Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan

An information filed by an officer who has no authority to do so is null and void; the infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even express consent, nor by the conduct of a new preliminary investigation — a proper information must be filed by the duly authorized officer.

Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged in 24 informations before the Sandiganbayan with violating Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 for his alleged failure to file statements of assets and liabilities for the years 1962 to 1985. The informations were subscribed and filed by PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin. In an earlier petition docketed as G.R. No. 105248, Romualdez assailed the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG. On May 16, 1995, the Supreme Court declared the PCGG’s preliminary investigation invalid because the offenses did not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth and thus fell outside the PCGG’s jurisdiction. However, the Court ruled that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the informations or affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and directed the Sandiganbayan to suspend proceedings and order the Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation. Romualdez, then in exile abroad, failed to submit counter-affidavits on remand and returned to the Philippines only on April 27, 2000, when he surrendered and posted bail. The Office of the Special Prosecutor thereafter initiated a reinvestigation.

The prior Supreme Court decision: In G.R. No. 105248, petitioner challenged the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin over 24 informations charging petitioner with failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities (SALNs) for 1962 to 1985, in violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019. The Supreme Court found that the crimes ascribed to petitioner did not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth and did not involve acquisition of wealth under a crony status; they pertained solely to bare physical non-compliance with the mechanical duty to file SALNs. The PCGG was thus declared to have no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Court, however, ruled that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the informations or affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; the Sandiganbayan was ordered to suspend proceedings and require the Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation.

Proceedings on remand: On November 13, 1995, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within 15 days and gave the PCGG a similar period to reply. The Office of the Special Prosecutor was tasked to conduct the reinvestigation. Petitioner, then in exile, failed to submit any counter-affidavit. He returned to the Philippines only on April 27, 2000, voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan, and posted bail.

Motion to Quash and reinvestigation: Special Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero scheduled a clarificatory hearing on June 2, 2000, and sent notice to Atty. Jesus Borromeo. Atty. Borromeo informed her that he did not represent petitioner in these particular cases. The June 2 hearing was cancelled for non-appearance of petitioner and counsel. Meanwhile, on June 2, 2000, petitioner, through Atty. Otilia Dimayuga-Molo, filed a Motion to Quash the informations on the ground that the PCGG Commissioner who filed them had no authority to do so. Petitioner received notice of a clarificatory hearing set for June 9, 2000, only on June 6, 2000, at his Tacloban City address.

Assailed orders: On June 8, 2000 — one day before the June 9 clarificatory hearing — the Sandiganbayan heard the Motion to Quash. Without allowing the prosecution time to oppose, the Presiding Justice denied the motion in open court, terminated the preliminary investigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero, and set petitioner’s arraignment. Written orders denying the Motion to Quash and denying the oral motion for reconsideration were both dated June 8, 2000.

• Lack of Authority of the Filing Officer: Petitioner maintained that the PCGG Commissioner who subscribed and filed the 24 informations had no authority to do so, as the offenses charged did not involve ill-gotten wealth; thus, the informations should be quashed under Rule 117, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court.

• Non-Compliance with the Supreme Court’s Directive: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor, in violation of this Court’s explicit directive in G.R. No. 105248 that a proper preliminary investigation be conducted by the Ombudsman.

• Denial of Due Process and Prejudgment: Petitioner contended that he was denied due process because the Presiding Justice prejudged the issues and dictated the lengthy order denying the motion to quash in open court, and issued another order on the same date denying an alleged oral motion for reconsideration, thereby exhibiting bias and lack of cold neutrality.

• Prior Adjudication: Respondents countered that the issue of the PCGG Commissioner’s authority had already been resolved in G.R. No. 105248, where the Court declared that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court or the validity of the informations, and that the only consequence was the obligation to suspend proceedings and order a proper preliminary investigation.

• Improper Remedy: The Solicitor General argued that certiorari is not the proper remedy against the denial of a motion to quash, invoking the general rule that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and must be challenged by appeal after trial, not by a special civil action, citing Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan and Raro v. Sandiganbayan.

• Quashal of Information: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash on the ground that the PCGG Commissioner who filed the informations had no authority to do so.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition may properly lie against the denial of a motion to quash under the circumstances of the case.

• Termination of Reinvestigation: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it prematurely terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor.

