Rosales vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

Self-defense requires proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; where the accused admits the killing but fails to establish these elements, the defense fails. Treachery exists when a defenseless victim is attacked from behind, employing means that offer no risk to the assailant from any defensive or retaliatory act.

Leovigildo Rosales was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar with murder and illegal possession of firearms, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. A-600 and A-601, respectively, which were jointly tried by agreement of the parties as they arose from the same incident. The accused was an overseer of a fishpond owned by a certain Bernardo Bulan, and the victim, Nilo Bulan, was found fishing in the fishpond on the day of the incident.

Leovigildo Rosales was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. A-600 and A-601, respectively, which were jointly tried as they arose from the same incident. Prosecution witness Francisco Buensalida testified that on the morning of 26 September 1982, he and Nilo Bulan were on their way to get bamboo poles when Bulan proceeded to the side of a fishpond to answer the call of nature. At that moment, Rosales approached Bulan from behind and, at a distance of six meters, fired at him with a shotgun. After Bulan fell to the ground, Rosales shot him again. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Caridad T. Bulusan, who autopsied the victim, revealed that the cause of death was internal hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds, and that of the two shots that hit the victim, one came from behind.

Rosales invoked self-defense. He claimed that at about ten o'clock in the morning of 26 September 1982, he went to inspect the fishpond owned by Bernardo Bulan but placed under his care as overseer. There, he caught Nilo fishing. He fired his shotgun into the air to scare Nilo after the latter resolutely refused to leave. Nilo then struggled for the possession of the shotgun, which fired and hit him. The Information for illegal possession of firearm alleged that Rosales had under his custody and control an unlicensed 12-gauge Winchester shotgun bearing Serial No. 1628119. He claimed that the shotgun was given to him by the owner of the fishpond with authority to possess coming from Mateo Olindo, its alleged owner.

The trial court rendered judgment on 13 June 1984, finding Rosales guilty of homicide and imposing a penalty of ten years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with indemnity of P20,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. The court likewise pronounced him guilty of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to a prison term of two years as minimum to four years as maximum. Although treachery and evident premeditation were alleged in the Information, the trial court did not hold them to have qualified the killing to murder, opining that since the killing was immediately preceded by an argument, the accused could not have planned the killing without risk to himself, and that there was no sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution of the act.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on 15 November 1989 remanded the record for retaking of the testimonies of six defense witnesses whose transcripts were reportedly lost. Only the testimonies of Bernardo Bulan, Exequiel Gerero, and the accused were actually retaken, as the Public Attorney's Office, then counsel for the accused, agreed to dispense with the testimonies of the other three witnesses. On 28 February 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner argued that the killing was in self-defense, as Bulan was trespassing on the fishpond over which he was overseer, and the firing of his shotgun into the air was a reasonable exercise of his authority as overseer and showed he had no intention to kill.
• Self-Defense (Struggle for Gun): Petitioner argued that he had to defend himself when Bulan struggled to wrest possession of the gun since he could have been killed himself.
• Due Process: Petitioner claimed he was denied due process, casting doubt on the Public Attorney's Office which represented him during his appeal, explaining that there is no clear showing that he understood the consequences of dispensing with the testimonies of three of his witnesses.

N/A — The decision does not recount the arguments of the respondent People of the Philippines.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused established self-defense, requiring proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and reasonable necessity of the means employed.
• Treachery: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery, given that the victim was shot from behind and shot again after falling to the ground.
• Due Process: Whether the accused was denied due process when the Public Attorney's Office dispensed with the retaking of the testimonies of three defense witnesses.
• Illegal Possession of Firearms: Whether the accused was liable for illegal possession of firearms under the applicable law.

• Self-Defense: No. The accused failed to establish self-defense because there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, and the element of reasonable necessity of the means employed was lacking.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was indubitably established based on the prosecution witness's positive testimony that the victim was shot from behind at a distance of six meters and shot again after falling, corroborated by the medical expert's findings.
• Due Process: No. Dispensing with the retaking of testimonies of witnesses may not be likened to an accused pleading guilty to a capital offense, and the accused amply presented his defense with his own testimony and those of two other available witnesses.
• Illegal Possession of Firearms: Yes. The accused proved no defense against the charge, and he is liable under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by R.A. No. 4, as P.D. No. 1866 cannot be retroactively applied.

