Saburnido vs. Madroño

A lawyer who, motivated by vindictiveness, files multiple complaints against individuals who were instrumental in his prior dismissal from the judiciary commits gross misconduct that reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law, in violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and may be suspended from the practice of law.

Complainants Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido—a Philippine National Police member and a public school teacher, respectively—had earlier filed administrative cases against respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño while he served as judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental. Those cases led to respondent’s dismissal from the judiciary and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. Following his removal, respondent brought several administrative and criminal actions against complainants. Complainants thereafter instituted the present disbarment complaint, alleging that respondent’s successive complaints were a form of harassment and retaliation.

• Prior Administrative Cases Against Respondent: Complainants had earlier filed administrative charges that resulted in respondent’s removal from the bench. In A.M. No. MTJ-90-383, respondent was found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at Venustiano Saburnido—who was unarmed—during an altercation; he was dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment but without forfeiture of retirement benefits. In the consolidated cases Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC, and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486, respondent was found guilty of granting and reducing bail without notifying the prosecution, and of mishandling confiscated smuggled goods deposited in his court (allowing unauthorized withdrawal without receipts, resulting in loss or substitution of goods); his retirement benefits were forfeited.
• Complaints Filed by Respondent Against Complainants: After his dismissal, respondent initiated the following actions against the spouses:
  • Adm. Case No. 90-0755 against Venustiano Saburnido for serious irregularity, alleging that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who then extorted money from jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
  • Adm. Case No. 90-0758 against Venustiano Saburnido and two others for falsification, averring that they inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustiano’s firearm.
  • Criminal Case No. 93-67 against Venustiano Saburnido for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that Venustiano, without superior’s permission, took custody of a prisoner by final judgment who later escaped.
  • Adm. Case No. 95-33 against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that she served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors in the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay councilor. At the time the disbarment complaint was filed, the three cases against Venustiano had been dismissed; the case against Rosalia remained pending.
• Allegations of Harassment and Damages: Complainants alleged that respondent filed those cases in retaliation because their earlier administrative complaints had caused his dismissal. They claimed the successive complaints caused them moral, mental, physical, and financial injury, including the interruption of their children’s education as family funds were diverted to litigation expenses.
• Respondent’s Defense: Respondent contended that the grounds for his dismissal and forfeiture of benefits did not involve moral turpitude, hence they could not support disbarment. He maintained that none of the complaints he filed was manufactured, attributing the dismissal of the serious irregularity charge to Venustiano’s antedating of a police blotter entry and pointing out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped under his watch. Regarding the case against Rosalia, respondent argued that she sought to deprive him of his right to report an Election Code violation.
• IBP Investigation and Recommendation: At the IBP hearing, respondent and his counsel failed to appear despite notice; he was deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and did not submit a memorandum. After evaluating complainant’s evidence, the IBP concluded that respondent committed gross misconduct and recommended a one-year suspension.

• Moral Turpitude: Respondent argued that the administrative charges that led to his dismissal from the judiciary and the forfeiture of his benefits did not involve moral turpitude and, therefore, could not serve as grounds for his disbarment.
• Genuineness of Complaints: He insisted that the complaints he filed against complainants were not manufactured; he claimed that the dismissal of the serious irregularity case was due to Venustiano’s antedating of a police blotter entry, and noted that Venustiano had been suspended after a prisoner escaped during his watch.
• Right to Report Election Violation: With respect to the complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent maintained that by raising the matter in the disbarment proceeding, she sought to deprive him of his right to bring an alleged violation of the Election Code to the attention of proper authorities.

• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent’s act of filing multiple complaints against complainants, after complainants had been instrumental in his dismissal from the judiciary, constituted gross misconduct warranting disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the extreme penalty of disbarment or a lesser period of suspension was the appropriate sanction.

• Gross Misconduct: Respondent’s filing of multiple complaints was deemed gross misconduct. The repeated actions evinced vindictiveness and a desire to exact revenge, not the legitimate pursuit of grievances. Such conduct violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in behavior that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, and constituted gross misconduct within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Proper Penalty: A one-year suspension, as recommended by the IBP, was imposed instead of disbarment. Disbarment is the supreme penalty, reserved for clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Where a lesser penalty suffices to protect the public and the legal profession, disbarment should not be decreed. Suspension served the protective purpose of the disciplinary proceedings.

• Discipline for Any Unfitting Conduct — A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue as an officer of the court. Respondent’s vindictive filings demonstrated such unfitness and fell within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
• Vindictive Litigation as Gross Misconduct — The filing of multiple complaints against individuals who were instrumental in a lawyer’s prior dismissal from office, when motivated by revenge rather than by a genuine effort to vindicate rights, constitutes gross misconduct in violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Proportionality in Lawyer Discipline — Disbarment is the ultimate penalty, meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the lawyer’s standing and character. Suspension is not primarily punitive but a means to protect the public and the legal profession; a lesser penalty should be imposed where it will accomplish the desired end.

• “A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.” — This broad statement underpins the Court’s disciplinary authority and was applied to respondent’s post-judicial conduct.
• “We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.” — The passage distinguishes vindictive litigation from legitimate legal recourse.
• “The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney … we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.” — This articulates the standard for disbarment versus suspension.
• “Suspension … is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.” — The protective rationale for the sanction imposed.

• Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr., et al., A.C. No. 3910, August 14, 2000 — Followed; for the principle that a lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct rendering him unfit as an officer of the court.
• Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, 293 SCRA 331 (1998) — Followed; for the rule that disbarment is reserved for clear cases of serious misconduct affecting the lawyer’s standing and character.
• Magat v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. L-43301-45662, 97 SCRA 1 (1980) — Followed; for the proposition that suspension is a protective measure, not primarily punitive.

• Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Imposes on every lawyer the duty to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times.
• Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Expressly prohibits conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law or scandalous behavior that discredits the profession. Respondent’s retaliatory complaints were held to violate this rule.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension, including gross misconduct. Respondent’s vindictive course of filing was deemed gross misconduct within the contemplation of this provision.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.