Salas vs. Bunyi-Medina

Habeas corpus is unavailable where the person restrained is detained under process issued by a court with jurisdiction over the case, and the political offense doctrine—which absorbs common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion—requires the accused to prove political motivation before the trial court, rendering premature any double jeopardy determination in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Rodolfo C. Salas was a leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army (CPP-NPA). In 1986, he was indicted for rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1834, which prescribed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. During trial, after Executive Order No. 187 repealed P.D. No. 1834 and restored the lesser penalty of prision mayor, Rodolfo entered a plea bargaining agreement with the prosecution, pleading guilty to rebellion and receiving a sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor. He served this sentence in full and was released in 1992. The plea bargaining agreement expressly stated that Rodolfo would be covered by the Hernandez-Enrile political offense doctrine against being charged for any common crime allegedly committed in furtherance of rebellion. Separately, in August 2006, a mass grave containing at least 67 skeletal remains was discovered at Sitio Mt. Sapang Dako, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte, believed to be victims of the CPP-NPA's "Operation Venereal Disease" spanning 1982 to 1992; 15 of the remains were identified by forensic experts and relatives.

Rodolfo C. Salas was a leader of the CPP-NPA who, in 1986, was indicted for rebellion before the RTC of Manila, Branch 12, under an Amended Information charging him and other CPP-NPA members with publicly taking up arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing it. The Information detailed a series of armed raids, ambushes, liquidations, and kidnappings attributed to the CPP-NPA from 1970 through 1986. Rodolfo was already in detention at the time of the filing of the Information and did not obtain provisional liberty through bail. During the trial, after Executive Order No. 187 repealed P.D. No. 1834 and restored the lesser penalty for rebellion, Rodolfo entered into a plea bargaining agreement with the prosecution, pleading guilty to rebellion under E.O. No. 187. The agreement, embodied in a Joint Manifestation and Motion dated May 9, 1991, expressly stated that Rodolfo would be covered by the mantle of protection of the Hernandez-Enrile political offense doctrine against being charged and prosecuted for any common crime allegedly committed in furtherance of rebellion or subversion. On May 10, 1991, the RTC convicted Rodolfo of rebellion and sentenced him to six years and one day of prision mayor, a fine of ₱6,000, and costs. He served the sentence in full and was released in 1992.

On August 26, 2006, the 43rd Infantry of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave containing at least 67 skeletal remains at Sitio Mt. Sapang Dako, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The remains were believed to belong to victims of the CPP-NPA's "Operation Venereal Disease," which spanned from 1982 until 1992. Among the remains, 15 were identified by forensic experts and their relatives. After a preliminary investigation conducted under I.S. No. 06-116, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte issued a Resolution on February 16, 2007 recommending the filing of murder charges against Rodolfo and 37 other CPP-NPA leaders. On February 20, 2007, an Information was filed charging Rodolfo and his co-accused with 15 counts of murder, alleging that in May and June 1985, at Sitio Mt. Sapang Dako, Inopacan, Leyte, they conspired to abduct, torture, strike, stab, and shoot 15 named victims, inflicting injuries that caused their instantaneous death, and buried them in the mass grave.

The venue of trial was transferred from RTC Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, to the RTC of Manila by an Order dated June 12, 2008. The case was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 08-262163 (formerly H-1581) and 14-306533 to 14-306546 before Branch 32 of the RTC of Manila, presided by respondent Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina. On August 28, 2019, Judge Bunyi-Medina issued a Warrant of Arrest against all accused. On February 18, 2020, Rodolfo was arrested at his residence in Angeles City, Pampanga, and detained at the PNP facility at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The following day, per a Commitment Order dated February 20, 2020, he was transferred to the Manila City Jail Annex in Taguig City. His son, petitioner Jody C. Salas, filed a petition for habeas corpus on March 2, 2020. The Court issued the writ on the same date. During oral arguments on March 12, 2020, Rodolfo was presented before the Court, which denied the application for a TRO or preliminary injunction but granted the alternative prayer for bail, ordering his provisional release upon posting of a ₱200,000 cash bond.

