Rosas vs. Montor

A Bureau of Immigration officer who has custody of aliens found to have entered the Philippines using fraudulent passports has the duty to initiate deportation proceedings under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, and the failure to do so — instead merely excluding the aliens — constitutes grave misconduct warranting dismissal from the service.

Petitioner Geronimo S. Rosas served as Senior Immigration Officer and Alien Control Officer of the Cebu Immigration District Office and was designated as Regional Director of the Bureau of Immigration Mactan International Airport Station. Respondents Imra-Ali Sabdullah and Dilausan S. Montor were employees of the Bureau of Immigration, Cebu, who filed the administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman. The case arose within the framework of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act No. 613), which provides distinct procedures for the exclusion of aliens at the point of entry (Section 29) and the deportation of aliens already within Philippine territory who have committed acts in violation of immigration laws (Sections 37, 45, and 46).

On December 7, 2004, two Iranian nationals, Jafar Saketi Taromsari and Jalal Shokr Pour Ziveh, arrived at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA) from Singapore. They entered the Philippines using counterfeit Italian and Mexican passports under the names "Marco Rabitti" and "Jaime Humberto Nenciares Garcia," respectively. After staying in a hotel in Cebu City for a few days, they departed for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004, still using the same fraudulent passports.

On December 16, 2004, Japanese immigration authorities at Narita International Airport discovered that Taromsari and Ziveh were using counterfeit or tampered Mexican and Italian passports. The Japanese authorities denied them entry for using fraudulent passports and lacking entry visas, and sent them back to the Philippines. They arrived at MCIA at 6:45 p.m. on the same day and were admitted to the detention cell of the Bureau of Immigration Cebu Detention Center. Petitioner Geronimo S. Rosas, along with security guards Elmer Napilot and Jose Ramon Ugarte, brought the two Iranian nationals to their detention cell on the night of their arrival from Japan and detained them there for three days.

An investigation was conducted by Atty. Serafin A. Abellon, Special Prosecutor, in the presence of petitioner. During the investigation, Taromsari and Ziveh admitted that they had purchased the Italian and Mexican passports from a certain "Kuram" in Tehran, Iran, for US$1,500 each, and had attached their own pictures to substitute those of the real owners. They confessed that they entered the Philippines on December 7, 2004 using these fraudulent passports, and that they traveled to Japan on December 14, 2004 with the same documents. Their purpose was to find work in Japan, as Iranians faced difficulty obtaining entry visas while Italians and Mexicans were not required to obtain them. Taromsari had previously worked in Japan from 1999 to 2002 before being caught and deported.

In a Memorandum dated December 15, 2004 addressed to BI Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, petitioner reported the circumstances of the Iranian nationals' return, including their admission of using fake passports, and recommended their exclusion under Section 29(a)(14) of the PIA and inclusion in the blacklist. An Exclusion Order was issued against Taromsari and Ziveh on grounds of "Not Properly Documented" and "No Entry Visa." On December 17, 2004, petitioner directed Napilot and Ugarte to escort the two Iranian nationals from the BI Detention Center in Mandaue City to MCIA pursuant to the exclusion order. On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released from detention and allowed to depart for Tehran, Iran via Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on board Malaysian Airlines.

On January 18, 2005, respondents filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner, Napilot, and Ugarte with grave misconduct, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service. Respondents alleged that petitioner irregularly and anomalously handled and disposed of the case by allowing the Iranian nationals to leave the country without initiating any proceeding for violation of immigration laws, notwithstanding that they were potential threats to national interest and security. The Ombudsman found substantial evidence of grave misconduct, holding that petitioner showed manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence in unduly releasing the two Iranian nationals, and imposed the penalty of dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, concluding that the release was irregular and that petitioner had the duty to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings under Section 37(a)(9) of the PIA in relation to Sections 45 and 46.

• Lack of Involvement in the Exclusion Order: Petitioner argued that he should not be held administratively liable for the purely discretionary acts of the assigned immigration officers who ordered the exclusion of the Iranian nationals, as the determination of whether a passenger should be excluded and the primary inspection of incoming and outgoing passengers pertained to the Head Supervisor, Mr. Casimiro P. Madarang III, and not to his area of responsibility.
• Validity of the Exclusion Order: Petitioner maintained that the exclusion order was validly and properly issued under the prevailing circumstances, as the two Iranian nationals were proper subjects for exclusion under Section 29(a)(17) of the PIA since they used Iranian passports without the requisite Philippine entry visas when they arrived on December 16, 2004.
• Lack of Unwarranted Benefit: Petitioner contended that there was no evidence that he gave unwarranted benefit to the Iranian nationals or that he was motivated by corrupt motives, as he merely submitted an incident and recommendatory report to the Commissioner of Immigration affirming the exclusion order.
• No Duty to Initiate Deportation: Petitioner asserted that the initiation of deportation and criminal proceedings against the Iranian nationals could only be exercised by the Immigration Commissioner, who was fully informed of the circumstances pertaining to the incident.
• No Prior Knowledge of Unlawful Entry: Petitioner claimed he did not have prior knowledge of the two Iranian nationals' previous entry to the country, as he was not at the MCIA on the date and time of their first arrival in the Philippines.

