Rura vs. Leopena

A "previous conviction by final judgment" under Section 9(c) of the Probation Law refers to a conviction that exists prior to the date of the conviction that is the subject of the probation application, not to the date of commission of the offense. Where multiple offenses are jointly tried and decided in a single decision promulgated on the same date, none of those convictions may be treated as a "previous conviction" that would disqualify the accused from probation in any of the other cases.

Teodulo Rura was charged with five counts of estafa committed on different dates before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The disqualification provision at issue, Section 9(c) of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended), bars from probation any person who has previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.

Teodulo Rura was accused of five counts of estafa committed on different dates, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried, and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983, convicting Rura in all five. He was sentenced in each case to three months and fifteen days of imprisonment, yielding an aggregate prison term of seventeen months and twenty-five days.

Rura appealed the conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The case was thereafter remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment. Upon remand, Rura filed an application for probation.

A probation officer of Bohol opposed the application, invoking Section 9(c) of the Probation Law, which disqualifies from probation any person who has previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. The probation officer's position was that because the five estafa cases involved offenses committed on different dates, each conviction constituted a "previous conviction" relative to the others. The respondent judge adopted this reasoning, holding that upon conviction Rura was guilty of the offenses as of the dates of their commission, and accordingly denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting the instant petition.

• No Previous Conviction by Final Judgment: Petitioner argued that there was no previous conviction by final judgment to speak of, because the five estafa cases were tried jointly and only one decision was rendered on the same date, August 18, 1983. It could not be presumed that he had been convicted one after the other, since the conviction in all five cases took place on the same day by means of a joint decision, not in separate decisions.
• "Previous" Refers to Date of Conviction, Not Date of Commission: Petitioner submitted that "previous conviction" presupposes a prior sentence or a decision that had already been rendered convicting the accused. In the instant cases, there was only one decision covering all five counts, promulgated on the same date, and the effects of conviction do not relate back to the date of commission of the offense as the trial court held.

• Conviction Relates Back to Date of Commission: The respondent judge reasoned that although the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided in a single decision, the dates of commission of the offenses were different. Upon conviction, the accused was guilty of the offenses as of the dates of commission of the acts complained of, making each conviction a "previous conviction" relative to the others for purposes of Section 9(c) of the Probation Law.

• Probation Disqualification: Whether petitioner is disqualified from probation under Section 9(c) of the Probation Law on the ground that he had been "previously convicted by final judgment" of an offense meeting the statutory threshold, where the five estafa convictions were rendered in a single joint decision promulgated on the same date.

• Probation Disqualification: No. Petitioner was not disqualified from probation. The word "previous" in Section 9(c) of the Probation Law relates to the date of conviction, not to the date of commission of the crime. When he applied for probation, the only conviction against him was the very judgment that was the subject of his application; there was no prior or separate conviction by final judgment that could serve as a disqualifying "previous conviction."

• Probation Disqualification: The disqualifying provision under Section 9(c) of the Probation Law bars from probation any person "who has previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos." The respondent judge interpreted "previous" as relating back to the date of commission of each offense, reasoning that because the five estafa counts were committed on different dates, each conviction was "previous" to the others. This interpretation was rejected. The statute uses the word "previous" in relation to the date of conviction, not the date of commission. Because all five cases were jointly tried and decided in a single decision promulgated on August 18, 1983, there was only one conviction event. When Rura applied for probation, the only conviction against him was the judgment that was itself the subject of his application. None of the five convictions could serve as a "previous conviction by final judgment" relative to any other, since they were all rendered simultaneously in one decision. Accordingly, the disqualification under Section 9(c) did not apply.

• Meaning of "Previous Conviction" under the Probation Law — The term "previous conviction by final judgment" in Section 9(c) of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) refers to a conviction that exists prior to the date of the conviction that is the subject of the probation application. It does not relate back to the date of commission of the offense. Where multiple offenses are jointly tried and decided in a single decision promulgated on the same date, none of the convictions may be treated as a "previous conviction" disqualifying the accused from probation in any of the other cases.

• "We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that "previous conviction" under Section 9(c) of the Probation Law is measured from the date of conviction, not the date of commission of the offense.

• "The statute relates 'previous' to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime." — This passage crystallizes the controlling interpretive principle and is the canonical formulation relied upon in subsequent probation disqualification cases.

• Section 9(c), Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law, as amended) — Disqualifies from probation any person "who has previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos." The provision was applied to determine whether multiple convictions rendered in a single joint decision could constitute "previous convictions" under the disqualification. The Court held that "previous" refers to the date of conviction, not the date of commission, so that simultaneously rendered convictions cannot serve as mutual predicates for disqualification.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concurred.