Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City

For purposes of election law, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which requires both physical presence and the intent to remain in a fixed place. A domicile, once established, is not lost by a temporary, involuntary absence, such as self-exile due to political upheaval, absent clear and convincing evidence of an intent to abandon it and acquire a new domicile.

Petitioner Philip G. Romualdez, a natural-born citizen, established his legal residence and domicile at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte in the early 1980s, where he built a house and served as Barangay Captain. Following the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, he and his family left the Philippines and were granted asylum in the United States. In December 1991, after being informed by U.S. authorities that his voluntary departure status would end, he returned to the Philippines and to his residence in Tolosa, Leyte. On February 1, 1992, he registered as a voter for the upcoming synchronized elections.

• Establishment of Domicile: In the early 1980s, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, by constructing a residential house there. He served as Barangay Captain and voted in the 1984 Batasan and 1986 snap presidential elections.
• Departure from the Philippines: Following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986, petitioner, fearing for his family's safety, left the Philippines and was granted asylum in the United States.
• Return and Registration: In December 1991, after receiving a letter from U.S. immigration authorities requiring his departure, petitioner returned to the Philippines and directly to his residence in Tolosa, Leyte. On February 1, 1992, he registered as a voter at Precinct No. 9, Malbog.
• Challenge to Registration: Private respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition for exclusion, alleging petitioner was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A., and lacked the required residency in Tolosa.
• Lower Court Findings: The MTC found petitioner to be a resident of Malbog and denied the petition. On appeal, the RTC reversed, finding petitioner had voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence.

• Non-Abandonment of Domicile: Petitioner maintained that he had been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte since the early 1980s and that his physical absence from 1986 to December 1991 did not constitute an abandonment of that domicile, as his departure was involuntary due to political circumstances.
• Jurisdictional Defect (Estoppel): Petitioner initially questioned the jurisdiction of the courts, arguing the petition for exclusion was filed by a person (Advincula) who did not allege he was a registered voter in the same precinct, as required by Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, this argument was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.

• Abandonment of Residence: Respondent Advincula argued that petitioner's long-term stay in the United States, where he had his profession and occupation, demonstrated an intent to abandon his Philippine residence and establish a new domicile abroad.
• Lack of Qualifying Residence: Respondent contended that petitioner did not possess the required one-year residence in the Philippines and six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify as a voter for the 1992 elections, having only recently arrived from the U.S.

• Jurisdiction and Locus Standi: Whether the lower courts acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the failure of the petition for exclusion to allege that the complainant was a registered voter in the municipality.
• Abandonment of Domicile: Whether the respondent court erred in finding that petitioner voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

• Jurisdiction and Locus Standi: The issue of jurisdiction was deemed foreclosed. Petitioner was estopped from questioning the courts' jurisdiction because he had actively participated in the proceedings without raising the issue and had even sought affirmative relief by praying for the affirmation of the MTC decision on appeal. The matter was characterized more as a question of the complainant's locus standi, which was not timely challenged.
• Abandonment of Domicile: The RTC's finding of abandonment was reversed. The departure from the Philippines in 1986 was not voluntary but was prompted by the political upheaval of the EDSA Revolution, constituting a temporary, involuntary absence. No clear and convincing evidence showed an intent (animus non revertendi) to abandon the Tolosa domicile and establish a new one in the United States. The right to vote is a precious political right that must not be abridged, and petitioner's established domicile remained intact.

• Domicile in Election Law — In election cases, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which requires not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence there, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. To acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioner's physical absence did not, by itself, sever his domicile.
• Estoppel by Laches Against Jurisdictional Challenges — While lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, especially by seeking affirmative relief, will estop such party from later assailing that lack of jurisdiction.

• "The political situation brought about by the 'People's Power Revolution' must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as 'voluntary,' or as 'abandonment of residence' at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of 'domicile by choice.'"
• "The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed."

• Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 — Cited for the principle that "residence" in election law is synonymous with "domicile."
• Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 — Cited for the three requisites for acquiring a new domicile by choice.
• Aquino vs. CA, G.R. No. 91896, 204 SCRA 240 [1991]; Salen vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 59082, 198 SCRA 623 [1991]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, 23 SCRA 29 [1986] — Cited collectively for the doctrine of estoppel against belatedly questioning jurisdiction after active participation in proceedings.

• Section 142, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Provides that any registered voter in a city or municipality may file a petition for the exclusion of a voter from the list. The Court noted the issue of whether the private respondent complied with this requirement but did not rule on it due to estoppel.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, and Puno, JJ., concur. Chief Justice Narvasa and Justice Feliciano were on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the decision.