• Habeas Corpus as Proper Remedy: Petitioner argued that habeas corpus is the proper remedy to redress the State's violation of Rodolfo's constitutional rights to due process and against double jeopardy, asserting that there is no plain and speedy remedy other than habeas corpus, and that pursuing remedies before the trial court would amount to additional time for Rodolfo to languish in jail.
• Double Jeopardy and the Political Offense Doctrine: Petitioner maintained that the 1991 plea bargaining agreement expressly covered Rodolfo with the Hernandez-Enrile political offense doctrine, protecting him from being charged for any common crime allegedly committed in furtherance of rebellion. Having already served his sentence for rebellion, Rodolfo can no longer be charged with murder because the crime is deemed absorbed in rebellion, as settled in People vs. Hernandez and Ponce-Enrile vs. Judge Salazar.
• Denial of Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner contended that Rodolfo was never notified of the preliminary investigation in the murder case, violating his right to due process.

• Lawful Process and Presumption of Regularity: Respondents argued that Rodolfo's arrest and subsequent detention were effected through lawful process enjoying the presumption of regularity.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Respondents contended that the petition violates the principle of hierarchy of courts by bypassing remedies readily available before the RTC.
• Political Offense Doctrine Requires Proof: Respondents argued that the political offense doctrine is inapplicable unless and until Rodolfo proves that the acts of murder were committed in furtherance of a political end, which must be raised as a defense during trial with supporting evidence before the court a quo—a factual issue beyond the province of habeas corpus.

• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: Whether the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus lies as the proper remedy for Rodolfo.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether jeopardy attaches, considering the prior conviction of Rodolfo for the crime of rebellion the penalty for which he had already fully served.

• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: No. Habeas corpus does not lie where the person restrained is in custody under process issued by a court with jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Rodolfo's detention was pursuant to a valid Warrant of Arrest and Commitment Order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 32.
• Double Jeopardy: Premature to determine. The political offense doctrine requires the accused to prove before the trial court that the killings were committed in furtherance of a political end, a factual matter that cannot be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.

• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny, serving as a swift remedy in cases of illegal restraint or confinement. However, its scope is considerably narrowed where the detention complained of may be traced to judicial action. Under Rule 102, Section 4, if a person is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court had jurisdiction to issue the process, the writ shall not be allowed. In the present case, an Information for 15 counts of murder was filed before Branch 32 of the RTC of Manila, which thereafter issued a Warrant of Arrest by virtue of which Rodolfo was arrested, and a Commitment Order directing his detention. These issuances are hallmarks of judicial process, and the restraint on Rodolfo's liberty was lawful from the beginning. The Court further noted that it had already granted Rodolfo's alternative prayer for bail, ordering his provisional release upon posting a cash bond, with no restrictions attached to his freedom of action beyond the bail bond requirement. The release of a detained person renders a habeas corpus petition moot and academic. Additionally, the Court rejected the contention that remedies before the RTC—such as a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 3, or a motion for reinvestigation—are inadequate, maintaining faith in the ability of trial court judges to resolve motions with dispatch.

• Double Jeopardy: The political nature or motive behind a crime is not presumed and is not readily accepted as an uncontroverted fact upon the mere assertion of an accused. In People vs. Gempes, the Court held that the burden is on the accused to prove that the killing was committed in furtherance of the resistance movement. In Ocampo vs. Judge Abando, which involved the same criminal cases, the Court declared that the defense that a crime was committed in furtherance of a political end must be raised and proven before the trial court. Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of rebellion, but the determination of whether the killings were motivated by a political end is a question that must be seasonably raised and proven by the accused as a defense before the trial court. It is not the Supreme Court's function to analyze or weigh evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding, as the Court is not a trier of facts. The issue of whether probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest is a question of fact that lies within the ambit of the RTC, in consonance with the principle of hierarchy of courts. Furthermore, the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional, and is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present during trial. It is therefore premature to declare that Rodolfo was deprived of due process during the preliminary investigation or that his indictment for murder violates double jeopardy.

• Habeas Corpus — Unavailability Where Detention Is Under Lawful Judicial Process — The writ of habeas corpus is a summary remedy whose primary purpose is to inquire into the legality of one's detention and to relieve a person from illegal restraint. However, where the person alleged to be restrained is in custody under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, the writ shall not be allowed (Rule 102, Section 4). Supervening events, such as the filing of an Information and issuance of a judicial process, may render lawful a detention that was illegal at its inception, thereby barring habeas corpus relief.

• Political Offense Doctrine (Hernandez-Enrile Doctrine) — Common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of rebellion, and consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal offense. However, the political nature or motive behind a crime is not presumed. The burden is on the accused to prove that the acts were committed in furtherance of a political end, and this must be raised and demonstrated before the trial court during trial, not in a habeas corpus proceeding.

• Mootness of Habeas Corpus Upon Release — The release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders a petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to the release which preclude freedom of action. Where the custodian is no longer detaining or restraining the applicant, the petition should be dismissed.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is not a trial or part thereof but is merely preparatory to trial; its purpose is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused is guilty. The right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional, and is not subject to the same due process requirements applicable during trial.

• "The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity." — This passage defines the proper scope of habeas corpus inquiry, distinguishing it from appellate review and establishing that only jurisdictional nullities, not mere errors, warrant the writ.

• "Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application." — This formulation from Velasco vs. CA articulates the supervening-events doctrine, a critical principle limiting habeas corpus relief where lawful judicial process has intervened after an initially illegal arrest.

• "Under the political offense doctrine, 'common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as 'common' offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.'" — This is the canonical formulation of the political offense doctrine as quoted from Ocampo vs. Judge Abando, defining the relationship between rebellion and common crimes committed in its furtherance.

• "The political nature or motive behind a crime is not presumed. Neither is it readily accepted as an uncontroverted fact upon the mere assertion of an accused." — This statement establishes that political motive is an affirmative defense requiring proof by the accused, not a presumption, and must be demonstrated during trial.

• People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) — Foundational case establishing the political offense doctrine, holding that common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be prosecuted separately. Petitioner invoked it; the Court acknowledged the doctrine but held that its applicability requires factual proof before the trial court.

• Ponce-Enrile vs. Judge Salazar, 264 Phil. 593 (1990) — Applied and reaffirmed the Hernandez political offense doctrine. Petitioner invoked it; the Court did not dispute the doctrine but confined its application to cases where political motive is duly proven during trial.

• IBP vs. Hon. Enrile, 223 Phil. 561 (1985) — Dismissed a habeas corpus petition as moot after an Information for rebellion was filed and a warrant of arrest issued, placing detention under judicial process. Followed as controlling precedent for the proposition that habeas corpus does not lie where detention is pursuant to lawful judicial process.

• Velasco vs. CA, 315 Phil. 757 (1995) — Held that even an illegal arrest is cured by the filing of an Information, rendering habeas corpus unavailable. Followed for the supervening-events doctrine.

• Mangila vs. Judge Pangilinan, 714 Phil. 204 (2013) — Affirmed denial of habeas corpus where the petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge with authority to do so. Followed as analogous precedent.

• Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410 (2005) — Exhaustively discussed the nature and limits of habeas corpus as a summary remedy, not a substitute for appeal or a writ of error. Relied upon for the doctrinal framework governing the writ.

• Ocampo vs. Judge Abando, 726 Phil. 441 (2014) — Involved the same criminal cases; held that the political offense doctrine must be raised and proven as a defense before the trial court, and that the burden of demonstrating political motivation rests on the defense. Followed as directly controlling.

• People vs. Gempes, 83 Phil. 267 (1949) — Held that the burden is on the accused to prove that killings were committed in furtherance of the resistance movement. Cited for the principle that political motive is an affirmative defense.

• Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919) — Defined the essential object and purpose of habeas corpus as inquiry into involuntary restraint. Cited for foundational principles of the writ.

• Rule 102, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that if a person restrained of liberty is in custody under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed; nor shall the rule authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense. Applied as the controlling provision barring the writ where detention rests on a valid Warrant of Arrest and Commitment Order from the RTC.

• Articles 134 and 135, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 187 — Define and penalize the crime of rebellion. E.O. No. 187 repealed P.D. No. 1834 and restored the penalty of prision mayor (six years and one day to twelve years) for rebellion. Applied in Rodolfo's 1991 conviction, which formed the basis of his double jeopardy claim.

• Rule 117, Section 3, Rules of Court — Governs motions to quash a complaint or information. Cited as an available remedy before the trial court that petitioner improperly bypassed by filing habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court.

• Article III, Section 15, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it. Cited as the constitutional basis for the writ.

• Rule 112, Section 6(b), Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes the investigating judge to issue a warrant of arrest during preliminary investigation upon a finding of probable cause. Cited in Mangila vs. Judge Pangilinan as authority for the issuance of a lawful warrant.

Gesmundo, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred. Leonen (Chairperson), J., concurred with a separate opinion, the text of which was not included in the provided case material.