Rugas vs. People

Self-defense cannot be successfully invoked where the accused voluntarily engaged in a fight, thereby negating unlawful aggression; and treachery, even if proven, cannot be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance if it was not alleged in the Information, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is applied retroactively when favorable to the accused.

Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas and private complainant Herberto (Gerberto) D. Rafol were acquaintances residing in Barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon. On the evening of September 16, 1997, Rafol was conversing with Perla Perez — the petitioner's aunt — in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano. The petitioner was inside his aunt's house, slicing lemon in the kitchen, when he heard shouting outside. The encounter culminated in the petitioner stabbing Rafol, inflicting critical injuries that required emergency surgery. The petitioner was thereafter charged with Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

At around 9:00 in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto Rafol was conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in Barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon. According to the prosecution, Alexander Rugas suddenly appeared and stabbed Rafol on the left thigh. When Rafol turned to see who had stabbed him, Rugas stabbed him again, this time on the stomach. Rafol ran and shouted for help; someone assisted him into a tricycle, and he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan, where Dr. Fermin M. Fatalla operated on him. Dr. Fatalla found two stab wounds: a fatal wound on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, 3 centimeters in length and 4 to 5 centimeters deep, penetrating the abdominal cavity and the right lobe of the liver; and a non-fatal wound 7.5 centimeters long on the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh. The abdominal wound could have caused death by severe hemorrhage without surgical intervention. Rafol testified that he first saw Rugas approaching from about twenty-five meters away, that Rugas came directly to him without provocation, and that they had no prior quarrel or misunderstanding. Rafol incurred total medical expenses of P25,390.00.

The petitioner interposed self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 p.m. he was inside his aunt's house, slicing lemon in the kitchen, when he heard someone outside shouting, "Get out those who are brave!" He pocketed the knife he was using and went outside to investigate. There he saw Crispulo Romano, Joval Rones, and Rafol, with Rafol armed with a bolo. He went out of the gate and asked Rafol, "Why are you like that?" Rafol, peeved, handed his bolo to Rones and approached the petitioner, kicking him on the left arm. A fistfight ensued. When the petitioner saw Rones raise the bolo, he pulled out his knife to defend himself; Rafol also drew a knife. The petitioner then stabbed Rafol on the front portion of his body, causing Rafol's knife to fall. The petitioner picked up his knife and stabbed Rafol anew. He then faced Rones, who ran away, and fled to his aunt's house.

The petitioner's account was corroborated in part by Jovy Vicente, who testified that he passed by Rafol conversing with Perla Perez, saw Rafol holding an empty bottle of gin and Romano holding a bolo, and observed the petitioner emerge from the gate. Perla Perez, the petitioner's aunt, testified that she saw Rafol holding a bolo and that when she saw the petitioner and Rafol throwing stones at each other, she fled in terror. She contradicted herself, however, by also testifying that she saw Rafol hand his bolo to Rones and then engage the petitioner in a fistfight; she admitted she did not witness the actual stabbing. The trial court found the petitioner's testimony and that of his witnesses inconsistent and incredible, noting in particular that the petitioner claimed Rafol kicked him on the left arm during direct examination but later pointed to his eyebrow during cross-examination, and that the petitioner demonstrated stabbing Rafol "in front" when the wound was actually on the left side of the body. The trial court also observed that the petitioner suffered no injury whatsoever, failed to surrender to authorities, and failed to account for the knife he used. The Court of Appeals sustained these findings.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner asserted that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, he proved that he acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed Rafol, because Rones raised a hand holding a bolo and Rafol was armed with a knife, and they had a confederate in Romano, leaving him alone against three adversaries, two of whom were armed with lethal weapons.
• Unlawful Aggression: Petitioner contended that Rafol's act of kicking him without justifiable cause constituted unlawful aggression, citing the ruling in People vs. Sabio that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression because the face represents a person's dignity, and arguing that a kick similarly placed his rights and safety in real danger.

• Self-Defense: Whether the petitioner successfully proved self-defense in stabbing the victim.
• Unlawful Aggression: Whether the victim's alleged kick on the petitioner's eyebrow constitutes unlawful aggression warranting self-defense.
• Treachery as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: Whether treachery may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance despite not being alleged in the Information.

• Self-Defense: No. The petitioner failed to prove the essential requisites of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, having voluntarily engaged in the fight and failed to account for the weapons used or to surrender to authorities.
• Unlawful Aggression: No. The victim's alleged kick was found baseless by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner's reliance on People vs. Sabio was misplaced because there was no evidence of a slap or attack on dignity; the claim was also inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to repel an imminent physical assault.
• Treachery as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: No. Treachery cannot be considered even as a generic aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information, as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is applied retroactively as favorable to the accused.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense is inherently a weak defense that can be easily fabricated. By interposing self-defense, the accused admits causing the victim's injuries, shifting the burden of proof to him to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of three requisites: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The petitioner's evidence was riddled with inconsistencies — he claimed Rafol kicked his left arm during direct examination but pointed to his eyebrow on cross-examination; he demonstrated stabbing Rafol "in front" when the wound was actually on the left side of the body. The petitioner suffered no injury whatsoever despite claiming to have faced three adversaries, two of them armed. He failed to surrender to authorities, failed to execute a statement claiming self-defense, and failed to account for the knife he used, the knife allegedly held by the victim, and the bolo supposedly handed to Rones. Citing People vs. Alfaro and People vs. Camacho, the failure to account for the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to a plea of self-defense. The findings of the trial court on credibility, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect, the trial court having the unique advantage of observing witness demeanor; the Court found no justification to deviate from those findings.

