Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan

The PCGG's authority to investigate and prosecute offenses under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is limited to offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth; a charge of mere failure to file statements of assets and liabilities does not relate to ill-gotten wealth and falls outside that authority, so a preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over such a charge is invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The absence or invalidity of a preliminary investigation, however, does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction; the proper remedy is to suspend the proceedings and remand the case for a proper preliminary investigation.

Benjamin Romualdez served in the government for more than two decades, beginning as a technical consultant in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and at the time the proceeding was instituted in 1989 he held at least two offices simultaneously: Philippine ambassador to the United States of America and governor of his home province of Leyte. Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) imposes on every person in the government service the mandatory duty of annually filing a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities. Executive Order No. 1 vested the Presidential Commission on Good Government with authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. The dispute concerns the PCGG's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charges that Romualdez failed to comply with the annual filing requirement.

Benjamin Romualdez began his career in the government service spanning more than two decades as a technical consultant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. At the time of the institution of the proceeding in 1989, he was holding at least two offices simultaneously: that of Philippine ambassador to the United States of America and of governor of his home province of Leyte.

On the theory that Romualdez had failed to comply with the annual filing requirement of Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for twenty-four years, from 1962 to 1985, and after conducting a preliminary investigation and finding prima facie that there had indeed been such culpable omissions, the PCGG filed on February 22, 1989 twenty-four identically worded informations against Romualdez. The informations differed in text only as to the years corresponding to the violation and as regards the nature of Romualdez's public office in a given year, whether that of Foreign Affairs officer or Provincial Governor of Leyte. The essential accusation was that as a public official, and during the years specified, he did willfully and unlawfully neglect or refuse or fail, without any justifiable cause, to execute and file with the Department of Local Government, or with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year as provided by law. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 13406 to 13429 and raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan issued warrants for the arrest of Romualdez, but these could not be executed since he was out of the country. On October 21, 1991, Romualdez filed, through counsel, a Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest, praying that the informations against him be nullified, no valid preliminary investigation having been conducted as predicate for said indictments. Citing Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, he argued that the power of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigations is limited to cases involving ill-gotten wealth only, investigation of all others involving government officials being within the competence of the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies.

That motion was shortly followed by another, dated November 3, 1991, entitled Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Warrants of Arrest and/or to Recall the Same. In this motion, Romualdez informed the Sandiganbayan that he intended to come to Manila to be in the company of his widowed sister, the former First Lady, but expressed fear that he would be arrested upon arrival at the airport; and that to avoid that possibility, he proposed to post a cash deposit equivalent to the recommended bail bonds in these cases, to assure his voluntary surrender to the jurisdiction of the court and serve as cash bond for his provisional liberty should his first motion be denied. He was careful to point out that his motion was without prejudice to his contention that the informations were null and void as well as the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG upon which these informations were based.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution dated November 4, 1991 granting this second motion upon specific conditions: (1) that the cash deposit equivalent to the aggregate amount of the bond shall serve as a provisional cash bond for the accused's temporary liberty upon his personal appearance to the court; (2) that the cash deposit shall be made within five days from receipt thereof by movant's counsel, said act of deposit representing the conformity of the accused to the conditions; (3) that the accused himself shall arrive in the Philippines within thirty days from counsel's receipt thereof; and (4) that the accused shall personally present himself to the court on the next succeeding working day after his arrival for completion of the bail process. Should the accused not comply with conditions No. 3 and No. 4, the cash deposit considered as provisional cash bond would be deemed automatically forfeited in favor of the government.

On November 7, 1991, pursuant to this resolution, Romualdez posted the cash deposit/provisional cash bond in the prescribed amount. About a week later, on November 15, 1991, Romualdez filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the resolution of November 4, 1991 be partially modified as regards condition No. 3, because the accused may not be able to arrive within the thirty-day period on account of important family matters which would need his personal attention. He gave the assurance, however, that he would faithfully comply with the other conditions, especially that which requires him to personally present himself at the next working day after his arrival. On December 16, 1991, Romualdez filed another motion, again seeking modification of the period fixed for his return. In two resolutions, the Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez an additional extension of sixty days, or until February 5, 1992, to present himself before it.

Once more Romualdez sought a change in the period set for his return, through a Second Manifestation and Motion dated January 17, 1992, this time pleading that no definite period be fixed but reiterating his willingness to comply with the other conditions set forth in the Resolution of November 4, 1991. The PCGG objected, in a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Confiscate Cash Bond filed by Cesario L. del Rosario, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, acting as PCGG Investigating Prosecutor and Deputized Special Attorney, Office of the Solicitor General. Prosecutor del Rosario alleged that the Cojuangco ruling was inapplicable, the juridical situation therein being different from that in the Romualdez cases; that it was in fact he who had conducted the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 12, under which the instant criminal cases were filed; that the provisions of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure were followed; and that his resolution was reviewed by a review committee and thereafter submitted for the consideration of the Commission en banc, which eventually approved the recommendation that appropriate informations be filed in the Sandiganbayan.

