Ruiz vs. Gordon

A petition for mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit for a peaceful assembly is rendered moot when the permit is in fact granted; applicants for such permits must verify the action taken by the licensing authority, and future litigation for the judicial protection of assembly rights should generally commence in the regional trial courts, without precluding direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Hector S. Ruiz was the coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, while respondent Richard Gordon was the City Mayor of Olongapo City, the public official charged with acting on applications to use public places for assemblies. The controversy is set against the constitutional guarantees of free speech and peaceable assembly and the guidelines laid down in J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing for permits to hold peaceful assemblies in public places. The Court had previously issued guidelines in that case governing the filing of applications, the clear and present danger standard for refusal or modification, and the transmission of the licensing authority's decision.

Petitioner Hector S. Ruiz was the coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation. On November 19, 1983, he wrote Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City, on behalf of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA), Concern Citizen for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa (DAMBANA), and the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), requesting a permit to hold a prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it would be finished in the early evening. The letter also requested that the named organizations be allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M. According to the petition, Ruiz personally delivered the letter application to Gordon on November 21, 1983; the permit and respondent's manifestation stated that the request was received in the Office of the Mayor on November 22, 1983.

Before the request, Gordon had repeatedly announced in his regular Sunday radio program over DWGO and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. He was interviewed by the Editor-in-Chief of the Guardian, a newspaper of general circulation in Olongapo and Zambales, and mentioned that he had granted the permit; the interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue.

On November 23, 1983, Mayor Gordon approved the request to hold the prayer-rally and parade/march on December 4, 1983. The permit granted the request provided that: (a) the parade/march and rally would be peaceful and orderly; (b) the organization would be responsible for any loss or damage to government property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; and (c) the parade/march would proceed from the corner of Gordon Avenue and Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Avenue, thence to the Rizal Triangle. It also directed coordination with the Integrated National Police for appropriate traffic assistance.

On November 25, 1983, Ruiz filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Gordon, invoking the constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly and referring to the minute resolution in Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing. The petition prayed for the immediate issuance of the writ of mandamus, without prejudice to an extended decision, or for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so as not to render moot the purpose for which the permit was applied for on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 to 6:00 P.M.

After the petition was filed, Gordon manifested that he had approved the request on November 23, 1983 and attached a copy of the permit, praying for dismissal. Ruiz then moved to withdraw the petition on the ground that the permit being sought had been granted by respondent. The permit's issuance and the withdrawal motion formed the factual backdrop for the Court's dismissal of the petition and its supplementary guidelines.

• Free Speech and Assembly: Petitioner invoked the constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly in seeking mandamus to compel the issuance of the permit.
• Urgent Relief: Petitioner sought the immediate issuance of the writ of mandamus, or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, so as not to render moot and academic the purpose for which the permit was applied for on December 4, 1983.
• Withdrawal: Petitioner moved to withdraw the petition on the ground that the permit being sought had been granted by respondent.

• Mootness and Dismissal: Respondent manifested that the permit had already been approved on November 23, 1983 and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
• Prior Announcement of Grant: Respondent stated that even before the request, he had repeatedly announced that he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.
• Publication of Approval: Respondent stated that he had mentioned in an interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the Guardian that he had granted the permit, which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue.

• Mootness of Mandamus: Whether the petition for mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit for a peaceful assembly should be dismissed as moot because the permit had already been granted.
• Verification of Permit Action: Whether applicants for permits to hold peaceful assemblies must verify the action taken by the licensing authority on their requests.
• Venue and Judicial Protection: Whether future litigation for the judicial protection of constitutional rights in permit cases should generally commence in the regional trial courts, without precluding direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

• Mootness of Mandamus: Yes. The petition was dismissed as prayed for because the permit had already been granted and petitioner moved to withdraw, rendering the action moot.
• Verification of Permit Action: Yes. Applicants for permits to hold peaceful assemblies must ascertain the action taken on their requests after a reasonable time or on the designated date for decision; if they fail to do so, a copy of the decision should be sent to their address.
• Venue and Judicial Protection: Yes. While direct petitions to the Supreme Court are not precluded, future litigation should generally start at the trial court level; certiorari to the Supreme Court remains available to the losing party.

• Mootness of Mandamus: The permit was approved on November 23, 1983, before the petition was filed on November 25, 1983. Respondent manifested this fact and attached the permit, and petitioner thereafter moved to withdraw the petition because the permit had been granted. The plea for dismissal was granted. The action for mandamus could have been obviated had petitioner verified on November 23 whether a permit had been issued. Because the permit was in fact granted, there was no denial or modification to test against the clear and present danger standard, and the petition was dismissed as prayed for.
• Verification of Permit Action: A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. After a reasonable time, or if the day and time was designated for the decision on the request, the party or his representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. This avoids waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit.
• Venue and Judicial Protection: Several petitions of this character had been filed with the Supreme Court, possibly due to lack of knowledge of the guidelines in J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing. Steps had been taken to send Regional Trial judges copies thereof. In the future, without precluding the filing of petitions directly with the Supreme Court, the interest of justice and of public convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level. While the petition was dismissed, the guidelines were set forth to specify in more detail the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with greater assurance that the factual background on which the clear and present danger standard depends is satisfied. A certiorari petition to the Supreme Court is likewise available to the losing party.

