the Secretary of Labor to order arrest, search, seizure, and closure in illegal recruitment cases.
• Respondents implicitly argued for the validity of the administrative issuance of such orders as a valid exercise of police power to combat illegal recruitment, a form of economic sabotage.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petition for prohibition was moot, as the acts sought to be prohibited (search and seizure) were already accomplished.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the Secretary of Labor (or POEA Administrator) may validly issue warrants of arrest and search and seizure under Article 38(c) of the Labor Code.

• Procedural: The Court treated the petition as one for certiorari, notwithstanding the fait accompli nature of the acts, due to the grave public interest involved in the constitutional question.
• Substantive: The Court declared Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code unconstitutional. It held that under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge may determine probable cause and issue warrants of arrest or search. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, cannot exercise this power. The Court distinguished the exceptional power of the Executive to order the arrest of aliens for deportation, which is rooted in the supremacy in foreign affairs, and found no analogous justification for the labor secretary's authority.

• Exclusive Judicial Power to Issue Warrants — Under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the power to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest is vested exclusively in judges. The elimination of the phrase "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" from the 1973 Constitution signifies a clear intent to remove this power from non-judicial officers. The Court applied this doctrine to invalidate the grant of such power to the Secretary of Labor.
• General Warrants Prohibition — A search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. A warrant that fails to do so is a general warrant and is constitutionally infirm. The Court found the description in the challenged order ("documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment") to be overly broad and thus a prohibited general warrant.

• "Under the new Constitution... it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." — This passage encapsulates the core constitutional mandate that formed the basis for the Court's ruling.
• "The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments." — The Court used this phrase to characterize the challenged Presidential Decrees, underscoring their incompatibility with the restored constitutional democracy.

• Ponsica v. Ignalaga — Cited to support the interpretation that the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests the power to issue warrants in judges, abrogating prior laws that granted this power to mayors.
• Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the ruling that a prosecutorial body cannot be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine probable cause for arrest or search, and that granting it such power is unconstitutional.
• Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP — Cited for the principle that a warrant describing articles in general terms (e.g., "subversive documents") is an invalid general warrant.
• Morano v. Vivo — Distinguished by the Court. The Solicitor General's reliance on this deportation case was rejected because the President's power to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is an exceptional power rooted in executive supremacy over foreign affairs, not a precedent for granting arrest powers to administrative agencies in domestic matters.

• Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision mandating that only a judge may issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest upon probable cause. This was the central basis for declaring the Labor Code provision unconstitutional.
• Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code — The specific provision, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1920 and 2018, that granted the Secretary of Labor the power to cause arrest, search, seizure, and closure in illegal recruitment cases. Declared unconstitutional and void.