By Resolution dated February 5, 1992, the Sandiganbayan conceded to Romualdez an inextendible period of thirty days from February 24, 1992 within which to return to the Philippines and present himself for bail proceedings, under the terms and conditions in the Resolution of November 4, 1991. At about this time, the Sandiganbayan acted on Romualdez's Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and denied it by Resolution dated January 29, 1992. It declared the Cojuangco ruling inapplicable, pointing out that the rationale therefor was the PCGG's inability to conduct the preliminary investigation with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, in view of its demonstrated pre-judgments of the cases in question, shown by its having earlier filed, after gathering evidence, a civil complaint alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints, and of its having also earlier issued sequestration and freeze orders on substantially the same basis. It postulated that the case of Romualdez was different, for as to it no such pre-judgment existed. The Romualdez cases did not refer to acquisition of wealth under a crony status, but solely to his bare physical non-compliance with his mechanical duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities over a period of twenty-four years; and the omissions have no bearing on Civil Case No. 0035 against Romualdez involving transactions in which he allegedly took advantage of his relationship with the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.

Romualdez moved for reconsideration on February 11, 1992. An opposition thereto was filed on February 28, 1992 by the PCGG. A reply was presented by Romualdez, in which he also asked for the deletion of the condition relative to the forfeiture of his cash deposit. A rejoinder to the reply was then submitted by the PCGG. By Resolution dated April 24, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied Romualdez's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, and ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of his cash bond in the total amount of P360,000.00 in all the twenty-four cases.

• PCGG's Lack of Authority to Conduct the Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner argued that the PCGG had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charges against him of violations of Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, conformably with Cojuangco vs. PCGG and Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan; hence the investigation conducted through its authorized deputy, Fiscal Cesario del Rosario, was invalid because beyond its jurisdiction.
• Sandiganbayan's Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that, as a necessary consequence, the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the twenty-four cases filed by the PCGG against him based on such preliminary investigation, it appearing on the face of the informations themselves that the party filing the information does not have the authority to file the same.
• Physical Submission to Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that the Sandiganbayan erred or acted capriciously and whimsically in ruling that the issue of the validity of the informations against him cannot be entertained unless he had physically submitted himself to the respondent court.
• Confiscation of the Cash Deposit: Petitioner contended that the Sandiganbayan erred in ordering the confiscation of the cash deposit.

• No Personality Without Physical Submission: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that without physically submitting himself to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, petitioner has no personality to raise any alleged defect in the preliminary and judicial proceedings, and that the absence of or defects in a preliminary investigation have no effect on the jurisdiction of the courts.
• PCGG Authority Over SAL Non-Filing: The OSG argued that the PCGG has authority to conduct preliminary investigations in ill-gotten wealth cases, including the non-filing of statements of assets and liabilities as a means of concealing one's assets and frustrating the efforts of the Government to determine the actual value or extent of a public officer's wealth.
• Estoppel by Acceptance of Conditions: The OSG argued that the posting of the cash deposit was an acceptance of the conditions set out in the Resolution of November 4, 1991, and estops petitioner from assailing any of them.

• Propriety of the Remedy: Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was the proper remedy to challenge the Sandiganbayan's interlocutory resolutions.
• PCGG's Authority to Conduct the Preliminary Investigation: Whether the PCGG had authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charges against Romualdez for violation of Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Waiver of the Right to Preliminary Investigation: Whether Romualdez waived his right to object to the defective preliminary investigation by filing motions to recall the warrants of arrest and to post bond.
• Effect of Invalid Preliminary Investigation on the Sandiganbayan's Jurisdiction: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the cases, issuing warrants of arrest, fixing bail, and confiscating the cash bond despite the absence of a valid preliminary investigation.
• Validity of the Confiscation of the Cash Bond: Whether the Sandiganbayan's confiscation of the cash deposit was proper.