• Mootness of Mandamus for Permit Applications — A petition for mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit for a peaceful assembly is rendered moot when the permit is in fact granted. In this case, the permit was approved on November 23, 1983, before the petition was filed on November 25, 1983, and petitioner moved to withdraw; the petition was dismissed as prayed for.
• Clear and Present Danger Standard — Refusal or modification of a permit for a peaceful assembly must be justified by the clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent; if the licensing authority believes such danger exists, the applicants must be heard, and the decision must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. This guideline was reproduced from J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, and the Court noted that the factual background for applying the standard must be assured.
• Preferred Status of Free Speech and Peaceable Assembly — Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in the constitutional scheme; the presumption must incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, and the judiciary bears the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to them. This principle was reiterated in supplementing the J.B.L. Reyes guidelines.
• Duty to Verify Permit Action — An applicant for a permit to hold a peaceful assembly must ascertain the action taken on the request after a reasonable time or on the designated date for decision; if the applicant fails to do so, a copy of the decision, whether favorable or adverse, should be sent to the applicant's address. This supplementary guideline is intended to avoid unnecessary litigation and waste of judicial resources.
• Venue for Permit Litigation — Without precluding the filing of petitions directly with the Supreme Court, the interest of justice and public convenience are better served if litigation for the judicial protection of assembly rights starts at the trial court level; certiorari to the Supreme Court remains available to the losing party.
• Pro tanto Modification of Navarro vs. Villegas — To the extent of any inconsistencies with the J.B.L. Reyes guidelines, Navarro vs. Villegas is modified pro tanto. This statement was reproduced in the Court's discussion of the guidelines.

• "As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued." — This passage states the Court's reason for dismissing the petition as unnecessary and introduces the supplementary duty of applicants to verify the licensing authority's action.
• "In the future, therefore, without precluding the filing of petitions directly with this Court, the interest of justice and of public convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level." — This passage lays down the Court's venue guideline for future permit litigation while preserving direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
• "While, therefore, this petition should be dismissed, the Court deems it best to set forth the above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that the factual background on which is dependent the determination of whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied." — This passage explains why the Court dismissed the moot petition yet still supplemented the J.B.L. Reyes guidelines.
• "It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached." — This passage, quoted by the majority from J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, states the controlling standard for refusing or modifying a permit for a peaceful assembly.

• Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, October 25, 1983, and November 9, 1983 — This case was referred to for its minute resolution and extended opinion, which laid down guidelines for permits to hold peaceful assemblies in public places, including the clear and present danger standard and the role of the judiciary. Its guidelines were stated to possibly require supplementation and were reproduced in the discussion.
• Navarro vs. Villegas — Under the J.B.L. Reyes guidelines, to the extent of any inconsistencies between the resolution in J.B.L. Reyes and Navarro vs. Villegas, the latter is modified pro tanto. This citation marks the displacement of the earlier rule to the extent inconsistent with the clear and present danger approach.

• Section 9, Article IV, Constitution — Guarantees that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. This provision was cited in the separate concurring opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr. as the constitutional basis for the rights involved; the majority invoked the same rights without quoting the provision.

• Chief Justice Fernando (ponente)
• Justice Makasiar
• Justice Aquino
• Justice Guerrero
• Justice Abad Santos
• Justice De Castro
• Justice Melencio-Herrera
• Justice Plana
• Justice Escolin
• Justice Relova
• Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
• Justice Teehankee (separate concurring opinion)
• Justice Concepcion Jr. (separate concurring opinion)

Justice Teehankee concurred and reaffirmed the J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing guidelines for applicants and licensing authorities. He stressed that the right to peacefully assemble, speak freely, and petition the government should be accorded utmost deference and respect and may not be limited or denied except under the clear and present danger standard. He supported the suggestion that future mandamus petitions be filed with the regional trial courts rather than directly with the Supreme Court, noting that granting permits absent clear and present danger is practically a ministerial duty. He restated the guidelines: applications should be filed ahead of time; the licensing authority should act promptly and transmit its decision at the earliest opportunity; refusal or modification requires the clear and present danger standard and a hearing if the authority believes such danger exists; the burden to show grave and imminent danger lies on the mayor, with objective and convincing proof; the right cannot be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised elsewhere; the city authorities must provide police protection; and organizers must take precautions for a peaceful march. He also observed that Condition No. 2 of the permit—holding the organization responsible for any loss or damage to government property and for cleanliness—was too loosely worded and could abridge the right; individuals responsible for damage should be held accountable, and cleaning up normally rests on city or town authorities. He cited U.S. vs. Apurado (7 Phil. 422) for the principle that disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd should not be seized upon to characterize the assembly as seditious and tumultuous.

Justice Concepcion Jr. concurred and emphasized that the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly are sacred and inviolate but not absolute or licentious; their exercise must take into account the rights of others and of the State. He noted that freedom of speech does not license libel, slander, or incitement to treason, rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or assault upon persons in authority. The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute but relative and does not allow the use of a public park, plaza, or street to the exclusion of the general public. He agreed that public officials may base decisions on the existence or non-existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, but stressed that the clear and present danger rule is not hard and fast and must be measured by circumstances of persons, time, and place. He proposed guidelines: for private places, only the owner's consent is needed; for public places, the authority must consider the convenience and right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy the same facilities; and conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered, with precautionary steps to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning a peaceful demonstration into a violent one.