Romualdez-Licaros vs. Licaros

Extraterritorial service of summons on a non-resident defendant in an action affecting personal status may be validly effected under the third mode of service ("any other means the judge may consider sufficient") under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, provided it complies with due process; and a document acknowledged before a notary public or consul enjoys a prima facie presumption of due execution, which cannot be overturned by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and convincing proof.

Spouses Abelardo and Margarita separated in 1979. Margarita moved to the US with their children in 1982 and obtained a divorce decree in California in 1990. In August 1990, the spouses executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties, which Margarita acknowledged before the Philippine Consul in San Francisco. Abelardo subsequently filed a petition in the Philippines to dissolve their conjugal partnership, which was granted in December 1990. In June 1991, Abelardo filed a petition to declare their marriage null and void based on psychological incapacity. Because Margarita resided in the US, the trial court ordered summons served by publication and by sending copies through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The DFA received the documents, and the marriage was declared null and void in November 1991. Margarita learned of the nullity decree only in 2000 and filed a petition to annul the judgments based on lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.

• Marriage and Separation: Abelardo and Margarita were married on December 15, 1968, and had two children. Marital conflicts led the spouses to agree to separate in 1979. In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and settled there with the children.
• Divorce and Property Separation: On April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for divorce in the Superior Court of California, which was granted on August 6, 1990, along with a distribution of properties. On August 17, 1990, the spouses executed an "Agreement of Separation of Properties." The agreement explicitly stated it was subject to later approval by a court of competent jurisdiction.
• Consular Acknowledgment: On August 6, 1990, Margarita appeared before Amado P. Cortez, Consul of the Republic of the Philippines in San Francisco, California, to affirm and acknowledge that she executed the agreement of her own free will. Abelardo was not present at the consulate during this acknowledgment.
• Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership: On August 21, 1990, Abelardo filed a petition before the RTC Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and approval of the separation agreement. On December 27, 1990, the RTC granted the petition.
• Nullity of Marriage Petition: On June 24, 1991, Abelardo filed a petition to declare the marriage null and void based on psychological incapacity. Margarita, residing in California, was considered a non-resident defendant not found in the Philippines.
• Service of Summons: Abelardo initially moved to serve summons through an international courier, but the trial court denied the motion. Instead, the court ordered service by publication once a week for three consecutive weeks, and simultaneously directed that copies of the order, summons, and petition be sent to Margarita's address in California through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), at Abelardo's expense.
• DFA Receipt: On July 3, 1991, the process server mailed the documents to the DFA. A receiving clerk at the DFA acknowledged receipt of the documents on July 3, 1991, as reflected in the Officer’s Return dated July 15, 1991.
• Judgment of Nullity: The trial court referred the case to a prosecutor who found no collusion. Abelardo presented evidence ex-parte. On November 8, 1991, the RTC declared the marriage null and void, noting that jurisdictional requirements had been duly established.
• Belated Discovery: Almost nine years later, in April 2000, Margarita received a letter from a lawyer informing her that her marriage had been judicially dissolved. Upon verifying the judgment, she filed a petition to annul the RTC decisions on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

• Extrinsic Fraud: Margarita alleged that Abelardo coerced her into signing the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and the Agreement of Separation of Properties by threatening to cut off all financial and material support to their children studying in the United States. She claimed she had no hand in preparing the documents, never met the counsel for the petitioner or the notary public, and never received notice of the petition's pendency or a copy of the decision.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Margarita insisted that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the nullity case because she was never validly served with summons, nor did she voluntarily appear in court.

• Jurisdiction over Res: Abelardo argued that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not necessary, as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, which is the marital status.
• Valid Service: Abelardo maintained that there was proper summons by publication effected through the DFA as directed by the trial court, thus the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity.

• Validity of Service of Summons: Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo.
• Existence of Extrinsic Fraud: Whether there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties.

• Validity of Service of Summons: Valid service was effected. An action for declaration of nullity of marriage affects the personal status of the plaintiff and is an action in rem or quasi in rem. In such actions, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential; extraterritorial service of summons is required solely to comply with due process. The trial court's order to serve summons through the DFA falls under the third mode of extraterritorial service under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court—"by any other means the judge may consider sufficient." The DFA's receipt of the documents, as certified by the process server, constituted sufficient compliance with the trial court's order.
• Existence of Extrinsic Fraud: No extrinsic fraud was established. The factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that the documents were freely and voluntarily executed are binding on the Supreme Court in a Rule 45 petition. Furthermore, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez, giving rise to a prima facie presumption of due execution. A notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, and this presumption cannot be overthrown by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and convincing proof, which Margarita failed to provide. The implementation of the property separation by both parties further negated the claim of coercion.

• Extraterritorial Service of Summons in Actions In Rem — In actions affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, which are actions in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res. Extraterritorial service of summons on a non-resident defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but only to comply with the requirements of due process. Under Section 15, Rule 14, service may be effected by "any other means the judge may consider sufficient."
• Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Documents — A document acknowledged before a notary public or an authorized officer, such as a consul, enjoys a prima facie presumption of due and regular execution. To contradict this presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant; bare allegations of coercion are insufficient.

• "In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential."
• "The due and regular execution of an instrument acknowledged before an officer authorized to administer oaths cannot be overthrown by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and convincing proof."
• "A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity in its execution, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant."

• Tenchavez v. Escano, 122 Phil. 752 (1965) — Cited as controlling authority establishing that "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife, thereby justifying extraterritorial service of summons.
• Caoili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128325, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA 345 — Followed for the doctrine that a notarized document is prima facie evidence of its due and regular execution and enjoys a presumption of regularity that requires clear and convincing evidence to contradict.
• Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120706, 31 January 2000, 324 SCRA 85 — Followed for the rule that the Supreme Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court — Governs extraterritorial service of summons when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff. Applied to validate the trial court's directive to serve summons through the DFA, falling under the third mode of service: "by any other means the judge may consider sufficient."
• Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court — Provides that a document acknowledged before a notary public is prima facie evidence of the due and regular execution of the document. Applied to uphold the validity of the Agreement of Separation of Properties acknowledged before Consul Cortez.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.