• Self-Defense: Having interposed self-defense, the accused admits the authorship of the killing and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that the killing was justified. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased; his act of grabbing the gun from the accused, assuming it to be the fact, cannot be considered unlawful aggression since it was done to protect himself, as the gun was pointed at him. The victim did not manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of the accused, as the aggression must be of such character as to put in real danger the personal safety of the accused. The firing of the gun to scare the victim was completely unnecessary, as he was not threatening to attack and was unarmed. The element of reasonable necessity of the means employed was also lacking, as even assuming the first shot was accidental, there was certainly no necessity to shoot the victim a second time after he had fallen to the ground. The nature and number of wounds inflicted are constantly considered to negate self-defense.
• Treachery: Based on the evidence on record, treachery was indubitably established. Prosecution witness Buensalida positively testified that Bulan was shot at a distance of six meters from behind and was shot again after he fell to the ground, corroborated by the medical expert's findings that the victim was shot twice and one of them came from behind. An eyewitness' account that jibes with the autopsy findings is credible. Treachery exists when a defenseless victim is shot or stabbed from behind, showing that the accused had employed means of attack which offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might have taken.
• Due Process: The retaking of testimonies of witnesses may not be likened to that of an accused pleading guilty to a capital offense. Judges should be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction, since any mistake or misunderstanding on his part, especially in capital offenses, may prove irreversibly fatal. In dispensing with the retaking of the testimonies of witnesses, there can be no possibility of a conviction based solely on an improvident plea. The accused amply presented his defense with his own testimony and those of two other available witnesses, so his right to due process was not curtailed.
• Illegal Possession of Firearms: There is no disputing that the accused was not the owner of the shotgun, yet as caretaker of the fishpond he carried the gun around without any license or permit issued by any competent authority, establishing his animus possidendi. A certification issued on 2 May 1983 by Dionisio T. Disonglo, Jr., Acting Chief of Records, Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine Constabulary, stated that as of 28 April 1983 the accused was not a firearm licensee of any kind or caliber and that the shotgun was licensed in the name of Mateo Y. Olindo, with that license expiring on 21 September 1982, five days before the incident. The accused proved no defense against the charge. He is liable under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by R.A. No. 4, providing for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos. P.D. No. 1866, prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, approved on 29 June 1983, cannot be retroactively applied as it is unfavorable to the accused.

• Self-Defense — When the accused interposes self-defense, he admits the authorship of the killing and the burden of proof shifts to him to establish that the killing was justified. The requisites are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In this case, the defense failed because there was no unlawful aggression — the victim's act of grabbing the gun was done to protect himself — and the means employed were not reasonably necessary, as the accused shot the victim a second time after he had fallen.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when a defenseless victim is shot or stabbed from behind, showing that the accused employed means of attack which offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might have taken. The Court applied this doctrine where the prosecution witness testified that the victim was shot from behind at a distance of six meters and shot again after falling, corroborated by autopsy findings that one of two shots came from behind.
• Retroactivity of Penal Laws — A penal law cannot be retroactively applied when it is unfavorable to the accused. The Court applied this principle in refusing to apply P.D. No. 1866, which prescribed a higher penalty, to an offense committed on 26 September 1982, before the law's approval on 29 June 1983.

• "But there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. His act of grabbing the gun from the accused, assuming it to be the fact, cannot be considered unlawful aggression since it was done to protect himself; after all, the gun was pointed at him." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of self-defense, establishing that an act done to protect oneself from a gun pointed at him cannot constitute unlawful aggression.
• "Treachery exists when a defenseless victim was shot or stabbed from behind showing that the accused had employed means of attack which offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might have taken." — This is the canonical formulation of treachery applied by the Court to the facts of the case.
• "The retaking of testimonies of witnesses may not be likened to that of an accused pleading guilty to a capital offense." — This passage distinguishes the due process protections required for a guilty plea from those applicable to the dispensing of witness testimony retaking.

• People vs. Macagaling, G.R. Nos. 109131-33, 3 October 1994, 237 SCRA 299 — Cited for the proposition that when the accused interposes self-defense, he admits the authorship of the killing and the burden of proof shifts to him.
• People vs. Alapide, G.R. No. 104276, 20 September 1994, 236 SCRA 555 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proof in self-defense.
• People vs. Ocana, G.R. No. 63009, 19 January 1994, 229 SCRA 341 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proof in self-defense.
• People vs. Tanduyan, G.R. No. 108784, 13 September 1994, 236 SCRA 433 — Cited for the principle that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by an assailant are constantly considered to negate self-defense.
• People vs. Sagadsad, G.R. No. 88042, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 641 — Cited for the same principle regarding wounds negating self-defense.
• People vs. Sarense, G.R. No. 97433, 20 October 1992, 214 SCRA 780 — Cited for the same principle regarding wounds negating self-defense.
• People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 59436, 28 August 1992, 213 SCRA 52 — Cited for the principle that an eyewitness' account that jibes with autopsy findings is credible.
• People vs. Encipido, G.R. No. 70091, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 478 — Cited for the same principle regarding credibility of eyewitness accounts.
• People vs. Bello, G.R. No. 92597, 4 October 1994, 237 SCRA 347 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Muyano, G.R. Nos. 105621-23, 5 August 1994, 235 SCRA 184 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Apolonia, G.R. No. 111707, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 124 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Duque, No. L-33267-A, 27 September 1973, 53 SCRA 132 — Cited for the principle that judges should be extra solicitous in ensuring that an accused pleading guilty understands the full meaning of his plea.
• People vs. Busa, No. L-32047, 25 June 1973, 51 SCRA 317 — Cited for the same principle regarding guilty pleas.
• People vs. Apduhan, No. L-19491, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 798 — Cited for the same principle regarding guilty pleas.
• People vs. Mamogay, G.R. Nos. 55418-19, and People vs. Bituin, G.R. Nos. 55485-86, both prom. 29 June 1982 — Cited as examples where accused were convicted of illegal possession of firearm under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by R.A. No. 4.

• Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code as amended by R.A. No. 4 — The applicable law for illegal possession of firearms, providing for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos. The Court applied this provision because the offense was committed on 26 September 1982, before P.D. No. 1866 took effect.
• P.D. No. 1866 — Prescribes the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms. The Court held that this law, approved on 29 June 1983, cannot be retroactively applied to the case which transpired on 26 September 1982, as it is unfavorable to the accused.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred.