Romulo vs. Yñiguez

The Batasan Pambansa's dismissal of an impeachment complaint, whether by its Committee or by the Batasan as a body, is a political question beyond judicial review, and the Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct an impeachment trial through mandamus or prohibition, as the 1973 Constitution vests in the Batasan the exclusive power to initiate, try, and decide all cases of impeachment.

The petitioners are members of the Batasan Pambansa representing more than one-fifth of all its members, who sought the impeachment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The respondents include the Speaker of the Batasan, members of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, and the Committee itself. The 1973 Constitution vests in the Batasan the exclusive power to initiate, try, and decide all cases of impeachment, providing that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of all members and that conviction requires the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all members. The Batasan approved its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings on August 16, 1984, by a vote of 114 in favor and 58 against.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan Pambansa, filed with the Batasan on August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with a verified complaint for impeachment. The resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration, disapproved Resolution No. 644, and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint on August 14, 1985. It then submitted its report, which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.

On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

On September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed with the Court. Petitioners prayed that the Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment unconstitutional, and Committee Report No. 154 dismissing Resolution No. 644 and the complaint null and void. They also prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from enforcing the questioned provisions and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the Committee to recall from the archives and report out the resolution and complaint so that the impeachment trial could be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body.

In G.R. No. L-71688, filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari to annul the same resolution of the Committee dismissing the complaint for impeachment, and mandamus to compel the Committee and the Batasan to give due course to the complaint. The Court denied due course and dismissed the petition, holding that the 1973 Constitution vested in the Batasan the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment, and that the action of the Committee involves a political question not cognizable by the courts.

The challenged provisions of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings include: Section 4, which empowers the Committee to determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance and to dismiss it if not; Section 5, which empowers the Committee to determine whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist and to dismiss the complaint if not; Section 6, which requires the Committee to submit a report with findings and recommendations, and provides for dismissal if probable cause has not been established; and Section 8, which requires a majority vote of all members of the Batasan for approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment.

• Unconstitutionality of the Rules: Petitioners contended that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules are unconstitutional because they amend Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa.
• Derailment of Impeachment Proceedings: Petitioners contended that the questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice with the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to the Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.
• Illegal Condition Precedent: Petitioners contended that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent — a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment — not required by the Constitution, which only requires the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all the members for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondents Speaker Yñiguez and the Members of the Committee contended that the petition should be dismissed because it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which the Court has no jurisdiction.
• Political Question: Respondents contended that the petition raises questions which are political in nature.
• Validity of the Rules: Respondents contended that the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution, and even assuming their invalidity, such invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint, for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules.
• Mandamus Not Available: Respondents contended that the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
• Procedural Objections: Respondent Cayetano contended that the question involved is purely political, the petitioners are not proper parties, the petition is in reality a request for an advisory opinion made in the absence of an actual case or controversy, prohibition and mandamus are not proper remedies, and preliminary mandatory injunction is not proper. Respondent Baterina contended that the petitioners lack standing to sue and impeachment is a power lodged exclusively in the Batasan.

• Jurisdiction over the Committee: Whether the Court has jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment.
• Power to Compel Trial: Whether the Court, assuming the resolution and complaint are recalled from the Archives, can order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained in said resolution and complaint.
• Constitutionality of the Rules: Whether Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional for violating Section 3, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

• Jurisdiction over the Committee: No. The Court has no jurisdiction to order the Committee to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment, because such an order would be tantamount to a direct order to the Batasan itself, which is beyond the Court's power to review.
• Power to Compel Trial: No. The Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial, because the dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers vested upon it by the Constitution, beyond the power of the Court to review.
• Constitutionality of the Rules: No. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are not violative of the provisions of the Constitution on Impeachment, as the Batasan has the power to adopt rules of its proceedings and the challenged provisions are not inconsistent with Section 3, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

• Jurisdiction over the Committee: The denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall from the Archives was tantamount to a confirmation of the Committee's action dismissing the resolution and complaint. The Batasan by even a majority vote can dismiss a complaint for impeachment. Since the Constitution requires at least two-thirds concurrence for conviction, a majority vote confirming the dismissal makes mathematically impossible the required two-thirds vote for conviction, so dismissal is in order. An order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself, citing Alejandrino vs. Quezon, where the Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

• Power to Compel Trial: The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers vested upon it by the Constitution, beyond the power of the Court to review. The Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. Issuing a writ of mandamus to the Committee would be an empty and meaningless gesture unless the Court would also order the Batasan to proceed to try the impeachment proceedings, which the Court cannot do. Citing Alejandrino vs. Quezon, mandamus should never issue where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial, or where it will create discord and confusion.

