Russell vs. Vestil

An action primarily seeking the declaration of nullity of a deed of partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended, even where the assessed value of the subject property is within the jurisdictional threshold of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

Petitioners and private respondents are co-heirs of the deceased spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho, who owned Lot 6149 in Liloan, Cebu, containing 56,977.40 square meters with an assessed value of ₱5,000.00. Upon the spouses' death, the property passed to their seven children and, in turn, to the respective descendants and legal heirs. The lot had remained undivided among the heirs until petitioners discovered a deed executed by private respondents purporting to partition the property among themselves. The jurisdictional framework at issue is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, which allocates civil jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts based on the nature of the action and, for real-property cases, the assessed value of the property.

Petitioners and private respondents are the legal heirs of the deceased spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho, who during their lifetime owned in fee simple a parcel of land designated as Lot 6149, located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu, containing 56,977.40 square meters with a total assessed value of ₱5,000.00. Upon the spouses' death, the property passed to their seven children—Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta, Felecisimo, Maria, Lorencia, and Marcelo—and, in turn, to the respective descendants and legal heirs of those children upon their death. The subject parcel of land had for years remained undivided among the legal heirs.

Very recently before the filing of the complaint, petitioners discovered a public document denominated "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of a Previous Oral Agreement of Partition," executed on June 6, 1990, whereby private respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, who are also heirs and descendants of the deceased spouses. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious and a complete nullity, because private respondents were not the only heirs of Casimero Tautho and no oral partition of the property had ever been made among the heirs. Pursuant to the document, private respondents had procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed "shares," to the prejudice of petitioners.

On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint denominated "Declaration of Nullity and Partition" with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275, praying that the deed be declared null and void and that the land be partitioned into seven equal parts corresponding to the seven children of the spouses, with attorney's fees of ₱30,000.00. On November 24, 1994, private respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the assessed value of ₱5,000.00 placed the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela under Section 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. Petitioners opposed, contending that the action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 and thus within RTC jurisdiction.

On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 30, 1995, reiterating that the action was not one for recovery of title or possession but for annulment of a document and declaration of nullity, hence incapable of pecuniary estimation. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the present petition for certiorari.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioners maintained that the complaint filed before the RTC was for the annulment of a document denominated "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition," which is clearly an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.
• Incidental Partition: Petitioners argued that the prayer for partition of the property was merely incidental to the principal action, which was the declaration of nullity of the deed, and that the action was not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land governed by the assessed-value thresholds of Section 33(3).

• Jurisdiction Based on Assessed Value: Private respondents insisted that the action was one for re-partition and that, since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint was ₱5,000.00, the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu under Section 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint for declaration of nullity and partition, given the property's assessed value of ₱5,000.00.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction because the principal action is annulment of a document, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended; the prayer for partition is merely incidental to the main relief sought.

• Jurisdiction: The Court applied the criterion established in Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill for determining whether an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation: first ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction depends on the amount claimed. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money—where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the principal relief sought—the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable exclusively by the RTC. The subject matter of the complaint was the annulment of a "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of a Previous Oral Agreement of Partition," in which private respondents declared themselves the only heirs and divided the property to the exclusion of petitioners. The main purpose was to declare that document null and void; the prayer for partition was merely incidental to that principal action. While actions involving title to or possession of real property under Section 33(3) of B.P. 129 are governed by the assessed value of the property, that provision applies to actions where the subject matter is the real property itself—not where the principal issue is the validity of an instrument affecting the property. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. Because the principal relief sought was annulment of a document, the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and fell within the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 19(1).

• Criterion for Actions Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation — In determining whether an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court adopts the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction depends on the amount claimed. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover money, and any money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable exclusively by the RTC. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the complaint's principal purpose was annulment of a deed, with partition merely incidental, thus placing jurisdiction in the RTC under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 regardless of the property's assessed value.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint — Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. The Court applied this principle by examining the complaint's allegations and the nature of the principal relief sought—annulment of the deed—rather than the assessed value of the property, to conclude that the RTC had jurisdiction.

• "[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation … However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts)." — This passage, quoting Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, articulates the canonical test for distinguishing actions capable of pecuniary estimation from those incapable of it, and is the ratio decidendi for the Court's jurisdictional ruling.
• "It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein." — This passage restates the fundamental rule that jurisdiction is fixed by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the merits of the claims, and is frequently cited in jurisdictional disputes.

• Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 (1979) — Controlling precedent establishing the criterion for determining whether an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation; followed and applied as the ratio decidendi.
• Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 (1992) — Cited in support of the Singsong criterion.
• Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 (1992) — Cited as an example of an action incapable of pecuniary estimation (annulment of judgment).
• Bunayog vs. Tunos, 106 Phil. 715 — Cited as an example of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
• Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. vs. Llanos, 14 SCRA 949 — Cited as an example of an action annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and recovering the price paid, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
• Arroz vs. Alojada, 19 SCRA 711 — Cited alongside Philippine Farming Corporation for annulment of deed of sale.
• Lapitan vs. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479 — Cited as an example of rescission as a counterpart of specific performance, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 239 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
• Caniza vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 — Cited alongside Garcia for the same jurisdictional rule.

• Section 19(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended — Confers on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court held that the complaint for annulment of the deed fell under this provision, giving the RTC jurisdiction.
• Section 33(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Confers on MTCs, METCs, and MCTCs exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (Metro Manila) or ₱50,000.00 (elsewhere). The Court found this provision inapplicable because the principal action was annulment of a document, not an action involving title to or possession of real property governed by assessed value.
• Section 19(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended — Confers RTC jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value exceeds ₱20,000.00 (Metro Manila) or ₱50,000.00 (elsewhere). The Court noted this provision but held it inapplicable for the same reason as Section 33(3).

Chief Justice Davide, Jr., Justice Melo, and Justice Pardo concurred.