Sabido vs. Custodio

When the concurrent or successive negligent acts of two or more persons, acting independently, combine to cause a single injury and it is impossible to determine each party’s proportionate share in causing the harm, each is responsible for the whole injury, even if one party’s liability arises from breach of contract and the other’s from quasi-delict.

On June 9, 1955, a fully loaded passenger bus owned by Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. and driven by Nicasio Mudales was negotiating a sharp, downhill curve in Barrio Halang, Lumban, Laguna. Agripino Custodio, a paying passenger, was riding on the left running board because there was no space inside. A six-by-six cargo truck owned by Prospero Sabido and driven by Aser Lagunda was climbing the same curve in the opposite direction. The two vehicles did not collide directly but sideswiped each other, striking Custodio and causing injuries that proved fatal. Custodio’s widow and son sued the bus company, its driver, and the truck owner and driver for damages.

• The Collision: At approximately 9:30 in the morning, on a sharp, bumpy, downhill curve, the LTB bus—fully loaded with passengers—met a six-by-six cargo truck coming from the opposite direction. The cargo truck was climbing the slope; it carried only three helpers, the owner Sabido, and the driver Lagunda. Agripino Custodio was hanging on the left side of the bus because the interior was full.
• The Sideswipe: The two vehicles did not collide head-on. Instead, the cargo truck sideswiped the bus, striking Custodio, who was on the left running board, and causing injuries that led to his death.
• Negligence of the Carrier: The bus employees allowed Custodio to ride while hanging on the side of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992 (the Motor Vehicle Law). This act was found to be negligent and constituted a breach of the contract of carriage.
• Negligence of the Truck Owner and Driver: The cargo truck was running at a fast speed despite the sharp curve and downward slope. Instead of hugging the right side of the road, it traveled on the middle portion, passing so close to the bus that it sideswiped the hanging passenger. Driver Lagunda admitted that he saw the three passengers on the left running board while his truck was still five to seven meters away, yet he made no effort to swerve to the right or take other evasive action, stating that the shallow canal on his right was “not a passage of trucks.” The courts found that by simply swerving right he could have averted the accident; his speed and lane position were therefore reckless and negligent.
• Proximate Cause: Both independent acts of negligence—allowing the passenger to hang on the side, and the excessive speed and improper lane of the cargo truck—were concurrent proximate causes of the death. The injury would not have occurred absent the negligence of the truck owner and driver. Their negligence was the last in point of time, giving them the last clear chance to avoid the fatal sideswipe.

• Exclusive Negligence of the Bus Company: Petitioners maintained that the death was caused exclusively by the carrier’s and its driver’s negligence in allowing Custodio to ride on the running board in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause.
• Absence of Negligence: Petitioners argued that they were not guilty of any negligence contributing to the accident.
• No Solidary Liability: Petitioners contended that they could not be held solidarily liable with the bus company and its driver because the carrier’s liability sounds in breach of contract of carriage, whereas any liability on their part would be based on quasi-delict; thus, the juridical bases of the obligations were incompatible for a solidary obligation.
• Dismissal: Petitioners urged that the complaint against them be dismissed.

• Exclusive Negligence of Carrier: Whether the death of Agripino Custodio resulted exclusively from the negligence of the bus company and its driver, thereby absolving petitioners.
• Contributory Negligence of Petitioners: Whether petitioners were guilty of contributory negligence that proximately caused the injury.
• Solidary Liability Between Contractual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations: Whether a common carrier liable in contract may be held solidarily liable with a third party whose liability arises from quasi-delict.

• Exclusive Negligence of Carrier: The death was not due exclusively to the carrier’s negligence. The findings of the Court of Appeals that the cargo truck was speeding on a sharp curve, positioned in the middle of the road, and sideswiped the hanging passenger were factual determinations binding on the Supreme Court in a petition for review by certiorari. The truck driver’s admission that he saw the passengers from five to seven meters away and could have swerved to the right but deliberately refrained showed independent negligence. Both the carrier’s negligence and petitioners’ negligence were concurrent proximate causes of the death.
• Contributory Negligence of Petitioners: Petitioners were properly found negligent. The truck’s excessive speed and lane position were adequately proven and constituted an independent, contributing cause. The negligence of petitioners was not superseded by the carrier’s prior negligence but combined with it to produce the fatal injury. The application of the last clear chance doctrine underscored this: petitioners’ truck had the last opportunity to avoid the accident because the passengers on the running board were already in that position before the truck approached, and Lagunda perceived them in time to take evasive action but did not.
• Solidary Liability Between Contractual and Quasi-Delictual Obligations: Solidary liability was correctly imposed. Under the rule drawn from 38 Am. Jur. 946–947, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts of two or more persons, acting independently, combine to cause a single injury and it is impossible to determine each one’s proportionate share, each tortfeasor is liable for the whole damage. The fact that the carrier’s liability stems from breach of contract while petitioners’ liability arises from quasi-delict does not bar solidary liability, because both acts contributed to the same indivisible harm. The award of P6,000 indemnity and costs against all defendants jointly and severally was proper.

• Concurrent Negligence and Solidary Liability — Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts of two or more persons, acting independently, are the direct and proximate cause of a single injury, and it is impossible to apportion the injury among them, each is liable for the entire damage, even though one’s act alone might not have caused the whole injury. This principle applies even if one party’s liability is based on contract and the other’s on quasi-delict.
• Last Clear Chance — When a party had the last clear opportunity to avoid an accident, perceived the danger, and failed to exercise ordinary care to prevent it, that party’s negligence is deemed the proximate cause. In this case, because the passengers were already on the running board before the truck came near, the truck driver saw them, and a safe swerve was possible, his failure to act gave him the last clear chance to avert the injury.

• “According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor … .”
• “What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.”

• 38 Am. Jur. 946-947 — This American legal encyclopedia passage was the controlling persuasive authority for the rule on solidary liability where concurrent negligence causes a single indivisible injury and apportionment is impossible. The Supreme Court adopted and applied it directly.

• Section 42, Act No. 3992 (Revised Motor Vehicle Law) — Prohibits passengers from riding on the running board of a motor vehicle. The bus company’s violation of this provision was found to be negligent conduct constituting a breach of the contract of carriage. The provision was not, however, a bar to finding the petitioners concurrently negligent; the violation by the carrier did not absolve them of their own duty of care.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave.