Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission

A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power, and the matter of converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. The Civil Service Commission cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed, and a discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioner Norberto A. Romualdez III was a career civil servant who had served as a Commercial Attache of the Department of Trade for twelve years. He held civil service eligibilities from the 1963 Patrolman examination and the 1973 Commercial Attache examination. The respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) is a government agency, and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the government body tasked with approving or disapproving appointments and attesting to the qualifications of appointees. The dispute centers on the nature of the appointment extended to petitioner upon his transfer to the PCA and the legal effect of the lapse of that appointment.

Petitioner Norberto A. Romualdez III was appointed and served as a Commercial Attache of the Department of Trade continuously for twelve years, from September 1975 to August 30, 1987. His civil service eligibilities were Patrolman of the City of Manila (1963 CS Exam) and Commercial Attache (1973 CS Exam). On September 1, 1987, he was transferred to the respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), where he was extended an appointment as Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development. The nature of his appointment was "reinstatement," and his employment status was "temporary," for the period covering September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1988. His appointment was renewed for another six months, from September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989, also on a "temporary" status and subject to certain conditions to which petitioner agreed.

When his appointment expired on February 28, 1989, the Governing Board did not renew it, and petitioner was promptly informed thereof by the Acting Chairman of the Board of the PCA, Apolonio V. Bautista. On February 6, 1990, petitioner appealed to the respondent CSC, requesting reinstatement to his previous position in PCA and invoking the provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 dated July 19, 1989. The respondent CSC denied petitioner's request for reinstatement on May 2, 1990, via Resolution No. 90-407, holding that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 was not applicable to petitioner's case because it took effect on July 19, 1989, when petitioner had long been out of the government service since February 28, 1989, and that his reappointment was essentially discretionary on the part of the proper appointing authority. On May 11, 1990, respondent PCA appointed Mr. Roman Santos to the contested position. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 90-407, but it was denied by respondent CSC in Resolution No. 90-693 dated July 31, 1990.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to capricious, whimsical, and despotic refusal to perform a legal/constitutional duty to enforce the Civil Service Law, constituting non-feasance/misfeasance in office in issuing Resolution Nos. 90-407 and 90-693.
• Applicability of CSC Circular No. 29: Petitioner raised the legal issue of the applicability of Civil Service Commission Circular No. 29, Series 1989, to his appointment as PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development.
• Mandatory Permanent Appointment: Petitioner argued that it is mandatory for an appointing authority to extend permanent appointments to selected appointees with corresponding civil service eligibilities.
• Security of Tenure and Due Process: Petitioner contended that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in not affording him, as a member of the career service in the government, the protective security of tenure and due process clause of the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Service Law under P.D. 807.
• Non-Compliance with P.D. 807: Petitioner argued that the PCA unlawfully and maliciously failed to strictly comply with paragraph (a), Section 25 of P.D. 807 in the matter of extending a permanent appointment to him, and that the CSC committed gross ignorance of the law in not correcting such non-compliance, given the mandatory directive of Section 8, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies.

• Non-Applicability of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29: The CSC denied petitioner's request for reinstatement, holding that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 was not applicable to his case because it took effect on July 19, 1989, when petitioner had long been out of the government service since February 28, 1989.
• Discretionary Nature of Reappointment: The CSC held that petitioner's reappointment was essentially discretionary on the part of the proper appointing authority.

• Nature of Temporary Appointment: Whether a temporary appointment vests the appointee with security of tenure.
• Discretion to Convert Appointment: Whether the appointing authority can be compelled to convert a temporary appointment to a permanent one.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the CSC to direct the PCA to reinstate petitioner and extend a permanent appointment to him.

• Nature of Temporary Appointment: No. A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When petitioner accepted the temporary appointment, he was thereby effectively divested of security of tenure.
• Discretion to Convert Appointment: No. The matter of converting a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. The CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed.
• Propriety of Mandamus: No. A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus. More so when petitioner has not shown a lawful right to the position; if the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and certain, the petition must be dismissed.

