Saguiguit vs. People of the Philippines

The gravamen of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check and putting it in circulation; the offense is malum prohibitum, and the purpose for which the check was issued, or the agreement surrounding its issuance, is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the issuer. Where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone is the more appropriate penalty under SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, penalizes the making and issuance of checks drawn against insufficient or closed accounts, and Section 1 thereof prescribes imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, or both such fine and imprisonment. In SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, dated November 21, 2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, dated February 14, 2001, the Court laid down a rule of preference in the application of those penalties, providing that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered the more appropriate penalty. Those circulars, which took effect while petitioner Nieves A. Saguiguit's convictions were pending review, furnished the framework for the penalty ultimately imposed.

In eight separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233, Nieves A. Saguiguit was charged with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The informations were identical as to the elements of the offense charged and differed only as regards the respective amounts and due dates of the check involved in each case. Each alleged that on or about the first week of April 1991, in Angeles City, Saguiguit willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously drew and issued to complainant Elmer Evangelista a Traders Royal Bank check, well knowing and without informing the complainant that she had no sufficient funds with the drawee bank; that the check, when deposited for payment, was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED"; and that demand notwithstanding for more than five days from notice of dishonor, she failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to redeem the check, to the damage and prejudice of Evangelista.

The eight checks were dishonored for the stated reason and were not redeemed within the period fixed by law after notice of dishonor. The case proceeded to trial on the informations as thus framed.

Petitioner's version of the facts was that her transaction was only with a certain Bernadette Montes and not with private complainant Elmer Evangelista. She accordingly contested her liability on the ground that the party with whom she had dealt was not the complainant named in the informations. The Court later observed that, in net effect, what she did was to borrow from Ruiz, and that she issued eight bouncing checks that went into circulation.

The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty as charged in each of the eight informations, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. What mattered to the Supreme Court's analysis was the undisputed fact that eight checks drawn and issued by petitioner went into circulation and were dishonored, and that no redemption followed despite demand — a factual setting that held true even on petitioner's own account of her transaction.

• Legislative Intent and Mens Rea: Petitioner argued that the case called for a reexamination and modification, if not abandonment, of the rulings to the effect that the mere issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties. She submitted that it was not the intention of the lawmaking body to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal offense, and that there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, with the subject check issued to apply on account or for value.
• Review of the CA's Findings of Fact: Petitioner argued that the case called for a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals as an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45, submitting that the CA's findings of fact were not supported by evidence and differed from those of the Regional Trial Court.
• Identity of the Party Transacted With: Petitioner maintained that her transaction was only with a certain Bernadette Montes and not with private complainant Elmer Evangelista, thereby putting in issue the identity of the payee and the true nature of the transaction underlying the checks.

• Recommendation of the Solicitor General on Penalty: The Solicitor General, in its Comment, recommended that the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals and Lim vs. People — of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness — be considered in favor of petitioner, who was not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist.

• Mens Rea and Intent under B.P. Blg. 22: Whether the rulings holding that the mere issuance of a check subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable under B.P. Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties should be reexamined, modified, or abandoned, such that intent to commit the prohibited act and issuance of the check on account or for value must be established.
• Review of Findings of Fact: Whether the Court may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 45.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals should be modified pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001.

• Mens Rea and Intent under B.P. Blg. 22: No. The rulings were not disturbed, B.P. Blg. 22 being a malum prohibitum statute whose gravamen is the mere act of making and issuing a worthless check and putting it in circulation; the policy or wisdom of the law is a matter addressed to Congress, not to the courts.
• Review of Findings of Fact: No. The Court is not a trier of facts, and no ground was shown to bring the case within the recognized exceptions; in any event, even on petitioner's own version she issued eight bouncing checks that went into circulation.
• Penalty: Yes. Pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the penalty of imprisonment was deleted and a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in each case was imposed, with subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding six months in each case in the event of insolvency.

• Mens Rea and Intent under B.P. Blg. 22: At its most basic, the petition asked the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within the domain of Congress. Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it; courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. While the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and strike them down if proven infirm, that power does not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. Petitioner made no attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, so her last and only remaining remedy was to seek an amendment of the law in question, a matter addressed to Congress, the legislature being the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law. As to the call for modification or abandonment of the rulings on liability regardless of intent, the Court invoked Article 8 of the Civil Code, under which judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws form part of the legal system of the Philippines, and the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere: when the Court lays down a principle of law applicable to a certain set of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts in issue are substantially the same, lest the ideal of a stable jurisprudential system never be achieved. The principle underlying the concept of mala prohibita, the Court noted, is the stare decisis governing a long history of cases involving violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. Quoting Ruiz vs. People, the Court reiterated that the gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment and putting them in circulation; that the law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor, a practice deemed a public nuisance and a crime against public order to be abated; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is covered by B.P. 22, a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The effects of issuing a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties, the mischief created being not only a wrong to the payee or holder but also an injury to the public, since the harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system, and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. While whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent, to be ascertained in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances through the purpose test and the proceeds test when the intent does not appear on the face of the check, what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; the mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22, and the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.
• Review of Findings of Fact: The Court declined to grant the call for review of the CA's findings of fact, restating the basic rule that the Court is not a trier of facts. Even granting arguendo that petitioner's version of the facts was true — that her transaction was only with a certain Bernadette Montes and not with private complainant Elmer Evangelista — the hard fact remained that she issued eight bouncing checks that went into circulation; in net effect, what she did was to borrow from Ruiz, to pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injuring the banking system, and eventually hurting the welfare of society and the public interest.
• Penalty: Although the conviction was affirmed, the Court deemed it proper to modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and effectively sustained by the CA, pursuant to the policy established under SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 dated November 21, 2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 imposes imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, the Court modified the sentence for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine double the amount of the check, reasoning that the petitioners were first-time offenders, Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy, and that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law were observed — that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In Lim vs. People, the Court En Banc, applying Vaca, likewise deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22. Under SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered the more appropriate penalty, the determination resting solely upon the judge; should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, the circular ought not to be deemed a hindrance. It is thus understood that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty; that judges may, in the exercise of sound discretion and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; and that should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay it, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. Although the decisions of the trial court and the CA were promulgated before SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 and its clarificatory circular took effect, there was no legal impediment to their application, favorable as they are to the accused. The pleadings contained no indication that petitioner was a habitual delinquent or recidivist, a circumstance strongly arguing for the application, as in Young vs. Court of Appeals, of the latest stare decisis towards modifying the penalties imposable. Quoting Lee vs. Court of Appeals, an earlier case likewise on all fours, the Court found that the penalty imposed by the CA should be modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine.

• Mala prohibita — Offenses prohibited by statute and punished regardless of the actor's intent; the prohibited act itself constitutes the offense, and malice or criminal intent is not an element. The Court held that B.P. Blg. 22 defines a malum prohibitum offense whose gravamen is the act of making and issuing a worthless check and putting it in circulation, so that the purpose for which the check was issued, or the agreement surrounding its issuance, is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the issuer. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22.
• Stare decisis et non quieta movere — A principle of law laid down by the Court applicable to a certain set of facts must be adhered to and applied to all future cases where the facts in issue are substantially the same; otherwise the ideal of a stable jurisprudential system can never be achieved. Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court applied the doctrine in declining petitioner's invitation to abandon the long line of rulings holding issuers of worthless checks liable regardless of intent, describing the principle underlying mala prohibita as the stare decisis governing a long history of B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
• Separation of powers and judicial restraint on questions of legislative policy — Under the allocation of powers among the three great branches of government, only the Legislature may remedy a deficiency in the law, if any, by proper amendment; the judiciary may interpret and apply the law and may strike it down if constitutionally infirm, but it may not amend or repeal it, read into it what is not written therein, or pass upon its necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency. The Court invoked the doctrine to reject petitioner's challenge to the policy behind B.P. Blg. 22, noting that she made no attempt to challenge its constitutionality, and that the legislature is the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.
• Rule of preference in the application of the penalties under B.P. Blg. 22 (SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001) — The circulars do not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 but lay down a rule of preference: where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered the more appropriate penalty. The determination rests solely upon the judge, who may still impose imprisonment if a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; and should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay it, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. The rule was applied in petitioner's favor, she not being shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist, and its application was held proper notwithstanding that the lower court decisions were promulgated before the circulars took effect, they being favorable to the accused.
• Purpose test and proceeds test in determining accommodation party status — Whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent; when the intent of the parties does not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the tests applied being the purpose test and the proceeds test. The Court nonetheless held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to a prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22, since what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

