Salapuddin vs. Court of Appeals

Probable cause to indict a person for conspiracy must rest on competent and consistent evidence of an overt act in furtherance of the common design; an extrajudicial confession of a co-accused is inadmissible against the accused under the res inter alios acta rule unless the conspiracy is first established by evidence other than the confession, and mere association, relationship, or ownership of the premises used in the crime does not, without more, constitute an overt act. The determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice is not subject to judicial reversal absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Shortly after adjournment of the House of Representatives session on November 13, 2007, an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle exploded at the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the Batasan Complex in Quezon City. Congressman Wahab Akbar and five others were killed; several others, including two members of Congress, sustained serious injuries. Police investigation traced the motorcycle to Ikram Indama, a former driver of petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin. Raids on an alleged Abu Sayyaf safehouse led to the deaths of three individuals and the arrest of Caidar Aunal, Ikram Indama, and Adham Kusain. During custodial investigation, Ikram executed multiple affidavits, the fourth of which claimed that Salapuddin ordered the killing of Congressman Akbar. Other arrestees initially gave statements mentioning the Hataman brothers but later recanted, alleging torture. The Department of Justice investigating panel recommended indictment of Salapuddin. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed and ordered Salapuddin’s exclusion from the information. The widow and daughter of Congressman Akbar challenged the Secretary’s resolution before the Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari and directed Salapuddin’s inclusion. Salapuddin then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

• The Batasan Bombing: On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day’s session, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The blast killed Congressman Wahab Akbar, Marcial Taldo, Jul-Asiri Hayudini, Maan Gale Bustaliño, and Dennis Manila, and inflicted serious injuries on Representatives Henry Teves and Luzviminda Ilagan, as well as Ismael Lim, Vercita Garcia, Kumhar Indanan, Larry Noda, and Paula Dunga. Post-blast investigation determined that the explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle parked near the entrance stairs.

• Raid and Arrests: Acting on confidential information that the person who parked the motorcycle was staying with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse at Parkwood Hills, Payatas, Quezon City on November 15, 2007. A firefight ensued during the raid, resulting in the deaths of three persons: Bong (an ASG member with standing warrants of arrest), Redwan Indama, and Saing Indama. Caidar Aunal, Ikram Indama, and Adham Kusain were arrested and brought to Camp Crame. Seized from the premises were two Cal. 45 pistols, one of which was traced to Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin; an HOR ID issued to Ikram; and a black wallet containing a GSIS ID issued to Aunal with calling cards of Salapuddin.

• Kusain’s Statement: On November 16, 2007, Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that he was from Tipo-Tipo, Basilan and stayed in Salapuddin’s house upon first arriving in Manila, as Salapuddin was his father’s friend. Salapuddin paid for one year of his college education and helped him get employed. He explained that Redwan took his black XRM Honda motorcycle on November 2, 2007 without disclosing its purpose, and he learned only after the raid that his motorcycle was the one used in the bombing.

• Ikram’s Initial Affidavits: On November 16, 2007, Ikram executed his first affidavit. He stated that he had been Salapuddin’s driver since July 2002 and had stayed at Salapuddin’s house at Greenbucks, Filinvest St., Batasan Hills. He returned to Manila on October 16, 2007. He recounted that on October 9, 2007, his cousin Redwan told him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar by means of a bomb on a motorcycle, but Redwan did not reveal the reason for the mission or the identity of the person who gave the order. Ikram narrated that the planning occurred at Greenbucks with Redwan, Saing, Bong, Aunal, and Kusain. On November 13, 2007, he parked the motorcycle with the bomb near the South Wing lobby at a spot reserved by Jang, who later detonated it by calling a cellphone attached to the bomb. Importantly, Ikram explicitly stated that he did not know who ordered the killing.

• Ikram’s Second and Third Affidavits: At 8:00 a.m. on November 18, 2007, Ikram executed his first supplemental affidavit (second affidavit), narrating that the plan was hatched on the night of October 17, 2007 at Greenbucks; they shopped for bomb materials in Raon, Quiapo on October 19, 2007; Bong made the bomb and placed it in the motorcycle toolbox at Greenbucks. At 6:00 p.m. that same day, Ikram executed his second supplemental affidavit (third affidavit), adding that on October 13, 2007, before leaving for Manila, they passed by Gersal Hardware owned by Salapuddin in Zamboanga City, where one Bayan Judda handed them a bag containing explosives; Bong made two bombs—one for the Batasan and another for Congressman Akbar’s Valle Verde house or Ortigas condo; Hajarun Jamiri arrived at Greenbucks on October 22, 2007 on a black Suzuki motorcycle and had the second bomb fitted. Neither of these affidavits mentioned Salapuddin’s involvement.

• Ikram’s Fourth Affidavit (November 20, 2007): Ikram’s narration fundamentally changed. In his third supplemental affidavit (fourth affidavit), he alleged that in September 2007, before Ramadan, Salapuddin asked him to fetch Redwan, and Ikram was beside Redwan when Salapuddin ordered: “Pateyun si Cong. Wahab Akbar.” Ikram further stated that he and Redwan met with Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman at Figaro Café in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth Avenue, where Jim Hataman spoke of the plan to kill Congressman Akbar, and later met Congressman Mujiv Hataman at his house in Filinvest II, Batasan Hills, where Congressman Hataman ordered Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar.

• Ikram’s Fifth Affidavit (January 10, 2008): Ikram amended dates, moving the timeline back by at least a month: he and Redwan saw each other again on September 5, 2007; Redwan talked of the mission on September 8, 2007; they started for Manila on September 8, 2007 and dropped by Gersal Hardware then; they returned to Manila on September 11, 2007; Bong made the bomb on September 13, 2007; they planned the bombing on September 17, 2007 and shopped in Raon on September 19, 2007. Jamiri allegedly went to Greenbucks on September 17, 2007, and Ikram saw Congressman Hataman in September 2007.

• Statements of Other Arrestees: Jamiri, arrested on November 19, 2007 for illegal possession of firearm, executed an affidavit on November 20, 2007 stating that during Ramadan in October, he brought a Suzuki motorcycle to Greenbucks at Redwan’s instruction, Redwan placed a bomb inside, and Jamiri was given PhP 50,000 with a promise of PhP 500,000 if the bomb was used to kill Congressman Akbar at Sulo Hotel. In a supplemental affidavit, he added that he met Congressman Hataman and Jim Hataman at Figaro Café in late October 2007, and they asked him to help Redwan’s “project.” Jamiri later led police to the bomb in Leveriza Street, Malate. Aunal, on November 22, 2007, stated he left Basilan on October 13, 2007 with Ikram, Redwan, and Bong; he saw Bong assemble two bombs and heard Bong say the target was Congressman Akbar; he heard Jim Hataman order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar at Figaro Café in October 2007. Neither Jamiri nor Aunal implicated Salapuddin.

• Salapuddin’s Voluntary Statement: On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn statement denying any knowledge of the bombing. He acknowledged that Ikram was his former driver, Aunal was his former brother-in-law, and Kusain had once sought his help for employment. He clarified that his house at Greenbucks was used by constituents, including Kusain and Ikram, as temporary shelter whenever they were in Manila.

• Torture Allegations and Recantations: On December 1, 4, and 7, 2007, Dr. Benito Molino, with Commission on Human Rights investigators, conducted medical examinations of Kusain, Aunal, and Jamiri. Dr. Molino found that the detainees were subjected to physical and mental torture; Jamiri’s injuries were consistent with his claim of being beaten and having electric current applied to his private parts during interrogation. On December 10, 2007, Jamiri executed an affidavit withdrawing his previous statements, alleging he was blindfolded, tortured, and forced to sign an affidavit he did not understand. On December 12, 2007, Kusain and Aunal executed recantations, stating they were coerced through physical and psychological torture and assisted by counsel not of their own choice. Ikram later filed recantations on October 6, 2008 and November 11, 2008, claiming he was tortured and forced to implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several Basilan mayors due to political rivalry.

