Romero vs. Singson

A Torrens certificate of title does not furnish a shield for fraud; where the deed of sale upon which it was based was forged — executed and notarized by vendors who were already deceased — the deed is null and void and vests no right of ownership or possession in the transferee, and the property remains in the names of the original registered owners, whose heirs hold it in co-ownership and may not be ejected by the transferee.

Petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent Engracia Domingo Singson are siblings, being among the children of the late spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo, who owned a 223-square meter parcel of land at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600) (23937) 845-R issued in 1953. Petitioners, together with their brothers Rafael and Ramon Domingo, had occupied the property since birth, having stayed there with their parents, while respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married. Macario died on February 22, 1981, and Felicidad on September 14, 1997. The controversy concerns the effect of a Torrens certificate of title secured by one heir over the common property and the availability of ejectment to exclude co-heirs from possession.

Petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent Engracia Domingo Singson are sisters, being among the children of the late spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo. The parents owned a 223-square meter parcel of land located at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600) (23937) 845-R (TCT 845-R), issued in 1953. Petitioners, together with their brothers Rafael and Ramon Domingo, had occupied the property since birth, having stayed there with their parents; respondent, upon getting married, took up residence in Mandaluyong City. Macario died on February 22, 1981, and Felicidad on September 14, 1997.

On June 7, 2006, TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new certificate of title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575-R (TCT 12575), was issued in respondent's name by virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale" ostensibly executed on June 6, 2006 between Macario and Felicidad, as sellers, and respondent, as buyer — notwithstanding that both vendors had long been deceased. Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the subject property under pain of litigation.

Petitioners and their other siblings responded by filing a Complaint against respondent and the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, alleging that the deed of sale was a forgery and that, as heirs of Macario and Felicidad, they were the true owners entitled to reconveyance. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898-SJ and assigned to Branch 160 of the RTC of Pasig City.

On September 26, 2006, respondent filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioners and her brothers Rafael and Ramon before the MeTC of San Juan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534 and assigned to MeTC Branch 58. Respondent alleged that she was the owner of the subject property; that her siblings' stay therein was merely tolerated; and that she now needed the premises to serve as her daughters' residence. She prayed that her siblings be ordered to vacate and to pay monthly rent of P2,000.00 from the date of demand until they vacated, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit. In their Answer, petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a forgery and that no certificate of title in respondent's name could validly be issued; that they thus remained co-owners of the subject property and respondent had no right to evict them; and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 70898-SJ barred the ejectment suit against them.

The MeTC rendered judgment on September 17, 2007, holding that it had jurisdiction over the ejectment case even though ownership had been asserted as a defense, and that respondent, as holder of a Torrens title, was entitled to possession. On appeal, the RTC initially affirmed in toto, but on motion for reconsideration it reversed itself, finding that petitioners' legal possession as heirs of the original owners had not ceased, and that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale bore the signatures of vendors whose respective death certificates showed that Macario had died on February 22, 1981 and Felicidad on September 14, 1997. The RTC further found that petitioners' occupancy of the subject property was premised on their right thereto as co-owners and compulsory heirs of their parents, and that it had not been established that they had alienated that right in favor of respondent.

• Compromise as a Condition Precedent: Petitioners argued that because the parties are siblings and respondent made no attempt at compromise before filing Civil Case No. 9534, the ejectment complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code.
• Co-Ownership and Right of Possession: Petitioners maintained that they could not be evicted from the subject property since they are co-owners of the same, having inherited it from their deceased parents, and that as co-owners they have a right of possession over the subject property.
• Forged Deed of Sale: Petitioners argued that respondent's title was derived from a forged deed of sale, which does not make her the sole owner of the subject property, and that since respondent's title is void, they may not be evicted therefrom.
• Collateral Attack: Petitioners contended that their defense that respondent obtained her title through a forged deed of sale does not constitute a collateral attack on such title, but is allowed in order to prove their legal right of possession and ownership over the subject property.

• Non-Joinder of Parties: Respondent claimed that the Petition should have been dismissed since only two of the respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 filed the Petition before the Supreme Court.
• Correctness of the CA Findings: Respondent argued that the findings of the CA do not merit review and modification, the same being correct.
• Repetition of Issues: Respondent maintained that the Petition is a mere reiteration of issues and arguments already passed upon exhaustively below.
• Registered Ownership as Basis for Possession: Respondent asserted that she has a right to possession because she is the registered owner of the subject lot, as evidenced by TCT No. 12575-R issued in her name in 2006, and that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked.