• Unlawful Aggression: The petitioner's reliance on People vs. Sabio was misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled that a slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression because the face represents a person and his dignity, and slapping is a serious personal attack coupled with willful disgrace. In this case, there was no evidence the victim slapped the petitioner; the petitioner merely claimed he was hit on the eyebrow, which both lower courts found baseless. Moreover, the reliance on Sabio to sustain a claim of defending his honor was inconsistent with his own testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself from an imminent physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife — a claim also inconsistent with the fact that the victim was stabbed three times. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the principle that when one agrees to engage in a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because there is no unlawful aggression to speak of; the petitioner voluntarily went out of the house and confronted the victim after hearing a shout that did not even mention his name.

• Treachery as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found that treachery attended the commission of the crime, as the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare and defend himself. However, treachery was not alleged in the Information, as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime took place before the said Rule took effect, it should nevertheless be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the accused. Accordingly, treachery could not be considered even as a generic aggravating circumstance. With no modifying circumstances attendant, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty was taken from the medium period of prision mayor (8 years and 1 day to 10 years), and the minimum from the full range of prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years). The trial court's failure to award moral and exemplary damages was corrected, with P25,000.00 awarded for each, conformably to current jurisprudence.

• Shift of Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — When the accused interposes self-defense, he thereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim, and the burden of proof shifts to him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of three essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. In this case, the petitioner's evidence was replete with inconsistencies and omissions — failure to surrender, failure to account for weapons, no injuries sustained — that fatally undermined his defense.

• Voluntary Engagement in Fight Negates Unlawful Aggression — When one agrees to engage in a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because there is no unlawful aggression to speak of. The first attack from an opponent is but an incident of the fight, not an unlawful or unexpected aggression. The petitioner voluntarily went out of the house and confronted the victim after hearing a shout that did not even mention his name, thereby exposing himself to the consequences of a fight.

• Failure to Account for Weapons as Fatal to Self-Defense — The failure of the accused to account for the presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to a plea of self-defense. The petitioner failed to account for the knife supposedly held by the victim, the bolo allegedly handed to Rones, and the knife he himself used; he also failed to surrender himself and the weapon to authorities.

• Retroactive Application of Section 8, Rule 110 Favorable to the Accused — Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specified in the Information, is applied retroactively when favorable to the accused. Because treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could not be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance, notwithstanding that the crime occurred before the Rule took effect.

• "When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the three requisites of self-defense and the shift in burden of proof, a foundational principle in Philippine criminal law jurisprudence.

• "The rule is when one agrees to engage in a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because there is no unlawful aggression to speak of." — This articulates the principle that voluntary participation in a fight negates unlawful aggression, a key rationale for rejecting the petitioner's defense.

• "Although the crime took place before the said Rule took effect, it should nevertheless be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellant." — This passage establishes the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 to crimes committed before its effectivity, where such application benefits the accused by precluding unpleaded aggravating circumstances.

• People vs. Sabio, 19 SCRA 901 (1967) — Cited by the petitioner for the proposition that a slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression. The Court distinguished this case, finding the reliance misplaced because there was no evidence of a slap and the claim was inconsistent with the petitioner's own testimony.
• People vs. Alfaro, 119 SCRA 204 (1982) — Cited for the doctrine that the failure of the accused to account for the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to a plea of self-defense.
• People vs. Camacho, 359 SCRA 200 (2002) — Cited alongside Alfaro for the same doctrine on failure to account for weapons, and for the formulation of the three requisites of self-defense and the shift of burden of proof.
• People vs. Kruse, 64 O.G. 12632 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the principle that one who voluntarily joins a fight cannot claim self-defense, as the first attack is merely an incident of the fight.
• People vs. Iluis, G.R. No. 135844-45, November 24, 2003 — Cited for the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure when favorable to the accused.
• People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001) — Cited as basis for the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal in its full range. The penalty for frustrated homicide is one degree lower, or prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty, with the maximum taken from the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum from prision correccional, there being no modifying circumstances.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines frustrated felony, where the offender performs all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Applied in relation to Article 249 to classify the crime as frustrated homicide.
• Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that the complaint or information state the designation of the offense, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Applied to preclude the appreciation of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information, with retroactive application as favorable to the accused.
• Article 2219, paragraph 1, New Civil Code — Authorizes the award of moral damages. Applied to sustain the award of P25,000.00 as moral damages to the victim.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Governs the credit of preventive imprisonment in favor of the accused.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.