Sabili vs. COMELEC

A candidate for local elective office need not own property in the locality to establish residence or domicile of choice; actual physical presence coupled with conduct indicative of intent to remain, even in a house owned by another or a common-law spouse, may suffice — and the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion when it uses wrong or irrelevant considerations, such as requiring property ownership or disregarding admissible official certifications, in evaluating whether a candidate met the one-year residency requirement.

Meynardo Sabili is a seasoned politician who was twice elected (1995 and 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas, a district that includes Lipa City. His domicile of origin was Barangay Sico, San Juan, Batangas. During the 2007 elections, he ran for Representative of the 4th District of Batangas but lost; at that time, he and his family were staying at his ancestral home in San Juan. He claims to have transferred his residence to Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City in April 2007, where he lived with his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares, in a house and lot registered in her name. The one-year residency requirement for local elective officials is imposed by Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code, while the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentation is governed by Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Meynardo Sabili is a politician whose domicile of origin is Barangay Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He was twice elected as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas in 1995 and 1998. During the 2007 elections, he ran for Representative of the same district, which includes Lipa City, but lost. At that time, he and his family were staying at his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas, and his certificate of candidacy for that election indicated San Juan as his residence.

Sabili claims that in April 2007, he and his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares, with whom he has been living for over two decades, began residing at a house and lot in Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. The property had been purchased from Leonila Suarez, who swore that after Sabili paid the down payment and agreed to settle her bank obligations, he and Palomares actually transferred their residence to the property in April 2007. The property, however, was registered solely in Palomares's name. The deed of absolute sale was notarized and the tax declaration transferred only in August 2008. Sabili and Palomares also acquired two adjacent lots in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City, registered jointly in both their names, though certificates of no improvement were issued over these lots. Sabili has no registered business in Lipa City.

On 1 December 2009, Sabili filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections, declaring therein that he had been a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City for two years and eight months. He had filed his income tax returns for 2007 and 2008 with the Revenue District Office in Lipa City, declaring his residence as Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. He applied for transfer of his voter registration on 6 June 2009, which was approved on 31 October 2009. A certification of residency was issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade, attesting that Sabili had been residing in the barangay since 2007. Multiple affidavits from Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and incumbent barangay officials, corroborated Sabili's claim of physical presence in the area since April 2007.

On 5 December 2009, private respondent Florencio Librea filed a petition before the COMELEC to deny due course to and cancel Sabili's COC, alleging material misrepresentation of his residency qualification. Private respondent presented certificates showing that the Pinagtong-ulan property was registered in Palomares's name, that Palomares was listed as a resident of Parañaque City in the tax declarations, that Sabili's children did not appear on the DepEd Lipa City list of graduates or the COMELEC Lipa City list of voters, and affidavits from Pinagtong-ulan residents who stated they had "rarely seen" Sabili in the area. The COMELEC Second Division granted the petition on 26 January 2010, canceling Sabili's COC. During the pendency of his motion for reconsideration, the 10 May 2010 elections were held, and Sabili was proclaimed duly elected Mayor of Lipa City after garnering 55,268 votes against his opponent's 48,825 votes. The COMELEC En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration on 17 August 2010, prompting Sabili to file the present petition.

• Due Process — Promulgation Without Notice: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC Resolution dated 17 August 2010 was null and void for having been promulgated without advance notice to the parties, in violation of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and his right to due process. He claimed he did not receive notice of the COMELEC's 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Property Ownership Emphasis: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by placing inordinate emphasis on the fact that the Pinagtong-ulan property was not registered in his name, when the issue should be residence, not property ownership.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Disregard of Barangay Certification: Petitioner faulted the COMELEC for failing to consider in the first instance the certification of residency issued by the Pinagtong-ulan barangay captain, and for later brushing it aside solely because it was not notarized.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Income Tax Returns: Petitioner ascribed grave abuse to the COMELEC's dismissal of his income tax returns filed in Lipa City, which declared Pinagtong-ulan as his residence, on the mere expedient that the law allows filing either at one's legal residence or principal place of business — noting that private respondent's own evidence showed he had no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence as the basis for filing there.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Quantum of Evidence: Petitioner bewailed that the COMELEC required "more" evidence than the substantial evidence standard prescribed by law for election cases.
• Inconsistent Stance on Palomares's Affidavit: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC was inconsistent in accepting the registration of the Lipa property in Palomares's name while simultaneously rejecting her affidavit stating that the property was purchased with petitioner's personal funds, which was not self-serving but ran counter to her property interest.

• COMELEC's Rule-Making Power: The COMELEC argued that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it.
• Failure to Prove Change of Domicile: Private respondent maintained that petitioner made material misrepresentations in his COC by falsely declaring residency in Lipa City, and that he failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code, having not abandoned his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas.

• Promulgation Without Advance Notice: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure requiring advance notice to the parties.
• Residency Requirement: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

• Promulgation Without Advance Notice: No. The COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, and the lack of advance notice did not vitiate the validity of the Resolution or violate due process.
• Residency Requirement: Yes. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by using wrong or irrelevant considerations in appreciating the evidence, and petitioner adduced substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

• Promulgation Without Advance Notice: The COMELEC issued an Order dated 4 May 2010 suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 — which required advance notice of the date of promulgation — on the ground of the proximity of the first automated national elections and lack of material time. This suspension was a valid exercise of the COMELEC's constitutionally granted power under Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Citing Lindo vs. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the additional requirement of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation itself; promulgation is the delivery of a decision to the clerk for filing and publication, coupled with notice to the parties. Noncompliance with the advance-notice rule is a procedural lapse that does not prejudice the rights of the parties or vitiate the validity of the decision, as long as the parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered. In this case, petitioner was furnished a copy of the Resolution and was able to timely lodge a petition with the Court, demonstrating no prejudice.

• Residency Requirement: The Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence, as findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are final and non-reviewable under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. However, exceptions exist when the COMELEC's appreciation becomes so grossly unreasonable as to amount to an error of jurisdiction. Citing Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found multiple instances of such abuse. First, the COMELEC placed inordinate emphasis on property ownership, reasoning that a "seasoned politician" should have registered the property in his own name — but property ownership is not among the qualifications for local elective office, and it is well-established that a candidate need not own a house to establish residence, as living in a rented house or that of a friend or relative suffices. Second, the COMELEC failed to consider the barangay captain's certification of residency in the first instance, and later dismissed it solely because it was not notarized — but under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of duty are prima facie evidence, and it is the business of a punong barangay to know the residents of his barangay. Third, the COMELEC brushed aside Sabili's income tax returns filed in Lipa City, which declared Pinagtong-ulan as his residence, on the ground that the law allows filing at one's principal place of business — but private respondent's own evidence showed Sabili had no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence as the basis for filing there. Fourth, the COMELEC rejected Palomares's affidavit as self-serving despite the inconsistency of accepting the property registration in her name while dismissing her statement that the property was purchased with petitioner's funds, which actually ran counter to her property interest. Collectively, while each piece of evidence might separately fail to convincingly show residence, together they constituted substantial evidence of Sabili's actual physical presence in and intent to remain in Lipa City since April 2007. The Court also noted that the electorate's will should be respected, citing Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections and Japzon vs. Commission on Elections, where the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.

• Domicile of Choice — Requisites — To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. The most important requirements are (1) actual and physical presence in the new locality and (2) a clear and declared intent to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in the new place (animus manendi). A transfer of domicile need not be completed in a single instance; it may be effected by incremental process, as recognized in Mitra vs. Commission on Elections.
• Residence Need Not Be Based on Property Ownership — It is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. Property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election.
• Entries in Official Records — Under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The three requisites are: (a) the entry was made by a public officer or person specially enjoined by law; (b) it was made in the performance of duty; and (c) the officer had sufficient knowledge of the facts, acquired personally or through official information. A barangay captain's certification of residency falls within this doctrine, as it is the business of a punong barangay to know the residents of his barangay.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Election Cases — The use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion. While the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation of evidence, it is compelled to intervene when the COMELEC's evaluation oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, causing errors of judgment to mutate into errors of jurisdiction.
• Will of the Electorate — When the evidence of alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to office, the will of the electorate should be respected, as the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it would create greater prejudice to democratic institutions.
• Advance Notice of Promulgation Not Essential — The additional requirement of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not prejudice the rights of the parties or vitiate the validity of the decision, as long as the parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered.

• "To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode." — This passage states the controlling rule for establishing domicile of choice in election cases, tying physical presence to animus manendi.
• "We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative." — This formulation, frequently cited in subsequent election-law jurisprudence, defines the scope of the residency requirement and rejects property ownership as a prerequisite.
• "while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact." — This passage articulates the Court's holistic approach to evaluating circumstantial evidence of domicile, applying the substantial evidence standard to the aggregate rather than to each item in isolation.
• "when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters." — This quotation, drawn from Japzon vs. Commission on Elections and reaffirmed here, states the doctrinal priority accorded to the electorate's will in residency qualification disputes.

• Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010 and 19 October 2010 — Controlling precedent on incremental transfer of domicile and on the definition of grave abuse of discretion as the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations. The Court relied on Mitra to recognize that a transfer of domicile may be effected by incremental process and that a barangay captain's declaration of residence carries the same meaning as domicile.
• Lindo vs. Commission on Elections, 271 Phil. 844 (1991) — Followed on the issue of promulgation, holding that advance notice of the date of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation and that noncompliance is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision.
• Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 733 — Followed on the principle that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession does not constitute loss of residence, and that a candidate's failure to be seen in the locality at all times does not preclude residence therein.
• Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 574 — Followed on the principle that to successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it would create greater prejudice to democratic institutions.
• Japzon vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331 — Followed on the principle that when evidence of lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive, the will of the electorate should be respected.
• Perez vs. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999) — Followed on the principle that mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran may be considered as evidence tending to establish domicile of choice.
• De los Reyes vs. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935) — Followed on the principle that a candidate need not own a house to establish residence; living in a rented house or that of a friend or relative suffices.
• Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc., 425 Phil. 511 (2002) — Followed on the three requisites for admissibility of entries in official records under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Domino vs. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798 (1999) — Followed on the rule that personal presence in a place must be coupled with conduct indicative of intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.

• Section 39(a), Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) — Requires that an elective local official be a resident of the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. Applied as the substantive qualification standard against which Sabili's residency was measured.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Authorizes a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false. Invoked by private respondent as the procedural basis for challenging Sabili's COC.
• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Specifies the contents of a certificate of candidacy, including the candidate's residence. The false declaration of residence in Sabili's COC was alleged to be a material misrepresentation under this provision.
• Section 6, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Grants the COMELEC the power to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it. Relied upon to uphold the COMELEC's authority to suspend Section 6 of its own Resolution No. 8696.
• Section 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 — Requires that promulgation of a decision or resolution be made on a date previously fixed, with advance notice served upon the parties. Suspended by the COMELEC's 4 May 2010 Order due to the proximity of the automated elections.
• Section 51(B), National Internal Revenue Code — Provides that an individual income tax return shall be filed either at the person's legal residence or principal place of business. Applied to show that Sabili's filing of his ITR in Lipa City, where he had no business, indicated his residence there.
• Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Applied to uphold the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the barangay captain's certification of residency.
• Section 117, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that transfer of residence by reason of occupation, profession, employment, educational activities, and other enumerated causes is not deemed loss of residence. Cited to support the principle that absence from a locality for certain purposes does not negate residence.
• Article 148, Family Code — Governs the property regime of common-law spouses not capacitated to marry each other, recognizing only actual contributions. Applied by the COMELEC to argue that Sabili could not prove ownership of the Lipa property through Palomares's registered ownership, though the Court found this consideration irrelevant to the issue of residence.
• Article 69, Family Code — Provides that the husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. Cited to note that the family domicile is jointly decided and that children do not dictate it.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez. (Jose Catral Mendoza took no part.)

• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. — Justice Velasco dissented on the second issue, arguing that a certiorari writ is not available to correct errors in the appreciation of evidence by the COMELEC, as Rule 65 is a limited remedy to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not of judgment. He maintained that the COMELEC's factual findings are binding absent grave abuse of discretion, and that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of continuity of his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas. He emphasized that Sabili failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence of all three requisites for a change of domicile: actual removal, bona fide intention to abandon the former residence, and definite acts corresponding with that purpose. He distinguished Mitra vs. COMELEC on the ground that Mitra had made incremental transfer moves — leasing a dwelling, purchasing a lot, building a house, and maintaining substantial investments — whereas Sabili made no improvements on his own registered lots and maintained no business in Lipa City. He further argued that Sabili's claim of residency based on his common-law wife's property was untenable, as the Family Code imposes on the husband the obligation to establish domicile with his lawful wife, not a concubine, invoking the maxim commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet. He also noted Palomares's prior perjury in birth certificates of their children and Sabili's own pattern of false declarations in official documents, applying falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. He would have upheld the COMELEC's Resolutions and denied the petition. (Justice Velasco concurred with the majority on the first issue regarding promulgation without advance notice.)