• Propriety of the Remedy: No. Rule 45 governs appeals from judgments or final orders, and the challenged Sandiganbayan resolutions are interlocutory determinations of incidental matters from which no appeal lies; the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and on this ground the petition may be dismissed.
• PCGG's Authority to Conduct the Preliminary Investigation: No. The PCGG's power under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1 to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth does not extend to other acts or omissions not involving ill-gotten wealth penalized by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; the preliminary investigation over the twenty-four offenses was therefore invalid for lack of jurisdiction.
• Waiver of the Right to Preliminary Investigation: No. The right to a preliminary investigation may be waived, but no waiver, express or implied, may be discerned in petitioner's conduct, since his motions were expressly without prejudice to his objection that the informations and the preliminary investigation were null and void.
• Effect of Invalid Preliminary Investigation on the Sandiganbayan's Jurisdiction: The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court; the only effect is to impose on the court the obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation.
• Validity of the Confiscation of the Cash Bond: The Sandiganbayan's dispositions — its refusal to recall and quash the warrants of arrest or to modify the conditions for the cash bond, and its confiscation of the cash deposit — cannot be regarded as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or as grave abuse of discretion.

• Propriety of the Remedy: The petition was expressly filed in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 45, a mode of appeal limited to questions of law and governing appeals from judgments or final orders. The resolutions sought to be reviewed — denying the motion to recall the warrants of arrest, refusing to make indefinite the period of return, and ordering the confiscation of the cash bond — are interlocutory resolutions from which no appeal lies, being determinations of mere incidental matters not touching on the merits of the cases and not putting an end to the proceedings. On this ground the petition may be dismissed. The Court nonetheless resolved the merits to remove any misunderstanding as to the course petitioner's cases in the Sandiganbayan should take, noting that the averments that the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion are proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the appropriate remedy for review of interlocutory orders.

• PCGG's Authority to Conduct the Preliminary Investigation: The PCGG has the power, under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amassed before or after February 25, 1986. This power does not extend to other acts or omissions not involving ill-gotten wealth penalized by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Per Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, the PCGG's authority under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1 covers (a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1739, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, and (b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth. Other violations of the Anti-Graft Act not falling under these categories require previous authority of the President for the PCGG to investigate and prosecute; otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies. For a penal violation to fall under the PCGG's jurisdiction under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, three elements must concur: (1) it must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) of the late President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates; and (3) who took undue advantage of their public office and/or used their power, authority, influence, connections or relationship. The crimes ascribed to Romualdez — failure to file his annual statements of assets and liabilities — do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by him. No such relation may be perceived in the indictments themselves, which merely state that there was no justifiable cause for Romualdez's refusal or failure to file his annual statements. The Sandiganbayan itself found that the cases against Romualdez did not refer to acquisition of wealth under a crony status, but solely to his bare physical non-compliance with his mechanical duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities over a period of twenty-four years, and that the omissions have no bearing on Civil Case No. 0035 involving transactions in which he allegedly took advantage of his relationship with the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. These considerations also called for rejection of the Solicitor General's theory that Romualdez's non-filing of statements of assets and liabilities was a means of concealing his assets and frustrating the Government's efforts to determine the actual value or extent of his wealth. The Court therefore declared invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the twenty-four offenses for lack of jurisdiction.

• Waiver of the Right to Preliminary Investigation: The right to a preliminary investigation or to object to attendant defects may be waived, but no such waiver, express or implied, may be discerned in petitioner's conduct. His filing of motions to recall the warrants of arrest and to post bond could not be deemed a waiver of his objections to the preliminary investigation since, in said motions, he was careful to stress that they were without prejudice to his explicit objection that the informations were null and void as well as the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG upon which these informations were based. The Court cited Go vs. Court of Appeals, which held that the right to a preliminary investigation, while statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, is a component part of due process in criminal justice and is a substantive right; that it is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment; and that posting bail does not waive the right where the accused had claimed it before the approval of the cash bond.

• Effect of Invalid Preliminary Investigation on the Sandiganbayan's Jurisdiction: The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court which may have taken cognizance of the information. Any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made before entry of the plea, and the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand the case for preliminary investigation; the refusal of the court to remand the case can be controlled by certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial. As regards proceedings in the Sandiganbayan particularly, since absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, proceedings upon such information should be held in abeyance and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. Considering that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the informations or otherwise render them defective, much less affect the jurisdiction of the court, the only effect being the imposition on the latter of the obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation, it follows that all acts done by the court prior thereto must be accorded validity and effect, subject to the outcome of the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted.

• Validity of the Confiscation of the Cash Bond: The dispositions made by the respondent Sandiganbayan — its refusal to recall and quash the warrants of arrest or to modify the conditions laid down for petitioner's cash bond, and its confiscation of the cash deposit for violation by petitioner of the conditions thereof — cannot be regarded as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or so whimsical, capricious or oppressive or so utterly without foundation as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

• PCGG Jurisdiction Over Anti-Graft Offenses — The PCGG's authority under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1 to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth is limited. For a penal violation to fall under the PCGG's jurisdiction under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, the following elements must concur: (1) it must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) of the late President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates; and (3) who took undue advantage of their public office and/or used their power, authority, influence, connections or relationship. Other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not falling under these categories require previous authority of the President for the PCGG to investigate and prosecute; otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies. Applied here, the charge of failure to file statements of assets and liabilities does not relate to ill-gotten wealth, so the PCGG's preliminary investigation was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.