• Nature of Temporary Appointment: The Court found no doubt that the appointment extended to petitioner by respondent PCA was temporary. Although petitioner was formerly holding a permanent appointment as a commercial attache, he sought and accepted this temporary appointment to respondent PCA. His temporary appointment was for a definite period, and when it lapsed and was not renewed on February 28, 1989, he complained of a denial of due process. The Court clarified that this was not a case of removal from office. Indeed, when he accepted this temporary appointment, he was thereby effectively divested of security of tenure. The Court cited the principle that a temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
• Discretion to Convert Appointment: The Court held that the matter of converting a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. The respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed. The duty of the respondent CSC is to approve or disapprove an appointment, and its attestation is limited to the determination of whether the appointee possesses the required qualifications for the position, including the appropriate civil service eligibility.
• Propriety of Mandamus: The Court addressed petitioner's invocation of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, S. 1989, which provides that a permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position, and that while the appointing authority is given a wide latitude of discretion in the selection of personnel, he shall be guided by and subject to the Civil Service Law and Rules. The Court agreed with the CSC that the circular cannot be given retrospective effect to apply to petitioner, who was separated from the service on February 28, 1989. Even if the circular applied, it recognizes the wide latitude of discretion of the appointing authority. Respondent PCA exercised its discretion and opted not to extend the appointment of petitioner. It cannot be compelled to extend petitioner's appointment, much less can it be directed to extend a permanent appointment to him. A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus. More so when petitioner has not shown a lawful right to the position; if the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and certain, the petition must be dismissed.

• Temporary Appointment and Security of Tenure — A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner, having accepted a temporary appointment, was effectively divested of security of tenure, and the lapse of his appointment without renewal was not a removal from office.
• Discretionary Power of the Appointing Authority — The matter of converting a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. The Court applied this doctrine to rule that the CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed, and the PCA's decision not to renew petitioner's appointment was a valid exercise of that discretion.
• Mandamus and Discretionary Duties — A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that since the decision to extend a permanent appointment is discretionary, mandamus does not lie to compel it, especially where the petitioner has not shown a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the position.

• "A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power." — This passage states the core doctrine on the nature of temporary appointments, which is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that temporary appointees lack security of tenure.
• "Thus, the matter of converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority." — This excerpt defines the discretionary nature of converting a temporary appointment to a permanent one, which is central to the Court's ruling that the PCA cannot be compelled to do so.
• "A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on mandamus, which the Court applied to dismiss the petition, as the act sought to be compelled was discretionary.
• "If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and certain, the petition must be dismissed." — This excerpt states the requirement for a clear legal right as a prerequisite for the petition, which the Court found lacking in petitioner's case.

• Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 (1974) — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that a temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office and that the appointee is effectively divested of security of tenure.
• Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil. 391, 394 (1958) — Cited as controlling precedent for the doctrine that a temporary appointment makes the appointee's tenure dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
• Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 (1989) — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that the CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make an appointment if it is not so disposed.
• Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986) — Cited as controlling precedent for the limited role of the CSC, whose attestation is limited to determining whether the appointee possesses the required qualifications for the position.
• Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil. 866 (1925) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus.

• Section 25(a), P.D. 807 — The Civil Service Law provision stating that a permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position, including the appropriate eligibility. The Court held that this provision does not make the issuance of a permanent appointment mandatory, as the appointing authority retains discretion in the selection of personnel.
• Section 8, Rule III, Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies — Cited by petitioner as a mandatory directive for extending permanent appointments. The Court implicitly rejected this argument by affirming the discretionary nature of the appointment process.
• CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, S. 1989 — The circular invoked by petitioner, which provides for the issuance of permanent appointments to qualified persons. The Court held that this circular cannot be given retrospective effect to apply to petitioner, who was separated from the service before its effectivity, and that it recognizes the wide latitude of discretion of the appointing authority.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.