Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals

The Court held that a petition for certiorari is premature if a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order remains pending before the lower court, unless exceptional circumstances justify immediate recourse. On the substantive issue, the Court held that the phrase "individually and jointly" in a compromise agreement creates a several or solidary obligation under Articles 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code, making each debtor liable for the entire prestation.

Private respondent Antonio P. So filed a collection case against petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo and three other defendants for the value of dishonored checks. The parties subsequently submitted a compromise agreement, which was approved by the trial court. The agreement provided for a reduced total sum and an installment payment schedule, with the defendants binding themselves to pay "individually and jointly." After the defendants allegedly failed to make the initial payment, the private respondent moved for execution. The petitioner opposed, arguing he had tendered his pro-rata share and that the obligation was merely joint, not solidary.

Petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo was one of four defendants in a collection case filed by private respondent Antonio P. So. The parties entered into a compromise agreement approved by the trial court, reducing the claim and providing for installment payments. The agreement stated the defendants would pay "individually and jointly." After an alleged default on the first installment, the private respondent moved for execution. The petitioner and another defendant tendered their alleged pro-rata shares, which were deposited with the Clerk of Court and later withdrawn by the private respondent. The trial court ultimately ordered execution of the entire unpaid balance against all defendants. A writ was issued, and a sheriff's sale of petitioner's personal properties was scheduled. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the execution order was reset to the same morning as the scheduled sale. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it as premature.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his certiorari petition as premature, contending that the motion for reconsideration had been denied by the trial court on the same day the petition was pending, rendering the issues ripe. He maintained that the trial court's execution order varied from the final and executory compromise judgment, which did not declare the defendants' liability to be solidary. Consequently, he asserted his liability was merely joint and pro-rata, and execution against his property for the entire debt of all co-defendants was unlawful.

Respondent countered that the certiorari petition was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust judicial remedies, as the petitioner did not await the resolution of his motion for reconsideration before the trial court. Substantively, respondent argued that the compromise agreement's use of "individually and jointly" created a solidary obligation, entitling him to full execution against any one of the defendants for the entire unpaid obligation.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petitioner's filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order before the trial court.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the liability of the defendants under the compromise agreement was merely joint or was several/solidary, such that execution could issue against one defendant for the entire unpaid obligation.

• Procedural: The Court found that the general rule requiring exhaustion of remedies via a motion for reconsideration was not absolute. Exceptional circumstances existed: the relief was extremely urgent because the petitioner's properties were scheduled for public auction on the same day his motion for reconsideration was to be heard, creating an imminent threat. Thus, direct recourse to certiorari was justified.
• Substantive: The Court held that the obligation was several/solidary. The phrase "individually and jointly" in the compromise agreement expressly indicated that each defendant bound himself to perform the whole obligation. Under Articles 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code, solidarity is not presumed but exists when the obligation expressly so states. The term "individually" was synonymous with "severally," creating an enforceable several obligation. Therefore, the execution against petitioner's property for the full debt was proper.

• Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative/Judicial Remedies — This doctrine requires that all available remedies within the court a quo be exhausted before seeking extraordinary writs from a higher court. The Court applied the recognized exception where the relief is extremely urgent, as the scheduled execution sale created an imminent threat to property rights that could not await the ordinary course of litigation.
• Nature of Obligations: Joint vs. Solidary (Articles 1207 & 1208, Civil Code) — The Court reiterated that the concurrence of debtors does not imply solidary liability. Solidarity must be expressly stated or required by law or the nature of the obligation. The Court interpreted the contractual phrase "individually and jointly" as an express statement creating a several obligation, following prior jurisprudence that similar terms impose individual liability for the entire debt.

• "The term 'individually' has the same meaning as 'collectively', 'separately', 'distinctively', respectively or 'severally'. An agreement to be 'individually liable' undoubtedly creates a several obligation."
• "The obligation in the case at bar being described as 'individually and jointly', the same is therefore enforceable against one of the numerous obligors."

• Parot v. Gemora — Cited for the ruling that the phrase "juntos or separadamente" in a promissory note is an express statement making each signatory individually liable for the full amount.
• Un Pak Leung v. Negorra — Cited to illustrate that absent a finding of individual liability, debtors are each liable only for their proportional share.

• Article 1207, Civil Code — Provides that the concurrence of debtors does not imply solidary liability, which exists only when expressly stated, or when required by law or the nature of the obligation.
• Article 1208, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption that a debt with multiple debtors is divided into equal shares, absent an indication of solidarity from the law, nature, or wording of the obligation.

• Justice Aquino — Concurred in the result only, without offering a separate opinion.