• Right to Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, but it is a component part of due process in criminal justice and is a substantive right, not a mere formal or technical right. It is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Posting bail does not waive the right where the accused had claimed it before the approval of the cash bond. In this case, no waiver was discerned because Romualdez's motions were expressly without prejudice to his objection that the informations and the preliminary investigation were null and void.

• Effect of Absence or Invalidity of Preliminary Investigation on Jurisdiction — The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court which may have taken cognizance of the information, nor does it impair the validity of the information or render it defective. The only effect is to impose on the court the obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation. Any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made before entry of the plea, and the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand the case for preliminary investigation; the refusal to remand can be controlled by certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial. Since absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information, proceedings should be held in abeyance and the case remanded to the Ombudsman.

• Interlocutory Orders Not Appealable — Rule 45 governs appeals from judgments or final orders. Interlocutory resolutions, being determinations of mere incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of the cases and do not put an end to the proceedings, are not appealable; the appropriate remedy for their review is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

• "Thus for a penal violation to fall under the jurisdiction of the respondent PCGG under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, the following elements must concur: (1) It must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) Of the late President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates; (3) Who took undue advantage of their public office and/or used their power, authority, influence, connections or relationship." — This passage, quoted from Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, states the controlling three-element test for determining whether a penal violation falls within the PCGG's jurisdiction, and supplied the ratio for invalidating the preliminary investigation in this case.

• "The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not however affect the jurisdiction of the Trial Court which may have taken cognizance of the information." — This is the ratio decidendi on the effect of a defective preliminary investigation: it does not oust the trial court's jurisdiction, but merely obliges the court to suspend proceedings and remand for a proper preliminary investigation.

• "The rule is that the right to a preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." — Quoted from Go vs. Court of Appeals, this passage states the canonical formulation of when the right to preliminary investigation is waived, and supported the finding that Romualdez did not waive the right.

• "Considering that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation 'did not impair the validity of the informations or otherwise render it defective, . . . (m)uch less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court . . .,' the only effect, to repeat, being the imposition on the latter of the obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation, it follows that all acts done by the Court prior thereto must be accorded validity and effect, subject to the outcome of the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted." — This passage explains why the Sandiganbayan's prior acts, including the confiscation of the cash bond, remained valid notwithstanding the invalid preliminary investigation.

• Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that the PCGG's power to conduct preliminary investigations is limited to cases involving ill-gotten wealth; the Sandiganbayan distinguished it on the ground that no pre-judgment existed in Romualdez's case.
• Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94595, February 26, 1991, 194 SCRA 474 — The controlling precedent enumerating the elements for a penal violation to fall under the PCGG's jurisdiction under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1; the Court applied its three-element test to invalidate the preliminary investigation.
• Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, 206 SCRA 138, February 11, 1992 — Cited for the rule that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive component of due process and is not waived by posting bail where the accused had claimed the right before arraignment.
• People vs. Escober, 157 SCRA 541, 565 (1988) — Cited for the rule that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or affect the jurisdiction of the court, the only effect being the obligation to suspend proceedings and hold a proper preliminary investigation.
• People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July 11, 1986 — Cited for the rule that any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made before entry of the plea.
• People vs. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16, 1961 — Cited for the rule that the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand the case for preliminary investigation.
• Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 — Cited for the rule that proceedings upon an information should be held in abeyance and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for a preliminary investigation.

• Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Imposes on every person in the government service the mandatory duty of annually filing a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities; the informations charged Romualdez with willfully and unlawfully neglecting or refusing or failing, without justifiable cause, to comply with this duty for the years 1962 to 1985.
• Section 2(a), Executive Order No. 1 — Vests the PCGG with power to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amassed before or after February 25, 1986; construed as not extending to other acts or omissions not involving ill-gotten wealth penalized by the Anti-Graft Act.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs appeals from judgments or final orders and is limited to questions of law; petitioner erroneously invoked it to challenge interlocutory resolutions.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The appropriate remedy for review of interlocutory orders on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
• Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — The provisions the PCGG Investigating Prosecutor claimed to have followed in conducting the preliminary investigation.
• Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information; cited to support holding the proceedings in abeyance and remanding for a proper preliminary investigation.

Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., took no part. Quiason and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.