• Constitutionality of the Rules: The Constitution only says that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its members and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all members. The Batasan, pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its proceedings (Article VIII, Sec. 8[3]), may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The rules providing for dismissal of a complaint not sufficient in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring a majority vote for approval of the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Section 3, Article XIII. The provision requiring two-thirds concurrence for conviction is not violated by rules authorizing dismissal by a majority vote, since with such number of votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained. The actions of the Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint initiated by at least one-fifth of all members, and are not properly part of the "initiation phase" but of the "trial phase" or "preparatory to trial" phase, likened to actions taken by the Court in determining whether a petition should be given due course or dismissed outright. The Committee is required to submit its report to the Batasan, which has the ultimate decision whether to approve or disapprove. The Rules are merely procedural and not substantive, in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings, and courts take no cognizance of the rules of deliberative bodies. Finally, injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Rules will not lie because the acts sought to be restrained have already been consummated — they are fait accompli.

• Political Question Doctrine — A political question is one that involves the exercise of discretionary power by a coordinate branch of government, the resolution of which is beyond the competence of the courts. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the dismissal of the impeachment complaint by the Batasan as a body is an act in the exercise of powers vested upon it by the Constitution, beyond the power of the Court to review, and the Court cannot inquire whether in the exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely, absent an allegation of violation of any provision of the Constitution.
• Separation of Powers — The doctrine of separation of powers distributes the major powers of government among the President, the Batasan Pambansa, and the Judiciary. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that mandamus will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility, and that the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
• Exclusive Power of Impeachment — The 1973 Constitution vests in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the interpretation and application of the Batasan's rules of procedure in impeachment proceedings are beyond the powers of the Court to review, and that the dismissal of a petition for impeachment which the Batasan finds not meritorious or defective in form and substance is discretionary and not subject to judicial compulsion.
• Rules of Deliberative Bodies — Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not substantive, having the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are not violative of the Constitution, and that courts take no cognizance of the rules of public deliberative bodies.
• Mandamus Against Legislative Bodies — Mandamus should never issue from the Court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial, or where it will create discord and confusion. The Court applied this principle to hold that the writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it, and that an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

• "The 1973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. The action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the complaint for the impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing said petition for being insufficient in form and substance involves a political question not cognizable by the Courts." — This states the political question doctrine as applied to impeachment proceedings and the exclusive power of the Batasan over impeachment, forming the basis for the Court's refusal to review the Committee's dismissal.
• "Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its Members and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the Constitution says no more." — This defines the scope of the constitutional provisions on impeachment, supporting the Batasan's power to adopt its own rules of procedure and the validity of the challenged Rules.
• "The rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the form of a 'manual' and formally adopted by the body, or whether consisting of a body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in memory and by tradition are matters of which the judicial courts, as a general rule, take no cognizance." — This states the principle that courts take no cognizance of the rules of deliberative bodies, supporting the Court's refusal to review the Batasan's application of its impeachment rules.

• Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 — Controlling precedent on the principle that the Court cannot issue mandamus against a legislative body or its subordinate employees, as such an order would be tantamount to controlling the legislative body itself; also cited for the principle that mandamus should never issue where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial.
• Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612 — Followed for the principle that interference by the courts with the workings of a legislative committee is tantamount to interference with the legislative department itself.
• Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, 29 Mich. 320 — Cited for the principle that it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity.
• Remonte vs. Banto, 16 SCRA 257 and Aragones vs. Subido, 25 SCRA 95 — Cited for the principle that prohibition or injunction will not issue to restrain acts already performed or consummated.

• Section 2, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution — Vests in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment; applied to hold that the Committee's dismissal of the impeachment complaint involves a political question not cognizable by the courts.
• Section 3, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution — Provides that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of all members and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all members; applied to hold that the challenged Rules are not inconsistent with this provision, since a majority vote confirming dismissal makes the two-thirds vote for conviction mathematically impossible.
• Article VIII, Sec. 8[3], 1973 Constitution — Grants the Batasan the power to adopt rules of its proceedings; applied to uphold the validity of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings.
• Article XVI, 1973 Constitution — Prescribes the mandatory amendatory process; petitioners claimed the Rules amended the Constitution without complying with this process, but the Court found no amendment.

Aquino, CJ., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurred. Abad Santos, J., reserved his vote. Teehankee, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, reserving his vote and observing that the petition may well be dismissed for having become moot and academic in view of the expiration of the incumbent President's term upon the holding of the presidential elections scheduled on February 7, 1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment resolution and verified complaint may be duly submitted to the people for their proper consideration and judgment.