Rosal v. COMELEC

A candidate's presence during the distribution of public-funded cash assistance within the 45-day election ban constitutes indirect participation in the release and expenditure of public funds, warranting disqualification under Section 261(v)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, even if the project was a pre-existing government program. The prohibition is preventative and does not require proof of intent to influence voters, distinguishing it from the offense of vote-buying under Section 68(a).

In the lead-up to the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, Joseph San Juan Armogila filed separate petitions for disqualification against Noel Rosal (candidate for Governor of Albay), Carmen Geraldine Rosal (candidate for Mayor of Legazpi City), and Jose Alfonso Barizo (candidate for Councilor of Legazpi City). The petitions alleged violations of Section 68(a) (vote-buying) and Section 68(e) in relation to Section 261(v)(2) (prohibition on release of public funds during the election period) of the Omnibus Election Code. The allegations stemmed from cash assistance payouts conducted by the Legazpi City government to tricycle drivers and senior citizens on March 28-29 and April 2, 2022, which fell within the 45-day prohibited period. Armogila presented a Facebook post by Barizo thanking the Rosals and others for the payouts, along with text messages and affidavits claiming the candidates were present and that the events were framed as their initiative.

• Nature of the Case: Four consolidated petitions for certiorari challenging COMELEC resolutions that disqualified three winning candidates in Albay and Legazpi City from the May 9, 2022 elections.
• The Cash Assistance Payouts: The Legazpi City government, through its City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWDO), conducted cash assistance payouts (PHP 2,000 each) to tricycle drivers and senior citizens on March 28-29 and April 2, 2022. These dates fell within the 45-day prohibited period before the May 9, 2022 elections.
• The Disqualification Petitions: Armogila alleged the payouts constituted vote-buying (Sec. 68(a), OEC) and violated the prohibition on the release of public funds during the election period (Sec. 261(v)(2), OEC). Evidence included a Facebook post by candidate Barizo thanking Governor Noel Rosal, "Mayor Gie Rosal" (Carmen Rosal), and "VM Bobby Cristobal" (Vice Mayor Oscar Cristobal) for the payouts, along with text messages and affidavits.
• COMELEC Proceedings: The COMELEC Divisions found the candidates not guilty of vote-buying but guilty of violating Section 261(v)(2). On reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc reversed course for Carmen Rosal, disqualifying her for vote-buying instead, and ordered the second-placer for Mayor proclaimed.
• Supreme Court Intervention: The candidates filed separate petitions for certiorari. The Vice Governor of Albay and the second-placer for Mayor sought intervention. The Court consolidated the cases.

• Ongoing Government Program: Petitioners argued the cash assistance payouts were a continuation of a pre-existing, COA-reported social welfare program under the 2020-2022 Medium Term Public Investment Program, commenced in August 2021, long before the election period. Thus, they were exempt from the prohibition.
• No Vote-Buying Intent: They maintained there was no evidence they gave money with the intent to influence, induce, or corrupt voters. The Facebook post and text messages were mere announcements and expressions of gratitude for an LGU project.
• No Personal Disbursement: Carmen Rosal argued she was not a public official and could not be held liable for the release of public funds. Barizo argued he had no role in disbursing funds.
• Improper Application of Law: They contended COMELEC erroneously applied Section 261(v)(2) to a non-calamity situation and that reporting to COA constituted substantial compliance with the exception.

• Violation of Election Ban: COMELEC and Armogila argued that the actual payout of cash during the 45-day prohibited period constituted a clear release, disbursement, and expenditure of public funds, regardless of when the project was obligated or approved.
• Indirect Participation: They contended the candidates' presence at the events, coupled with the display of election paraphernalia and attribution of the project to them in the Facebook post, constituted indirect participation in the distribution of relief, violating Section 261(v)(2).
• Failure to Secure Exception: Respondents argued the LGU failed to file a petition for a Certificate of Exception before COMELEC as required by its rules for social welfare projects, and mere reporting to COA was insufficient.
• Carmen Rosal's Liability: COMELEC argued Carmen was liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or, as later held, for vote-buying under Section 68(a), as the ordinary interpretation of the Facebook post was that the cash assistance came from her and other candidates.

• Vote-Buying (Sec. 68(a), OEC): Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Carmen Rosal guilty of vote-buying, and in finding Noel Rosal and Jose Barizo not guilty of the same.
• Prohibited Release of Public Funds (Sec. 261(v)(2), OEC): Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Noel Rosal, Carmen Rosal, and Jose Barizo for violating the prohibition on the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the 45-day election ban.
• Succession/Replacement: Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the proclamation of the second-placer for Mayor and in applying the rules on succession for the Governor.
• Intervention: Whether the petitions for intervention of Al Francis Bichara and Alfredo Garbin, Jr. should be granted.

• Vote-Buying (Sec. 68(a), OEC): COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Carmen Rosal guilty of vote-buying. The evidence—consisting of a Facebook post, text messages, and affidavits—was insufficient to prove she personally gave money with the intent to influence voters. The payouts were an LGU project, and gratitude expressed to her did not meet the substantial evidence standard for disqualification under this provision. The findings absolving Noel Rosal and Jose Barizo of vote-buying were upheld.
• Prohibited Release of Public Funds (Sec. 261(v)(2), OEC): COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The actual payout of cash within the 45-day prohibited period constituted a prohibited "release, disbursement, or expenditure" of public funds. The prohibition applies to social welfare projects of LGUs, not just national agencies, and a "continuing" project is not exempt. The candidates' presence at the distributions, coupled with their association with the event, constituted "indirect participation" prohibited by the law. The LGU's failure to secure a Certificate of Exception from COMELEC was fatal to their defense.
• Succession/Replacement: For the Governor and Councilor positions, the rules on succession under the Local Government Code apply. For the Mayor position, the Court, pro hac vice and due to the exceptional circumstance that the Vice Mayor (the successor) appeared equally implicated in the same offense, ordered COMELEC to conduct a separate disqualification proceeding against him before determining the rightful successor.
• Intervention: The belated petition for intervention by the second-placer for Governor was dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period and directly before the Supreme Court, which is not a trier of facts.

• Prohibition on Release of Public Funds During Election Period (Sec. 261(v)(2), OEC) — The prohibition is preventative and aims to insulate public funds from partisan political activity. It applies to the actual payout or release of funds during the 45-day ban, regardless of when the project was obligated or approved. The exemption for "routine and normal expenses" or projects authorized by COMELEC after due notice and hearing is strictly construed. A social welfare project of an LGU falls within the prohibition.
• Indirect Participation — A candidate's or their spouse's presence at a distribution of public-funded relief, especially when coupled with electioneering materials and public attribution of the project to them, constitutes "indirect participation" in the prohibited release and distribution, even if they did not physically hand out the money.
• Distinction Between Vote-Buying and Illegal Disbursement — The offenses under Section 68(a) (vote-buying) and Section 261(v) (illegal disbursement) are not mutually exclusive but have different elements. Vote-buying requires proof of intent to influence voters, while the illegal disbursement prohibition is a strict liability rule focused on the timing and source of funds. A finding of no vote-buying does not absolve one of violating the election spending ban.

• "The law's intention is to prevent a scenario in which incumbent public officials promote their respective candidacies for re-election using public funds by spending the same in cashout activities or projects that help boost their visibility and winnability. The law frowns upon the usage of people's money to distort the democratic process of elections."
• "It is the act of the release of the funds—the act which is more tangible and can therefore better influence the electorate—that is punished, and not so much the other processes that are typically carried out only within the halls of power and are not done in full public display, and so will not have as much influence upon the voters."
• "The prohibition to disallow the release, disbursement, and expenditure of public funds for all social welfare and development projects and activities applies to those undertaken by the LGU, as well."
• "What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. It would also be the height of absurdity and impropriety to install someone in power and effectively give the people a leader who, after all, like respondents in this case, seems to have also violated the law..."

• Lozano v. Yorac (280 Phil. 280 [1991]) — Cited as controlling precedent for the standard of proof in vote-buying cases. The Court upheld COMELEC's dismissal where the evidence showed the government, not the candidate, was the giver of Christmas gifts, and the candidate's presence was incidental.
• Velez v. People (860 Phil. 629 [2019]) — Applied to hold that the prohibition in Section 261(v)(2) covers all social welfare projects by any government office, including LGUs, and that a "continuing" project is not exempt.

• Section 68(a), Omnibus Election Code — Disqualifies a candidate found to have given money or other material consideration to influence, induce, or corrupt voters.
• Section 261(v)(2), Omnibus Election Code — Prohibits any public official from releasing, disbursing, or expending public funds for social welfare projects within 45 days before a regular election. It also prohibits any candidate or their spouse/family member from participating, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of any relief or goods.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 10747, Section 13 — Requires the filing of a petition for a Certificate of Exception before the COMELEC for social welfare projects to be implemented during the prohibited period.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur. Hernando, J., on official business, but left concurring vote. Lazaro-Javier and Rosario, JJ., on official business, but left concurring vote. Zalameda, J., on leave, but left concurring vote. Inting, J., no part.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.