Sablas vs. Sablas

A trial court may admit an answer filed beyond the reglementary period if no motion to declare the defendant in default has yet been filed and no prejudice or intent to delay is shown, as courts cannot motu proprio declare a party in default.

Respondents Esterlita and Rodulfo Sablas filed a complaint for judicial partition, inventory, and accounting against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma Sablas in the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte. Petitioners were served with summons and requested an extension to file their answer. They filed the answer three days after the extended deadline. The trial court admitted the answer, noting no motion to declare petitioners in default had been filed at the time of submission. Respondents subsequently filed a motion to declare petitioners in default, which the trial court denied.

• The Complaint: Respondents Esterlita and Rodulfo Sablas filed a complaint for judicial partition, inventory, and accounting against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma Sablas in the RTC of Baybay, Leyte on October 1, 1999.
• The Delayed Answer: Petitioners were served with summons on October 6, 1999. On October 21, 1999, they filed a motion for a 15-day extension to file their answer, moving the deadline to November 5, 1999. The answer was filed on November 8, 1999, three days late.
• The Default Motion: On November 9, 1999, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in default, alleging they were unaware the answer had already been mailed. The trial court admitted the late answer and denied the motion to declare default in an order dated December 6, 1999, finding no intent to delay.

• Misconstruction of the Rules of Court: Petitioners argued the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court was compelled to declare them in default, misconstruing Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
• Contravention of Jurisprudence: Petitioners maintained that jurisprudence prohibits courts from declaring default motu proprio and allows the admission of late answers filed before any default motion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents argued the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the late answer, asserting that the failure to answer within the reglementary period left the trial court with no recourse but to declare petitioners in default.

• Admissibility of Late Answer: Whether a trial court may admit an answer filed beyond the reglementary period when no motion to declare default has yet been filed.
• Motu Proprio Declaration of Default: Whether a trial court can motu proprio declare a defendant in default.
• Default After Answer: Whether a defending party can be declared in default after their answer has already been filed and admitted.

• Admissibility of Late Answer: An answer filed beyond the reglementary period may be admitted if filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice or intent to delay is shown. Trial courts possess discretion to extend the time for filing an answer or to allow an answer after the reglementary period pursuant to Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court.
• Motu Proprio Declaration of Default: A trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default. Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires a motion from the claiming party with notice to the defending party, ensuring the court does not act as counsel for the plaintiff.
• Default After Answer: A defending party cannot be declared in default once their answer has been filed and admitted. Declaring a party in default after an answer has been filed constitutes grave abuse of discretion, the policy of the law favoring the resolution of cases on the merits.

• Doctrine of Default — Default requires three elements: (1) valid acquisition of jurisdiction over the defending party; (2) failure to answer within the time allowed; (3) filing of a motion to declare default by the claiming party with notice to the defending party. Courts cannot motu proprio declare default. An answer filed out of time may be admitted if no default motion has been filed and there is no intent to delay. Once an answer is filed, a party can no longer be declared in default.

• "The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the reglementary period."
• "Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted."

• Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr., 225 Phil. 397 (1986) — Followed: It is error to declare a defending party in default after the answer has been filed.
• Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, 04 April 2001, 356 SCRA 367 — Followed: Declaring a defending party in default despite the filing of an answer constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
• De los Santos v. Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 390 — Followed: Cited for the three requirements before a court can declare a defending party in default.

• Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court — Governs declaration of default. Applied to emphasize that default requires a motion from the claiming party with notice to the defending party; courts cannot act motu proprio.
• Section 11, Rule 11, Rules of Court — Governs extension of time to plead. Applied to show the trial court's discretion to extend time or allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the rules.

Reynato S. Puno, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Cancio C. Garcia