• Quashal of Information: The informations were held void because they were filed by the PCGG Commissioner, who lacked authority over offenses that did not relate to ill-gotten wealth. The earlier decision in G.R. No. 105248 resolved only the invalidity of the preliminary investigation, not the authority to file the informations themselves. Under Rule 117, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court, lack of authority of the officer filing the information is a distinct ground for quashal. An information is an accusation subscribed by the prosecutor; in Sandiganbayan cases, the prosecutor is the Ombudsman, not the PCGG, when the charge does not involve ill-gotten wealth under Executive Order No. 1. The defect is not a mere remediable form inadequacy but a substantive nullity: an invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. The infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, express consent, or by conducting another preliminary investigation. Quoting Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Cudia v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that when an information is null and void for lack of authority to file, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment; a new information must be filed by the proper officer. The Sandiganbayan’s refusal to quash therefore constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Propriety of Certiorari: While the general rule is that certiorari does not lie against the denial of a motion to quash, the recognized exception was held to apply: special circumstances exist that clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal. Allowing trial to proceed on informations filed by an unauthorized officer would be a gross infringement of due process and an utter waste of judicial resources, since any subsequent conviction would necessarily be nullified. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was therefore properly entertained.

• Termination of Reinvestigation: The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion in abruptly terminating the reinvestigation. The Supreme Court’s directive in G.R. No. 105248 to order the Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation was rooted in the recognition that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right. Petitioner was effectively denied the opportunity to participate through no fault of his own: the initial notice of hearing was served on a lawyer who did not represent him in these cases, and the clarificatory hearing scheduled for June 9, 2000 was preempted the day before by the Sandiganbayan’s order terminating the reinvestigation. Petitioner could not be deemed to have waived his right to a proper preliminary investigation under these circumstances. The Sandiganbayan’s premature termination defeated the objective of affording petitioner procedural due process as mandated by the earlier decision.

• Due Process Claim: In light of the disposition quashing the informations, the Court did not pass upon the charge that the Sandiganbayan had prejudged the case and denied petitioner due process.

• Void Information for Lack of Authority — An information signed and filed by an officer who lacks the legal authority to do so is null and void. It is not a mere formal defect that can be cured by amendment, silence, acquiescence, or even express consent. A valid information subscribed by a competent officer is a jurisdictional requisite; without it, no criminal proceedings can be maintained. The remedy is to quash the information and require the filing of a new one by the proper officer.

• Separate and Distinct Grounds: Preliminary Investigation vs. Filing Authority — The invalidity of a preliminary investigation and the lack of authority of the officer who filed the information are distinct defects with different consequences. The former does not impair the validity of the information or the jurisdiction of the court, and the remedy is to suspend proceedings and remand for a proper preliminary investigation. The latter renders the information void ab initio and compels its quashal, as the defect goes to the very existence of a valid charge.

• Certiorari Against Denial of Motion to Quash: Exception — While an order denying a motion to quash is generally interlocutory and not subject to certiorari, the remedy may be exceptionally allowed where special circumstances demonstrate that an appeal would be an inadequate remedy, such as when trial on a void information would constitute a gross infringement of due process and an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.

• Substantive Right to Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural, right. A court-ordered reinvestigation must be meaningfully conducted and cannot be curtailed without violating the accused’s right to due process, especially when the accused was not afforded a genuine opportunity to participate.

• “An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.” This passage succinctly captures the dispositive rationale that a void information cannot anchor jurisdiction or valid proceedings.

• “It is a valid information signed by a competent officer, among other requisites, which confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.” The excerpt establishes the jurisdictional character of a properly subscribed information and the irremediable nature of the vice.

• “Consequently, all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case including the filing of the information and amended information with the respondent court should be struck down.” (quoting Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan) Adopted to underscore that unauthorized prosecutorial acts are nullities that must be entirely expunged.

• “It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.” Articulates the standard applied to justify immediate appellate review of the denial of the motion to quash.

• Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 244 SCRA 152 (1995) — Distinguished. The earlier decision only resolved the invalidity of the PCGG’s preliminary investigation and did not decide the issue of the PCGG Commissioner’s authority to file the informations; that question was now squarely raised and required a different analysis.

• Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 194 SCRA 474 (1991) — Directly in point and controlling. Held that an amended information filed by the PCGG for a non-ill-gotten-wealth offense was null and void for lack of authority; all PCGG actions, including the filing of the information, were struck down.

• Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 (1998) — Followed. Reiterated that the infirmity of an information due to lack of authority of the signing officer cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or express consent; a valid information signed by a competent officer is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.

• Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan, 271 SCRA 575 (1997) and Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 335 SCRA 581 (2000) — Cited by respondents for the general rule that certiorari does not lie against denial of a motion to quash; the Court acknowledged the rule but applied the recognized exception.

• Rule 110, Section 4, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines an information as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. The provision underscores that the authority of the subscribing officer is an essential element of a valid information, and the PCGG Commissioner, not being the proper prosecutor for non-ill-gotten-wealth cases, could not fulfill this requirement.

• Rule 117, Section 3(d), Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Enumerates “That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so” as a ground for a motion to quash. The ground was correctly invoked and should have been granted.

• Section 2(a) and (b), Executive Order No. 1 — Delimits the PCGG’s authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his family, relatives, and close associates. The charges of failing to file SALNs, which bore no relation to such ill-gotten wealth, fell outside this mandate.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were filed.

None. The decision was unanimous.