AI-generated

Roquero vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

The dismissal of petitioner Roquero was affirmed on the ground that possessing and using shabu on company premises constitutes serious misconduct warranting termination, instigation being only a defense against criminal liability and not a shield against administrative dismissal — especially for a position involving aircraft maintenance and the safety of human lives. However, PAL was ordered to pay Roquero's salaries from the time the NLRC's reinstatement order was issued until the finality of the Supreme Court's decision, because the order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal and no restraining order had been issued. The Court thus split the outcome: the dismissal stood, but the employer's refusal to comply with the executory reinstatement order carried a financial consequence.

Primary Holding

An employee caught possessing and using prohibited drugs on company premises may be validly dismissed for serious misconduct notwithstanding employer instigation, which is a defense only against criminal liability and not against administrative dismissal, but the employer must pay the employee's wages from the time a reinstatement order was issued until the finality of the decision reversing it, because such orders are immediately executory even pending appeal and absent a restraining order, compliance is ministerial.

Background

Alejandro Roquero and Rene Pabayo were ground equipment mechanics of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), tasked with the repair and maintenance of PAL's airplanes. PAL maintained a Code of Discipline prohibiting employees from taking or being under the influence of prohibited or controlled drugs while on company premises or on duty, with dismissal as the prescribed penalty. The statutory framework governing the immediate executory nature of reinstatement orders is found in Article 223 (third paragraph) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals.

History

  1. Labor Arbiter

    Upheld the dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo, finding both parties at fault (PAL for enticing the complainants, the complainants for giving in), but awarded separation pay and attorney's fees.

  2. RTC Branch 114, Pasay City

    Acquitted Roquero and Pabayo in the criminal case charging conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug under Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, on the ground of instigation.

  3. NLRC

    Reversed the Labor Arbiter, found PAL guilty of instigation, and ordered reinstatement of Roquero and Pabayo to their former positions but without backwages.

  4. Labor Arbiter

    Granted the motion for writ of execution of the order of reinstatement; PAL refused to execute, having filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

  5. Supreme Court

    Referred PAL's petition to the Court of Appeals per St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC.

  6. Court of Appeals (Former Thirteenth Division)

    Reversed the NLRC, reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision upholding Roquero's dismissal, and denied the award of separation pay and attorney's fees; denied Roquero's motion for reconsideration.

  7. Supreme Court (Third Division)

    Affirmed the dismissal but ordered PAL to pay Roquero's wages from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of the decision.

Facts

Alejandro Roquero and Rene Pabayo were ground equipment mechanics of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), responsible for the repair and maintenance of the airline's airplanes. They were caught red-handed possessing and using methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel inside company premises. The two claimed they did not voluntarily indulge in the act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato, who was introduced to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL. According to Pabayo, Alipato often bragged about the drugs he could smuggle inside the company premises and invited other employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was unsuccessful until he persuaded Pabayo to join him; they met Roquero along the way and he agreed to join them. Inside the company premises, they locked the door and Alipato prepared the drugs. When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men entered the room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo, and seized the drugs and paraphernalia used.

Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination, the results of which showed they were positive for drugs. They were also brought to the security office of PAL, where they executed written confessions without the benefit of counsel. On March 30, 1994, they received a notice of administrative charge for violating the PAL Code of Discipline, were required to answer the charges, and were placed under preventive suspension. In their reply to the notice, they assailed their arrest and asserted that they were instigated by PAL to take the drugs. They argued that Alipato was not really a trainee of PAL but was placed in the premises to instigate the commission of the crime, basing this on the fact that Alipato was not arrested and had no record of employment with PAL.

By Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, PAL dismissed Roquero and Pabayo, prompting them to file a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal, finding both parties at fault — PAL for applying means to entice the complainants into committing the infraction and the complainants for giving in to the temptation — but awarded separation pay and attorney's fees. While the case was on appeal with the NLRC, the RTC acquitted Roquero and Pabayo of the criminal charge of conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug on the ground of instigation. The NLRC then ruled in favor of the complainants, likewise finding PAL guilty of instigation and ordering reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages. The complainants did not appeal but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of reinstatement, which the Labor Arbiter granted. PAL refused to execute the order on the ground that it had filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court, which was referred to the Court of Appeals per St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC. During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, PAL and Pabayo entered into a compromise agreement, and Pabayo's case was dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision insofar as it upheld the dismissal of Roquero, but denied the award of separation pay and attorney's fees on the ground that one who has been validly dismissed is not entitled to those benefits. Roquero's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this petition.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Instigation as Defense to Dismissal: Petitioner argued that he was instigated by PAL to take drugs through Alipato, who was not a real PAL trainee but was placed in the premises to instigate the commission of the crime, as evidenced by the fact that Alipato was not arrested and had no record of employment with PAL.
  • Sole Responsibility for Instigation: Petitioner raised whether the instigated employee should be solely responsible for an action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the employer.
  • Non-Halt of Executory Reinstatement Order: Petitioner argued that the executory nature of the reinstatement order cannot be halted by a petition filed in higher courts absent any restraining order or preliminary injunction.
  • Employer Liability for Refusal to Reinstate: Petitioner contended that the employer who refused to reinstate an employee despite a duly issued writ should be liable to pay the employee's salary from the time he was ordered reinstated up to the time the reversed decision was handed down.

Issues

  • Instigation as Defense to Dismissal: Whether the instigated employee shall be solely responsible for an action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the employer.
  • Executory Nature of Reinstatement Order: Whether the executory nature of the decision, more so the reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunal's order, can be halted by a petition filed in higher courts without any restraining order or preliminary injunction having been ordered in the meantime.
  • Employer Liability for Refusal to Reinstate: Whether the employer who refused to reinstate an employee despite a writ duly issued shall be held liable to pay the salary of the employee from the time he was ordered reinstated up to the time the reversed decision was handed down.

Ruling

  • Instigation as Defense to Dismissal: Yes. The instigated employee is solely responsible; instigation is only a defense against criminal liability and cannot shield against dismissal from employment, especially when the position involves the safety of human lives.
  • Executory Nature of Reinstatement Order: No, the executory nature cannot be halted. An order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal, and absent a restraining order, implementation is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter.
  • Employer Liability for Refusal to Reinstate: Yes. PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he were reinstated, from the time of the NLRC decision until the finality of the Supreme Court's decision, because no restraining order was issued and PAL failed to actually reinstate or reinstate him in the payroll.

Ruling Rationale

  • Instigation as Defense to Dismissal: Petitioner is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing and using shabu, in violation of Chapter 2, Article VII, Section 4 of the PAL Code of Discipline, which mandates dismissal for any employee who takes or is under the influence of prohibited drugs while on company premises or on duty. Serious misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, implying wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For serious misconduct to warrant dismissal, it must (1) be serious, (2) relate to the performance of the employee's duty, and (3) show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. All three elements are present: drugs damage the mental faculties of the user; Roquero was tasked with the repair and maintenance of airplanes, a duty he cannot safely discharge as a drug user; his failure could mean great loss of lives and property. He took the drugs fully knowing he was on duty and that it was prohibited by company rules. Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability — as shown by the RTC's acquittal — but it cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from employment, especially when the position involves the safety of human lives. Procedural due process was satisfied through compliance with the twin-notice requirement: the notice apprising the employee of the charges and the subsequent notice of the decision to dismiss.
  • Executory Nature of Reinstatement Order: Article 223 (third paragraph) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The rationale, as explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC, is a compassionate policy designed to stop a continuing threat to the survival of the dismissed employee and his family. No restraining order was granted in this case, making it mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them.
  • Employer Liability for Refusal to Reinstate: The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Even if the order of reinstatement is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. PAL failed to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Accordingly, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he were reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the Supreme Court's decision.

Doctrines

  • Serious Misconduct — Defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implying wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For serious misconduct to warrant dismissal, three elements must concur: (1) it must be serious; (2) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duty; and (3) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. The Court found all three present: Roquero's drug use was serious, related to his duty as an airplane mechanic, and rendered him unfit because drugs damage the mental faculties critical to safe aircraft maintenance.
  • Instigation as Defense Limited to Criminal Liability — Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability and cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from employment, especially when the position involves the safety of human lives. The Court applied this doctrine by affirming Roquero's dismissal notwithstanding the RTC's acquittal on the ground of instigation, drawing a clear boundary between criminal and administrative consequences of the same conduct.
  • Immediate Executory Nature of Reinstatement Orders — Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The employer must either admit the employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to dismissal or, at the employer's option, merely reinstate him in the payroll. Absent a restraining order, implementation is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter. The unjustified refusal to reinstate entitles the employee to payment of salaries from the time of non-reinstatement despite a writ of execution. Even if the reinstatement order is ultimately reversed on appeal, the employer's obligation to reinstate and pay wages during the appeal period persists until the higher court's reversal becomes final.
  • Twin-Notice Requirement — Requires (1) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, along with the opportunity to air his side, and (2) a subsequent notice of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The Court found that PAL complied with both notices before dismissing Roquero.

Key Excerpts

  • "Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability. It cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from employment especially when the position involves the safety of human lives." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first issue, establishing the boundary between criminal and administrative liability in cases of employer instigation, and is the proposition for which the case is most commonly cited.
  • "The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution." — This states the controlling rule on the immediate executory nature of reinstatement orders and the financial consequence of an employer's non-compliance, articulating the doctrine in canonical form.
  • "even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court." — This clarifies that the employer's obligation to reinstate and pay wages persists throughout the appeal period even if the order is ultimately reversed, resolving the tension between immediate executory status and eventual appellate reversal.

Precedents Cited

  • Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246 (1991) — Followed for the rationale behind the immediate executory nature of reinstatement orders, explaining the compassionate policy that underlies the statutory provision and the police-power justification for stopping a continuing threat to the dismissed employee's survival.
  • Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 306 SCRA 151 (1999) — Followed for the rule that unjustified refusal to reinstate entitles the employee to payment of salaries from the time of non-reinstatement despite a writ of execution; cited in turn for the principle that technicalities have no room in labor cases.
  • Austria vs. NLRC, 312 SCRA 410 (1999) — Followed for the definition of serious misconduct as transgression of an established and definite rule of action, willful in character and implying wrongful intent.
  • Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. NLRC, 331 SCRA 237 (2000) — Followed for the three-element test for serious misconduct warranting dismissal: seriousness, relation to duty, and unfitness to continue working.
  • St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 — Applied as the procedural basis for referring PAL's petition for review from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals.
  • Skippers Pacific, Inc. vs. Manuel V. Vera, G.R. No. 144314, November 21, 2002 — Followed for the twin-notice requirement in employee dismissal proceedings.
  • Medina vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System, 222 SCRA 707 (1993) — Cited via Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines for the rule on reinstatement and salary payment upon employer's refusal to comply.

Provisions

  • Article 223 (third paragraph), Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 — Provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee is immediately executory insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, even pending appeal; the employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions or reinstated in the payroll at the option of the employer. The Court applied this provision to hold that PAL was obligated to reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll, and that its failure to do so entitled Roquero to salary payment.
  • Section 2, NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under Republic Act No. 6715 — States that the reinstatement aspect of a Labor Arbiter's decision is immediately executory even pending appeal. Applied in conjunction with Article 223 to establish the ministerial duty of implementation absent a restraining order.
  • Chapter 2, Article VII, Section 4, PAL Code of Discipline — Company rule providing that any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the influence of prohibited or controlled drugs shall be dismissed. The Court found that Roquero's conduct violated this provision and constituted serious misconduct.
  • Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 — The criminal provision under which Roquero and Pabayo were charged with conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug; the RTC acquitted them on the ground of instigation, which acquittal the Supreme Court held did not preclude administrative dismissal.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.