• Irregular Handling of the Case: Respondents alleged that petitioner irregularly and anomalously handled and disposed of the case involving the two restricted Iranian nationals by allowing them to leave the country without initiating any proceeding for violation of immigration laws.
• Threat to National Security: Respondents contended that the Iranian nationals were potential threats to the country's national interest and security.
• Failure to Charge for Deportation: Respondents argued that the Iranian nationals should have been charged for deportation because they violated Section 37(a)(9), in relation to Sections 45 and 46 of the PIA, having entered the Philippines using fraudulent passports.

• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: Whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the finding of grave misconduct warranting petitioner's removal from the service.
• Duty to Initiate Deportation and Criminal Proceedings: Whether petitioner had the duty to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings against the two Iranian nationals under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Sections 45 and 46 of the PIA of 1940, and whether his failure to do so constitutes grave misconduct.
• Validity of Exclusion vs. Deportation: Whether the validly issued exclusion order shielded petitioner from administrative liability despite his failure to initiate deportation proceedings.

• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: Yes. The findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• Duty to Initiate Deportation and Criminal Proceedings: Yes. Petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and deportation proceedings against the Iranian nationals under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45 of the PIA, and his failure to do so constituted grave misconduct.
• Validity of Exclusion vs. Deportation: No. The exclusion order did not shield petitioner from liability, as exclusion and deportation are distinct removal procedures under the PIA; the aliens' admitted use of fraudulent passports to enter the Philippines independently triggered the duty to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings.

• Substantial Evidence of Grave Misconduct: Findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as more than a mere scintilla — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The factual findings of the Ombudsman are accorded great weight and respect by reason of its special knowledge and expertise over matters within its jurisdiction. The question of whether substantial evidence exists is a question of fact beyond the Supreme Court's power of review, as it is not a trier of facts. The Court found no cogent reason to overturn the Court of Appeals' findings, which in turn affirmed the Ombudsman's conclusion that the release of the two Iranian nationals was irregular and not in accord with existing immigration laws.

• Duty to Initiate Deportation and Criminal Proceedings: Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory. Under Philippine immigration law, exclusion and deportation are formal removal procedures provided separately under Sections 29 and 37 of the PIA, respectively. Exclusion is the removal of an alien by immigration officers upon arrival and prior to entry, while deportation is the removal of an alien already within the country who has committed acts in violation of immigration laws. Section 37(a)(9) mandates that aliens who commit acts described in Sections 45 and 46 shall be arrested and deported after a determination by the Board of Commissioners. Section 45(c) penalizes any individual who obtains, accepts, or uses any immigration document knowing it to be false, and Section 46 penalizes aliens who enter the Philippines by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact. The two Iranian nationals confessed during investigation that they knowingly used falsified passports and obtained entry into the Philippines through false representations when they arrived on December 7, 2004. These admissions established grounds for both criminal prosecution under Section 45 and deportation under Section 37(a)(9). Petitioner was already aware of these facts when he recommended their exclusion on December 17, 2004, as shown by his own December 15, 2004 Memorandum. Instead of filing the appropriate criminal charge and initiating deportation proceedings as mandated by law, petitioner allowed the aliens to depart for Iran via Malaysia. This failure displayed a blatant disregard of established immigration rules.

• Validity of Exclusion vs. Deportation: While exclusion and deportation both ultimately result in an alien's removal from Philippine territory, they serve different purposes and are triggered by different circumstances. Exclusion applies to aliens at the point of entry who are barred from admission, while deportation applies to aliens already within the country who have committed violations of immigration laws. The two Iranian nationals had already entered the Philippines on December 7, 2004 using fraudulent passports — a fact established by their own admissions during investigation. Their initial detention may have been for lack of entry visas when they were returned from Japan on December 16, 2004, but once they admitted to using falsified passports to enter the country, the basis for deportation proceedings under Section 37(a)(9) arose independently of the exclusion ground. Section 45 imposes an additional penalty beyond mere removal — a fine and imprisonment — making the initiation of criminal proceedings mandatory. Petitioner's claim that he lacked prior knowledge of the aliens' unlawful entry was belied by official log book records showing that he brought the two Iranian nationals to their detention cell on the night of their arrival from Japan on December 16, 2004, and by his own December 15, 2004 Memorandum reporting their use of fake passports. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave misconduct when it involves additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Petitioner's failure to initiate proper proceedings and his allowance of the aliens to escape criminal charges and thorough investigation for possible terrorist activities or human trafficking constituted grave misconduct warranting removal from the service.

