Sabello vs. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

An absolute pardon restores the pardoned person’s civil and political rights and eligibility to public office, but it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement; he must apply for reappointment. Where the pardoned employee is reinstated without any circumstance warranting diminution in rank, justice and equity require restoration to his former position, though not backwages for the period of lawful separation.

Petitioner Isabelo T. Sabello was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School in the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was treated by the barrio council as a barrio project, and the RICD fund was a presidential aid program of P2,000 for each barrio.

Isabelo T. Sabello held the positions of Elementary School Principal of Talisay and Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School under the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time because the students could hardly pay their monthly tuition fees. Since the President of the Philippines, who was earnestly campaigning, was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council, through proper resolutions, allotted P840.00 to cover the salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought that the barangay high school was a barrio project and was therefore entitled to its share of the RICD fund.

Petitioner was authorized by the barrio council to withdraw the P840.00, and he subsequently deposited the amount in the City Treasurer’s Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. This was a grave error on petitioner’s part because it involved the intricacies of disbursement of government funds and its technicalities. Petitioner, together with the barrio captain, was charged with violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted and sentenced to suffer one year and disqualification to hold public office.

Petitioner appealed his case to the CA, Manila. The CA modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount involved. Petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest court. He was later granted an absolute pardon by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights.

With the pardon, petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service. He was reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I. Petitioner prayed for reinstatement to his former position, continuous government service since September 10, 1948, back salaries from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982, restoration of service credits, and other rights and privileges. The Division of City Schools, Gingoog City, Region X, DECS did not act on petitioner’s request.

• Reinstatement After Absolute Pardon: Petitioner claimed that he must be restored to the same position he held before conviction, which he characterized as having been imposed on a mere technical error and for which he was granted an absolute pardon.
• Back Salaries, Continuous Service, and Service Credits: Petitioner prayed for back salaries from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982, continuous government service from September 10, 1948 to the present, restoration of service credits, and other rights and privileges.

• No Justiciable Controversy: The Solicitor General commented that there was no justiciable controversy because the issue involved was whether petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to his conviction.
• Suability of DECS: Respondent raised the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be sued.

• Justiciable Controversy: Whether the petition presents a justiciable controversy despite the Solicitor General’s comment that the issue is petitioner’s reappointment to his former position.
• Suability of DECS: Whether the Department of Education, Culture and Sports can be sued, or whether the suit may be treated as one against its officials for alleged grave errors in official acts.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be set aside in this petition filed by a non-lawyer claiming poverty.
• Reinstatement to Former Position: Whether petitioner, after absolute pardon and reinstatement as a classroom teacher, is entitled to be returned to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
• Back Salaries: Whether petitioner is entitled to back salaries from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982.
• Continuity of Service and Retirement Benefits: Whether petitioner’s government service should be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present and whether he should receive retirement benefits as Elementary School Principal I.

• Justiciable Controversy: Yes. The petition presents a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal relations of parties with adverse interests, admitting of specific relief through a conclusive court decree.
• Suability of DECS: The suit may be maintained against the officials of the agency for alleged grave errors in their official acts; the SC treated it as a suit against the officials.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The requirement was set aside because petitioner filed the petition as a non-lawyer claiming poverty, and the SC resolved the merits directly.
• Reinstatement to Former Position: Yes. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be returned to his former position as Elementary School Principal I, there being no circumstances warranting diminution in rank.
• Back Salaries: No. Petitioner was lawfully separated from service upon conviction, and an absolute pardon does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement or backwages.
• Continuity of Service and Retirement Benefits: No. The SC cannot decree continuous service from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not continuous; at compulsory retirement, petitioner shall receive appropriate retirement benefits as Elementary School Principal I.

• Justiciable Controversy: The SC rejected the Solicitor General’s comment. It reasoned that the petition does not present a hypothetical or abstract dispute; it is not academic or moot because there is a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal relations. It is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a court decree that is conclusive in character, and it calls not for a mere opinion or advice but for affirmative relief.
• Suability of DECS: The SC answered the argument that DECS cannot be sued by holding that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. The SC ignored the technicality and considered the case a suit against the officials of the government agency.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The SC set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies because the petition was filed by a non-lawyer who claimed that poverty denied him the services of a lawyer. The SC thus resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.
• Reinstatement to Former Position: In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., the SC held that absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores eligibility to public office, it does not entitle the pardoned person to automatic reinstatement; he should apply for reappointment. In this case, after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by DECS. As there were no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictated that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher. The general rule that reappointment is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority did not leave the SC powerless, because where petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what was rightfully his, the discretion was qualified by fairness and justice and was no longer pure discretion but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
• Back Salaries: The SC denied backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982. Under Monsanto, petitioner was not entitled to automatic reinstatement. He was lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Although his reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.
• Continuity of Service and Retirement Benefits: The SC could not decree that petitioner’s government service be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it was not continuous. At any rate, when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher.

• Absolute Pardon and Reinstatement — An absolute pardon frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores civil rights, including eligibility to public office, but it does not entitle the pardoned person to automatic reinstatement; he must apply for reappointment. The SC applied this by noting petitioner was reinstated as a classroom teacher after pardon, but equity required restoring him to his former rank because no circumstances warranted diminution.
• Qualified Discretion of Appointing Authority — Reappointment to a former position is generally discretionary, but the discretion is qualified by fairness and justice where the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his; it is no longer pure discretion but discretion tempered with fairness and justice. The SC used this to order petitioner’s appointment as Elementary School Principal I.
• Suability of Officials for Grave Errors — Government officials may be sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts, and a suit against an agency may be treated as a suit against its officials. The SC applied this to overcome the argument that DECS cannot be sued.
• Relaxation of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be set aside for a petition filed by a non-lawyer claiming poverty. The SC applied this and went directly to the merits.
• Backwages After Pardon-Based Reinstatement — Backwages are available only to those illegally dismissed and ordered reinstated or otherwise acquitted; a person lawfully separated upon conviction and later pardoned is not entitled to backwages even if reinstated. The SC applied this to deny petitioner’s back salaries.
• Justiciable Controversy — A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching the legal relations of parties with adverse interests, admitting of specific relief through a conclusive court decree, and not merely hypothetical, abstract, academic, or moot. The SC applied this to reject the Solicitor General’s comment.

• “Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.” — The SC explains the effect of an absolute pardon on public office, distinguishing restored eligibility from automatic reinstatement.
• “As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.” — This is the basis for granting petitioner’s reinstatement to his former rank.
• “Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.” — The SC uses this rule to deny backwages because petitioner was lawfully separated upon conviction.
• “Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this government agency.” — The SC addresses the argument that DECS cannot be sued by treating the case as one against its officials.

• Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239 (Feb. 9, 1989) — Controlling precedent followed by the SC for the rule that absolute pardon restores civil rights and eligibility to public office but does not entitle automatic reinstatement, and for the denial of backwages.

• Republic Act No. 3019 — The statute under which petitioner and the barrio captain were charged and convicted; the SC considered the conviction as a lawful separation from government service and the subsequent absolute pardon in resolving reinstatement and backwages.
• Penal Code (as referenced in Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.) — The SC noted that absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code, and that pardon frees the individual from all penalties and legal disabilities and restores civil rights.