Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Court held that an inordinate delay of almost six years by the Office of the Ombudsman in resolving criminal complaints violates the accused's constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the complaints.

Petitioners Felicidad M. Roque and Prudencio N. Mabanglo, both Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Schools Division Superintendents, were subjects of a Commission on Audit investigation regarding a P9.36 million allotment released by DECS Regional Office No. XI. Following the audit, which found major deficiencies and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, affidavits of complaint were filed against Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against Roque on May 16, 1991, with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

• Audit and Complaints: In January 1991, COA auditors found major deficiencies and violations in the P9.36 million allotment released by DECS Regional Office No. XI. Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991.
• Inordinate Delay: On June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for preliminary investigation, and petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits. However, no action was taken for almost six years. The case against Mabanglo was resolved only on March 18, 1997, and the case against Roque on April 30, 1997. Respondents offered no explanation why it took almost six years for the Deputy Ombudsman to resolve the complaints.
• Filing of Informations and Petition for Mandamus: Following the resolution of the complaints, Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Mabanglo (Criminal Case No. 24229) and Roque (Criminal Case Nos. 24105 and 24106). On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the Petition for Mandamus, alleging that the six-year delay violated their right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court issued a TRO on November 24, 1997. Petitioners subsequently moved to cite respondents in contempt for allegedly filing an information in violation of the TRO.

• Petitioners maintained that the six-year delay in resolving the complaints violated their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.
• Petitioners argued that such undue and unjustifiable delay warranted the dismissal of the complaints.
• Petitioners contended that respondents should be cited in contempt for filing an information in violation of the TRO issued by the Court.

• Respondents countered that petitioners could not compel the Ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges via mandamus, because dismissal involves a discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.
• Respondents argued that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the complaints were resolved and the informations were filed.
• Respondents attempted to justify the delay by noting that Ombudsman Desierto needed six months to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel the Ombudsman to dismiss the complaints, given the discretionary nature of the Ombudsman's duty.
  • Whether the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic upon the filing of the Informations.
  • Whether respondents should be held in contempt for allegedly violating the TRO.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the six-year delay in resolving the complaints violated petitioners' constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.
  • Whether such delay warrants the dismissal of the complaints.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that mandamus is proper despite the discretionary nature of the Ombudsman's duty. An exception exists where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority, which applies to the six-year inordinate delay. The Court also ruled that the Petition for Mandamus did not become moot and academic; the subsequent filing of informations could not cure the unconstitutional delay that had already occurred. Finally, the Court denied the petition for contempt, holding that the Information against Mabanglo was filed before the TRO was issued, and the petition for contempt was improperly docketed under the same case number as the principal action without a court order for consolidation, in violation of Section 4(2), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the almost six-year delay violated petitioners' constitutional rights to due process and a speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the complaints. Because the Ombudsman failed to comply with the constitutional mandate to act promptly, the Court directly dismissed the Ombudsman cases, even though petitioners only prayed for a ruling directing the Ombudsman to dismiss them.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The Constitution mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. An inordinate and unexplained delay in resolving criminal complaints violates the accused's constitutional rights to due process and a speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the complaints. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the complaints that had been pending for almost six years without justification.
• Mandamus as a Remedy Against Discretionary Acts — As a general rule, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. However, an exception exists where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority equivalent to the denial of a settled right. The Court applied this exception because the six-year delay constituted gross abuse of discretion and manifest injustice.

• "Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials' rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint." — Articulates the ratio decidendi that inordinate delay by the Ombudsman violates constitutional rights and warrants dismissal.
• "But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time." — Quoted from Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, emphasizing that the eventual filing of informations cannot cure the violation of the right to speedy disposition caused by prior delay.

• Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court dismissed a complaint pending for more than six years before the Ombudsman, ruling that inordinate delay violates the right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
• Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988) — Followed. The Court dismissed complaints where the Tanodbayan took three years to resolve them, establishing that the eventual filing of informations cannot cure the prior unconstitutional delay.
• First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 30 (1996) — Followed. Held that mandamus will issue where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority equivalent to the denial of a settled right.
• Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 156 SCRA 222 (1987) — Followed. Recognized the exception to the rule that mandamus will not issue to control discretionary acts in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.

• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The Court held that the six-year delay by the Ombudsman violated this provision.
• Section 12, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. The Court found that the Ombudsman failed to comply with this constitutional mandate.
• Section 13, Republic Act No. 6770 — Reiterates the duty of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints. The Court cited this provision to emphasize the Ombudsman's statutory duty to act promptly.
• Section 4(2), Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for contempt arising from or related to a principal action pending in court shall be docketed, heard, and decided separately, unless the court orders consolidation. The Court applied this rule to deny the petition for contempt, which was filed under the same docket as the principal action without a court order for consolidation.

Romero, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.