• DOJ Proceedings: Based on the affidavits of Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent Asher Dolina requested the inclusion of Salapuddin, the Hataman brothers, and PO1 Bayan Judda. The DOJ Investigating Panel’s Supplemental Resolution dated February 22, 2008 recommended the inclusion of Salapuddin, stating that his participation “cannot be downplayed” because “the circumstances, the people and place used are all, in one way or another, associated with him.” The same resolution dismissed charges against the Hataman brothers and Julham Kunam, reasoning that “apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement in the crime.” Salapuddin appealed to the Secretary of Justice.

• Secretary of Justice’s Resolution (April 23, 2008): The Secretary of Justice modified the Supplemental Resolution and excluded Salapuddin from the information. The Secretary found that the only material evidence was Ikram’s statements, which were “laden with irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions” and unworthy of belief; there was no evidence Salapuddin performed any overt act; and the statements of other accused were obtained through force and intimidation and were later recanted. Salapuddin’s counter-affidavit denying involvement was given credence.

• Court of Appeals Decision: In CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Secretary’s resolution. The CA granted the petition and set aside the Secretary’s resolution. The appellate court ruled that the “totality of the evidence” sufficiently indicated Salapuddin lent moral and material support to the crime, that matters of admissibility and credibility are best determined at trial, and that the recantations and torture claims were of little probative value as unsupported by competent proof.

• Inadmissibility of Co-Accused’s Confession: Petitioner contended that the sole direct evidence against him was Ikram’s extrajudicial confession, which was inadmissible against him under the res inter alios acta rule because it bound only the confessant and could not be used absent prior independent proof of conspiracy.

• Inherent Inconsistencies: Petitioner argued that Ikram’s affidavits were riddled with material contradictions and inconsistencies—including his initial categorical denial of knowledge of the mastermind—rendering them incapable of supporting a finding of probable cause.

• Absence of Overt Act: Petitioner maintained that no evidence showed he performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy; his mere relationship or association with the arrested persons, or his ownership of the house where some of them stayed, did not constitute participation in the crime.

• Recantations and Torture: Petitioner highlighted that the extrajudicial admissions of Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain were extracted through torture, were recanted, and were substantiated by independent medical findings, thus could not be considered competent evidence.

• No Grave Abuse by the Secretary: Petitioner insisted that the Secretary of Justice’s resolution rested on a judicious assessment of the evidence and correct application of the rules, so the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own judgment absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Trial Court’s Primacy on Evidence: Respondents argued that questions of admissibility and credibility of evidence are properly resolved during trial, not at the preliminary investigation stage.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondents claimed that the totality of evidence demonstrated petitioner’s involvement, as he lent moral and material support to the perpetrators, and that such support constituted an overt act of conspiracy.

• Validity of Recantations: Respondents asserted that the recantations of Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain carried little probative value because they were unsupported by competent proof.

• Evasion as Evidence of Guilt: In opposing the motion for reconsideration, respondents pointed to petitioner’s evasion from arrest as indicative of guilt.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to indict Salapuddin.

• Res Inter Alios Acta: Whether the extrajudicial confession of Ikram Indama implicating Salapuddin was admissible against Salapuddin under the res inter alios acta rule.

• Establishing Probable Cause for Conspiracy: Whether, apart from Ikram’s confession, there existed sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause that Salapuddin participated in a conspiracy.

• Reliance on Inconsistent and Recanted Statements: Whether the irreconcilably inconsistent and recanted statements of the other accused could support a finding of probable cause against Salapuddin.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion attended the Secretary of Justice’s resolution. The Court of Appeals did not explain how the Secretary’s decision was capricious or arbitrary; it merely substituted its own appreciation of the evidence. The determination of probable cause is an executive function vested in prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice, subject to judicial review only upon clear and patent showing of grave abuse of discretion—a standard not met in this case.

• Res Inter Alios Acta: Ikram’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against Salapuddin. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant and is hearsay as to co-accused. The exception in Section 30, Rule 130—allowing the declaration of a conspirator against a co-conspirator—requires that the conspiracy first be established by evidence other than the declaration itself. No such independent evidence was presented.