• "At its most basic, what the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within the domain of Congress." — This passage states the threshold ground for rejecting petitioner's challenge to the Bouncing Checks Law and articulates the Court's stance on judicial restraint over questions of legislative policy.
• "Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Let the decision stand and disturb not what is already settled. The doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary and necessary rule. When the Court lays down a principle of law applicable to a certain set of facts, it must adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts in issue are substantially the same." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the doctrine of stare decisis in this decision, invoked to justify continued adherence to the rulings on liability under B.P. Blg. 22 regardless of intent.
• "What the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner." — This passage, quoted from Ruiz vs. People, supplies the ratio decidendi on the nature of the offense and the irrelevance of the underlying agreement to criminal liability.
• "The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22." — This passage defines the operative effect of the administrative circulars and is the controlling formulation for the penalty ultimately imposed on petitioner.

• Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323 — Cited in Ruiz vs. People as the source of the characterization of B.P. Blg. 22 as a malum prohibitum offense; relied upon for the proposition that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is covered by the law.
• Ruiz vs. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476 — Quoted at length and treated as controlling; the Court adopted its holdings that the gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check and putting it in circulation, that the offense is malum prohibitum, and that the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to prosecution and conviction.
• Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131714, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 656 — The origin of the policy of deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine double the amount of the check for first-time offenders under B.P. Blg. 22; the Court applied its philosophy of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.
• Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 497 — The Supreme Court En Banc, applying Vaca, deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22; cited as reinforcing the penalty policy applied to petitioner.
• Young vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 109 — Cited for the application of the latest stare decisis in modifying the penalties imposable under B.P. Blg. 22.
• Lee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455 — Described as an earlier case likewise on all fours; quoted for the disposition deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine in light of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 as clarified by No. 13-2001.
• Josef vs. People, G.R. No. 146424, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 417 — Cited in connection with the rule of preference under the administrative circulars and the availability of subsidiary imprisonment where only a fine is imposed.
• Go vs. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 451 — Cited for the proposition that the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge, and that imprisonment is not foreclosed.
• Paloma vs. Mora, G.R. No. 157783, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 711 — Cited for the doctrine of separation of powers and the impropriety of judicial inquiry into the wisdom of a statute.
• Agote vs. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 60 — Cited for the rule that the judiciary cannot encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers and cannot read into the law what is not written therein.
• Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 436 — Cited for the principle that the legislature is the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.
• Ladanga vs. Aseneta, G.R. No. 145874, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 381 — Cited for the formulation of the doctrine of stare decisis and the need for a stable jurisprudential system.

• Article 8, Civil Code — Provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court cited this provision as the statutory anchor of the doctrine of stare decisis, which it applied in refusing to abandon the rulings holding issuers of worthless checks liable regardless of intent.
• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The provision supplied the range within which the modified penalty was fixed.
• Paragraph 2, Article 39, Revised Penal Code — Governs subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Court applied it in the dispositive portion by providing that petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding six months in each case should she be unable to pay the fine imposed.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, which may raise only questions of law. The provision framed the procedural posture of the case and supported the Court's refusal to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
• Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution — Requires that the conclusions of the Court in a decision be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to the writer of the opinion. The provision is the basis of the certification appended to the decision.

• Reynato S. Puno (Acting Chief Justice, Chairperson; the decision carries the notation "(on official leave)")
• Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez
• Renato C. Corona
• Adolfo S. Azcuna