• Compromise as a Condition Precedent: Whether the ejectment complaint should be dismissed for respondent's failure to comply with the requirement of earnest efforts toward a compromise under Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Jurisdiction and the Intertwined Issue of Ownership: Whether respondent's cause of action in her ejectment complaint is so intertwined with the issue of ownership raised by petitioners' defense as to render the complaint not an unlawful detainer case over which the MeTC has jurisdiction.
• Award of Damages and Attorney's Fees: Whether the award of damages and attorney's fees in favor of petitioners and against respondent should be upheld.
• Collateral Attack on Respondent's Title: Whether petitioners' act of raising ownership as a defense, under Section 16 in relation to Section 18, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, constitutes a collateral attack on respondent's title.

• Compromise as a Condition Precedent: No. Failure to comply with the requirement of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a jurisdictional defect; if the opposing party fails to raise it in a motion to dismiss, the defect is deemed waived. This procedural issue was thus resolved in respondent's favor.
• Jurisdiction and the Intertwined Issue of Ownership: The MeTC retained jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, where ownership is raised as a defense and possession cannot be resolved without deciding it, ownership is resolved provisionally and solely to determine possession; the CA erred in resolving it in respondent's favor.
• Award of Damages and Attorney's Fees: Yes. The RTC's award of P8,000.00 each in attorney's fees to petitioners was reinstated, they having been compelled to litigate to protect their right.
• Collateral Attack on Respondent's Title: No. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack; petitioners were not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.

• Compromise as a Condition Precedent: The Court acknowledged that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. However, it held that the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, the defect is deemed waived, citing Tribiana vs. Tribiana. The procedural issue was accordingly resolved in respondent's favor.

• Jurisdiction and the Intertwined Issue of Ownership: Both parties raised the issue of ownership, and the CA passed upon it. While this procedure is allowed under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — which provides that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession — the CA committed serious and patent error in concluding that, based solely on respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to possession pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof." Such provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners' favor. When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed and notarized on June 6, 2006, it was perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors, Macario and Felicidad, were forged, since both were by then long deceased — Macario having died on February 22, 1981 and Felicidad on September 14, 1997. This made the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation." While it is true that respondent had in her favor a Torrens title, she nonetheless acquired no right or title by virtue of the null and void deed, because when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. The fact that respondent had a certificate of title was of no moment; her title could not be used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested, and the indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration; otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world, and if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee. Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain, co-owners by succession of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession, whether de facto or de jure; respondent thus had no right to exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.

• Award of Damages and Attorney's Fees: The Court reinstated the December 11, 2009 Order of the RTC in all respects, including its award of P8,000.00 each in attorney's fees to petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael, the RTC having found that they were compelled to litigate to protect their right and that such award was just and equitable.

• Collateral Attack on Respondent's Title: With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void, the matter of direct or collateral attack became a foregone conclusion. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack; petitioners were therefore not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case. It did not appear either that petitioners were claiming exclusive ownership or possession of the subject property; quite the contrary, they acknowledged all this time that the property belongs to all the Domingo siblings in co-ownership. In the absence of an allegation or evidence that petitioners were claiming exclusive ownership over the co-owned property, respondent had no alternative cause of action for ejectment which should prevent the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9534. While under Article 487 of the Civil Code a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property, evidence was totally wanting to establish such exclusive ownership, and respondent was in fact the one claiming exclusive ownership of the property owned in common. Left with no cause of action for ejectment against petitioners, respondent's ejectment case had to be dismissed. On respondent's argument that only two of the defendants in the ejectment case filed the Petition, the Court held that there is no rule requiring all parties in the proceedings before the CA to jointly take recourse to the Supreme Court or else such recourse would be dismissible. Since petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael are siblings, co-heirs, co-owners, and occupants of the subject property, they all have common interests, and their rights and liabilities are identical and so interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable; the reversal of the assailed CA judgment should therefore inure to the benefit of Ramon and Rafael as well, and the December 11, 2009 Order of the RTC — decreeing dismissal as against petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael, as well as the payment of attorney's fees to all of them — may be reinstated in all respects.

• Torrens Title Does Not Shield Fraud — A Torrens certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested, and the indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration; otherwise, registration is an exercise in futility. Where registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's Torrens title, procured through a forged deed of sale, could not validate the forgery or cure the void sale.

• Nullity of a Deed of Sale Executed by Deceased Persons — A deed of sale purportedly executed and notarized by vendors who were already deceased is a forgery and is null and void. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect and does not create, modify, or extinguish a juridical relation. The Court applied this doctrine because the June 6, 2006 deed of sale bore the signatures of Macario and Felicidad, who had died on February 22, 1981 and September 14, 1997, respectively.