• Establishing Probable Cause for Conspiracy: No competent evidence independent of Ikram’s confession demonstrated Salapuddin’s participation in a conspiracy. Mere association with the persons arrested, ownership of the house where they stayed, or relationship to them, without more, does not prove conspiracy. The prosecution failed to identify any overt act performed by Salapuddin in furtherance of the common design. The investigating prosecutors’ own reasoning for dismissing charges against the Hataman brothers—that mere mention without other evidence was insufficient—applied with greater force to Salapuddin, who was named only by Ikram and not by the other arrested persons.

• Reliance on Inconsistent and Recanted Statements: The numerous inconsistencies in Ikram’s affidavits, including his initial denial of knowledge of the mastermind and irreconcilable dates, undermined the reliability of his statements. The discrepancies between his version and the accounts of Aunal, Jamiri, and the defense witness further eroded the foundation for probable cause. The recantations, supported by medical findings of torture, lent credence to the claim that the statements were not voluntarily given. At the preliminary investigation stage, only constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent, and material evidence may be considered; the evidence against Salapuddin failed this threshold.

• Secretary of Justice’s Power of Control (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals) — The Secretary of Justice exercises direct control and supervision over prosecutors and may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings. His resolution may not be disturbed by courts absent grave abuse of discretion. The power extends to directing the filing or dismissal of the complaint or information.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Standard — Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty.

• Res Inter Alios Acta Rule (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court) — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is hearsay as against co-accused. The exception under Sec. 30, Rule 130 (admission by conspirator) applies only after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than the declarant’s statement.

• Proof of Conspiracy — Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, not mere inferences, conjectures, or speculation. To be held liable as a conspirator, the accused must have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the common design. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval, without active cooperation, does not suffice; relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy. The overt act may consist of moral assistance, such as being present at the commission of the crime or exerting moral ascendancy, but such assistance must be linked to the actual commission.

• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigation — Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent and relevant evidence. Prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through evidence and file only such charges as the evidence and inferences can properly warrant. The objective is to protect persons from the expense, ignominy, and stress of defending groundless charges and to guard the State against prosecuting frivolous suits.

• Crespo v. Mogul Doctrine — The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal, who may or may not file the complaint or information according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not. Prosecuting officers have both the authority and the duty not to prosecute when the evidence does not establish a prima facie case.

• “Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.”

• “Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.”

• “In finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of.”

• Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 — Established the principle that the filing of criminal charges lies within the sound discretion of the public prosecutor, whose determination should be accorded respect. Followed.

• Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 — Defined the Secretary of Justice’s power of control and supervision over prosecutors and the standard for judicial review of his resolutions. Applied.

• Tamargo v. Awingan, 610 SCRA 316 — Elaborated on the res inter alios acta rule and the requirement of prior independent evidence of conspiracy before a co-conspirator’s declaration becomes admissible. Applied to bar Ikram’s confession against Salapuddin.

• People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA 40 — Cited by the Court of Appeals but distinguished; the Supreme Court clarified that moral assistance as an overt act requires presence at the locus criminis, which was completely absent in Salapuddin’s case.

• People v. Elijorde, 306 SCRA 188 — Reiterated that an overt act in furtherance of the complicity is indispensable to establish conspiracy. Applied.

• People v. Huang Zhen Hua, 439 SCRA 350 — Held that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the illegal act, without cooperation, does not prove conspiracy. Applied.

• Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court (Res Inter Alios Acta) — “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.” Applied to exclude Ikram’s extrajudicial confession from evidence against Salapuddin.

• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court (Admission by Conspirator) — “The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.” Held inapplicable because no independent evidence of Salapuddin’s participation in the conspiracy existed.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Empowers the Secretary of Justice to reverse or modify the investigating prosecutor’s resolution and direct the dismissal of the complaint or information. Applied.

• Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV and Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Revised Administrative Code — Define the Secretary of Justice’s supervision and control over prosecutors, including the authority to review, approve, reverse, or modify their decisions. Applied.

Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen concurred.