Royong vs. Oblena

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct even absent a criminal conviction and even though such conduct is not among the statutorily enumerated grounds for disbarment, provided it demonstrates moral depravity rendering the lawyer unfit for the legal profession; and good moral character is an objective reality corresponding to what a person really is, not his subjective self-estimation.

Complainant Josefina Royong was the foster daughter of Cecilia Angeles and the niece of Briccia Angeles, who had lived as the common-law wife of respondent Atty. Ariston Oblena since 1942. Briccia was legally married to Teodoro Arines, who had himself taken another woman. Respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1955 after filing a sworn petition in 1954 alleging he was a person of good moral character. From childhood, complainant treated respondent as an uncle, calling him "tata," owing to his being the paramour of a sister of her mother.

Complainant Josefina Royong charged respondent Atty. Ariston Oblena with rape in a verified complaint filed with the Supreme Court on January 14, 1959. Royong was the niece of Briccia Angeles, who had been respondent's common-law wife since 1942. Briccia was legally married to Teodoro Arines, who had himself taken another woman named Conching Guevara. Respondent met Briccia in December 1941 when she and her sister Cecilia were evacuated to Cavinti, Laguna, by the Red Cross, and began living with her as husband and wife from February 1942—a cohabitation that continued to the time of the decision.

According to complainant, on August 5, 1958, while she was ironing clothes alone on the second floor of the house after her foster mother had gone to feed the pigs, respondent entered, covered her mouth, dragged her to a bedroom, and forced her to have sexual intercourse through threats and physical blows to her thigh. She did not shout for help because of respondent's death threats against her and her family. As a result, she became pregnant and gave birth on June 2, 1959. She admitted that she continued visiting respondent's house afterward, sometimes running errands, cooking his coffee, and receiving his mail, and that on one occasion she was left alone with him when he was sick with influenza.

Respondent denied committing rape, testifying that on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission on Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant. However, he admitted having illicit relations with complainant from January 1957 to December 1958, when their affair was discovered by her foster parents. He claimed he limited himself to kissing, embracing, and "sucking her tongue" before she turned eighteen to avoid criminal liability for seduction, and that their first sexual intercourse occurred on May 11, 1958, after she reached eighteen. He estimated they had sexual intercourse approximately fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his. He expressed intent to marry her but acknowledged objections from both her foster parents and his common-law wife. After discovery of the affair, he confessed to Briccia, explaining that he wanted a child, something Briccia could not give him.

The Solicitor General investigated and found that the sexual intercourse was repeated and consensual rather than a single act of rape, but nonetheless recommended disbarment. The investigation revealed that respondent had seduced complainant, who was seventeen or eighteen years old at the time, using his moral ascendancy over her—she treated him as an uncle, calling him "tata," because he was the paramour of a sister of her mother. He promised marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to Briccia, who had forsaken her husband for him. Additionally, respondent had continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles in an adulterous relationship from 1942 to the present, even after his admission to the bar in 1955. In his sworn bar petition dated May 22, 1954, he alleged he was "a person of good moral character"—a representation that was false given his ongoing adulterous cohabitation, which permanently disqualified him from bar admission.

• Gross Immorality: The Solicitor General argued that respondent was guilty of gross immorality by continuously cohabiting adulterously with Briccia Angeles while simultaneously maintaining illicit relations with her niece, rendering him unfit for the legal profession and unworthy of public confidence.
• False Bar Application: The Solicitor General charged that respondent falsely and deliberately alleged good moral character in his 1954 bar petition when he was in fact living adulterously with a married woman, permanently disqualifying him from bar admission.
• Abuse of Moral Ascendancy: The Solicitor General observed that respondent seduced complainant by abusing his moral influence over her as her "uncle," taking advantage of her age, inexperience, and his moral ascendancy, and by using his knowledge of the law to avoid criminal liability.

• No Criminal Conviction: Respondent argued he was not liable for disbarment because he had not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, and the grounds alleged were not among those enumerated in Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
• Improper Complaint: Respondent maintained that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority by filing a complaint charging offenses different from the original rape complaint, citing Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128, and that the complaint lacked the necessary formalities under Section 1, Rule 128.
• Good Moral Character Subjectively Determined: Respondent contended he did not falsify his bar petition because, in his own opinion and estimation at the time, he believed himself to be a person of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not.
• No Seduction or Rape: Respondent argued no rape was proven and no seduction was committed since complainant was above eighteen at the time of their first sexual intercourse, and that he had no intention to alienate Briccia's love for her husband or to commit adultery.

• Grounds for Disbarment: Whether illicit relations with complainant and open cohabitation with a married woman are sufficient grounds for disbarment even absent a criminal conviction and even though not among the statutorily enumerated grounds.
• Authority of Solicitor General: Whether the Solicitor General exceeded his authority by filing a complaint charging offenses different from those in the original complaint.
• Moral Character in Bar Application: Whether respondent falsified his bar petition by claiming good moral character despite his adulterous cohabitation.

• Grounds for Disbarment: Yes. The enumerated grounds for disbarment in the Rules of Court are not exclusive; the Court's inherent power to exclude unfit members extends to grossly immoral conduct unrelated to professional duties that shows the lawyer unfit for the office.
• Authority of Solicitor General: No. The Solicitor General did not exceed his authority; the rules permit him to file any complaint justified by the evidence adduced during investigation, without being confined to the offense charged in the original complaint.
• Moral Character in Bar Application: Yes. Respondent falsified his bar petition; moral character is an objective reality corresponding to what a person really is, not his subjective self-estimation.

• Grounds for Disbarment: The enumeration in Section 25, Rule 127 is not exclusive. The power to exclude unfit members is inherent in the Court and may be exercised without special statutory authority; statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar rather than create it. Citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, the Court affirmed that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice but also for gross misconduct not connected with professional duties that shows him unfit for the office. Respondent's moral depravity was apparent: he schemed to avoid criminal liability by limiting sexual acts before complainant's eighteenth birthday, abused his moral ascendancy as her "uncle," and maintained simultaneous adulterous and promiscuous relationships. His conduct, though unrelated to his office, rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. To hold otherwise would be to recognize a "double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." Fornication committed under scandalous and revolting circumstances that shock the common sense of decency may justify disbarment. The reasons respondent advanced for continuing his adulterous relations—that Briccia helped him finish law studies and that Christian charity did not allow him to abandon her—were no excuse; an immoral act cannot justify another immoral act.

• Authority of Solicitor General: Nothing in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 requires the Solicitor General to charge the same offense as the original complaint. The rules provide that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General is therefore at liberty to file any case against the respondent justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation.

• Moral Character in Bar Application: One's own estimation of oneself is not a gauge of moral character. Moral character corresponds to objective reality—what a person really is, not what he or others think he is. It is distinguished from good reputation, which is the opinion generally entertained of a person. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. Respondent lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles at the time of his bar application, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced in his status did not render him a person of good moral character. He was permanently disqualified from bar admission at the time he applied, and the same misconduct warrants disbarment.

• Inherent Power to Disbar Beyond Statutory Grounds — The enumeration of grounds for disbarment in the Rules of Court is not exclusive. The power of courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent, is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice, and may be exercised without special statutory authority. Statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar rather than create it, and do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to hold respondent disbarable for gross immorality not among the enumerated statutory grounds.

• Disbarment for Non-Professional Misconduct — An attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The Court applied this doctrine to respondent's adulterous cohabitation and seduction of complainant, conduct entirely unrelated to his legal practice but demonstrating moral depravity rendering him unfit.

• Moral Character as Objective Reality — Moral character is what a person really is, not what he or other people think he is. It is distinguished from good reputation, which is the opinion generally entertained of him in the place where he is known. One's subjective self-estimation is not a gauge of moral character; good moral character includes at least common honesty. The Court applied this doctrine to reject respondent's claim that he believed himself to be of good moral character when he filed his bar petition.

• Continuing Requirement of Good Moral Character — Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement during the practice of law. Its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though statutes do not specify it as a ground. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's adulterous relations, which permanently disqualified him from bar admission, likewise warranted his removal from the roll of attorneys.

• "Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is." — This passage defines the controlling standard for moral character in bar admission and disbarment proceedings, distinguishing it from reputation and rejecting subjective self-assessment.

• "An attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine allowing disbarment for non-professional misconduct, quoted from Peyton's Appeal via In Re Pelaez, and remains frequently cited in disbarment jurisprudence.

• "If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar." — This articulates the rationale against a double standard of morality for admission and disbarment, anchoring the Court's holding that good moral character is a continuing qualification.

• In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 — Controlling precedent establishing that the enumeration of disbarment grounds is not exclusive and that the Court's inherent power extends to non-statutory grounds; quoted with approval from Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398) for the proposition that attorneys may be removed for gross misconduct unrelated to professional duties.

• In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 — Cited in support of the definition of good moral character as including at least common honesty, and as authority for the distinction between moral character and reputation.

• People vs. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612 — American authority cited for the standard of personal and professional integrity required of attorneys, supporting the proposition that the standard is not satisfied by conduct that merely escapes criminal penalties.

• Section 25, Rule 127, Rules of Court — Enumerates grounds for disbarment; the Court held this enumeration is not exclusive and does not restrict the Court's inherent power to disbar for other misconduct showing unfitness for the office.

• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 128, Rules of Court — Govern the Solicitor General's report and complaint in disbarment proceedings; the Court held these provisions do not require the Solicitor General to charge the same offense as the original complaint, but permit him to file any complaint justified by the evidence adduced during investigation.

• Section 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court — Cited by respondent regarding formalities required in disbarment complaints; the contention was rejected as devoid of merit.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred.

N/A. Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.