• Finality of Ombudsman Findings — Findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scantilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. The factual findings of the Ombudsman are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality, by reason of its special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under its jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the Ombudsman's finding of grave misconduct, noting that the question of whether substantial evidence exists is a question of fact beyond the Supreme Court's power of review.

• Distinction Between Exclusion and Deportation — Exclusion is the authorized removal of an alien by immigration officers performing primary inspection, or by the immigration boards of special inquiry by secondary inspection, of any foreigner arriving in the Philippines who, upon inspection and prior to entry or admission, is barred by immigration laws from entering or being admitted. Deportation, on the other hand, is a police measure against undesirable aliens already within the country whose continued presence is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The Court relied on this distinction to hold that the exclusion order alone was insufficient, as the aliens had already entered the Philippines using fraudulent passports, thereby triggering deportation proceedings under Section 37(a)(9) of the PIA independently of the exclusion ground.

• Grave Misconduct — Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave misconduct when it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. The charge of gross misconduct warrants removal or dismissal from service together with accessory penalties such as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The Court found that petitioner's failure to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings, and his allowance of the aliens to escape criminal charges, displayed a blatant disregard of established immigration rules, satisfying the elements of grave misconduct.

• "Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country with the use of fraudulent passports and false representations when they arrived on December 7, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh should have been ordered arrested and formally charged with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(c) and (d). Deportation proceedings should have been initiated forthwith against these aliens." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the duty of a Bureau of Immigration officer to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings when aliens are found to have entered the country using fraudulent documents.

• "In failing to initiate the proper proceedings against the Iranian nationals and allowing them to escape criminal charges and thorough investigation for possible terrorist activities or human trafficking, petitioner displayed a blatant disregard of established immigration rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants his removal from the service." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that petitioner's omission constituted grave misconduct, connecting the factual finding to the legal standard for dismissal.

• "While both exclusion and deportation ultimately removes a person from our territory, Section 45 imposes an additional penalty - deportation has an additional penalty in that it imposes a fine. Indeed, that these aliens were released without undergoing deportation proceedings as required by law is highly irregular." — This passage distinguishes exclusion from deportation by emphasizing that deportation carries an additional penal consequence, reinforcing why mere exclusion was legally insufficient.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014 — Cited for the proposition that findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, and that the Ombudsman's factual findings are accorded great weight and respect.
• Gupitan-Aguilar vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 503 — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as more than a mere scintilla — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, 604 Phil. 405 (2009) — Cited for the principle that the power to deport aliens is an act of State, a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence is injurious to the public good, and for the proposition that the question of substantial evidence is a question of fact beyond the Supreme Court's power of review.
• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Apolonia, 683 Phil. 553 (2012) — Cited for the definition of misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, and for the elements that qualify misconduct as grave.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569 (2005) — Cited for the rule that a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve the additional elements to qualify it as grave.
• Pleyto vs. PNP-CIDG, 563 Phil. 842 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that the charge of gross misconduct warrants removal or dismissal from service together with accessory penalties.

• Section 29(a)(17), Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) — Provides that persons not properly documented for admission as required under the Act shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines. This was the basis for the exclusion order issued against the two Iranian nationals.
• Section 37(a)(9), Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) — Mandates that any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections 45 and 46 of the Act shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and deported after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation. The Court held that this provision required petitioner to initiate deportation proceedings against the two Iranian nationals.
• Section 45(c), Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) — Penalizes any individual who obtains, accepts, or uses any immigration document knowing it to be false. The Court found that the two Iranian nationals' admitted use of counterfeit Italian and Mexican passports violated this provision, triggering the duty to file criminal charges.
• Section 46, Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) — Penalizes any alien who enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by immigration officials, or obtains entry by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact, with imprisonment and deportation. The Court applied this provision to the aliens' admitted entry using fraudulent passports under false names.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This was one of the charges filed against petitioner, though the decision focused on the grave misconduct finding.
• Rule XIV, Section 23, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 — Provides the penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct, which was imposed by the Ombudsman and affirmed throughout the proceedings.

Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Acting Chairperson), Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were noted.