• Forged Instrument Confers No Title on the Transferee — When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent acquired no right over the subject property despite the issuance of TCT 12575 in her name.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership in Ejectment — Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The adjudication is merely provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the CA erred in resolving the provisional issue of ownership in respondent's favor based solely on her more recently issued certificate of title.

• Collateral Attack on a Void Title — An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioners were not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.

• Compromise Between Family Members as a Condition Precedent — No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but failed. However, the failure to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect; if the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, the defect is deemed waived. The Court applied this doctrine in resolving the procedural issue in respondent's favor.

• Co-Ownership and the Right of Possession — Under Article 487 of the Civil Code, any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment, but such an action lies only against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the common property. In the absence of evidence of exclusive ownership, a co-owner in possession by virtue of co-ownership is as much entitled to enjoy possession as any other co-owner. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent, who was claiming exclusive ownership, had no cause of action for ejectment against petitioners.

• Reversal Inuring to the Benefit of Non-Appealing Co-Parties — As a general rule, in appellate proceedings the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception exists where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. The Court applied this exception in holding that the reversal inured to the benefit of Ramon and Rafael, who did not join the Petition.

• "This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is 'equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.'" — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the nullity of the forged deed of sale, grounding the conclusion that respondent acquired no right over the subject property despite the issuance of a Torrens title in her name.
• "Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property." — This passage defines the controlling rule on forged instruments and Torrens titles, and is the doctrinal core of the decision.
• "A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the fraud exception to the indefeasibility of Torrens titles, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;" — This passage disposes of the collateral-attack issue and explains why petitioners could question respondent's title within the ejectment case.

• Tribiana vs. Tribiana, 481 Phil. 539, 547 (2004) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that failure to comply with the condition precedent of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a jurisdictional defect and is deemed waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss.
• Cana vs. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, 568 Phil. 205 (2008) — Cited by the CA for the principle that the person who has a Torrens title over land is entitled to possession thereof; the Supreme Court held that the CA erred in applying this principle to resolve the provisional issue of ownership in respondent's favor.
• Borromeo vs. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 516, 528 — Cited for the rule that a void contract is equivalent to nothing, produces no civil effect, and does not create, modify, or extinguish a juridical relation.
• Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 726, 739-740, citing Spouses Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, 624 Phil. 88 (2010) — Cited for the rule that when the instrument presented is forged, the registered owner does not lose his title and the assignee in the forged deed acquires no right or title to the property.
• Spouses Reyes vs. Montemayor, 614 Phil. 256, 274-275 (2009) — Cited for the rule that a Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud and that a fraudulent registrant holds the land as a mere trustee.
• Spouses De Guzman vs. Agbagala, 569 Phil. 607, 614 (2008) — Cited for the rule that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack.
• Abing vs. Waeyan, 529 Phil. 199, 207 (2006) — Cited for the rule that a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property, but only where such exclusive ownership is established by evidence.
• First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. vs. Solid Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 155680, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 407, 422 — Cited for the exception to the general rule on appeals, under which a reversal as to one party operates as a reversal as to all where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable.
• Esmaquel vs. Coprada — Cited by the CA for the rule that the sole issue in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership, although ownership may be passed upon provisionally where raised.
• Asuncion Urieta Vda. de Aguilar vs. Alfaro — Cited by the CA for the principle that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.
• Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 420, 426, citing Refugia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, July 4, 1996 — Cited by the MeTC for the rule that inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, subject to the caveat that the issue of ownership be resolved solely to determine possession.
• Balanon-Anicete vs. Balano, 402 SCRA 514 — Cited by the MeTC for the rule that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.
• Raymundo and Perla De Guzman vs. Praxides J. Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566, February 19, 2008 — Cited by the RTC for the rule that a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one year from issuance, and that such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.
• Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals — Cited by the RTC for the feature of an unlawful detainer case that possession by the defendant is at the start legal, becoming illegal by reason of the termination of the right to possess based on his contract or other arrangement with the plaintiff.

• Section 16, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The Court held that the CA erred in resolving this provisional issue of ownership in respondent's favor based solely on her more recently issued certificate of title.
• Article 151, Family Code — Provides that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but failed, and that if no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. The Court held that failure to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect and is deemed waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss.
• Article 222, Civil Code — Provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it appears that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. Cited in relation to Article 151 of the Family Code on the compromise requirement between family members.
• Section 1(j), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Lists as a ground for a motion to dismiss that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. The Court held that this ground must be raised in a motion to dismiss or is otherwise waived.
• Article 487, Civil Code — Provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. The Court held that this remedy is available only against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the common property, which was not established in this case.
• Articles 427, 428, and 434, Civil Code — Cited by the MeTC on the attributes of ownership, the owner's right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, and the rule that in an action to recover property the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.