Romero vs. People of the Philippines

An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability ex delicto unless the final judgment declares that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist; the civil liability may be sustained by preponderant evidence of negligence.

Petitioner Sonny Romero was the driver of the JC Liner bus; the respondents are the People of the Philippines and the private individuals named in the caption. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code makes every person criminally liable also civilly liable, while Rules 111 and 120 of the Rules of Court govern whether an acquittal extinguishes the civil action based on delict. Those provisions frame the dispute over whether Romero's acquittal should have freed him from civil liability.

On April 1, 1999, around noon, a JC Liner bus driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and an Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City, while the taxi was going in the opposite direction toward Partido Area. The collision killed Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis, and Jimmy Padua; Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived but sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged in the MTC of Ocampo, Camarines Sur with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property. The MTC could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short distance between the bus and the taxi before the collision.

Petitioner, for his part, claimed that he should be totally exonerated because Gerardo Breis, Sr., not the regular driver Jimmy Padua, was actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was clearly in violation of insurance and transportation laws. The MTC, the RTC, and the CA uniformly held that it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.

• Effect of Acquittal on Civil Liability: Petitioner argued that his acquittal should have freed him from payment of civil liability.
• Actual Driver and Total Exoneration: Petitioner claimed that he should be totally exonerated from any liability because Gerardo Breis, Sr., not the regular driver Jimmy Padua, was actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was clearly in violation of insurance and transportation laws.

• Effect of Acquittal on Civil Liability: Whether petitioner's acquittal of the crime charged extinguished his civil liability.
• Actual Driver and Factual Review: Whether the SC should re-examine the evidence and exonerate petitioner on the ground that Gerardo Breis, Sr., not Jimmy Padua, was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.

• Effect of Acquittal on Civil Liability: No. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability unless the final judgment declares that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist; civil liability may be sustained by preponderant evidence of negligence.
• Actual Driver and Factual Review: No. The SC is not a trier of facts, and none of the recognized exceptions was present; the MTC, RTC, and CA uniformly found that Jimmy Padua, not Gerardo Breis, Sr., was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.

• Effect of Acquittal on Civil Liability: The SC began from Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code: every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability gives rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Every crime gives rise to two actions: a criminal action for punishment of the guilty party and a civil action for restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for losses. The reverse, however, is not always true. Under Section 2, Rule 111, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action, but the civil action based on delict is deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Under Section 2, Rule 120, an acquittal judgment must state whether the prosecution's evidence absolutely failed to prove guilt or merely failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and in either case the judgment must determine if the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, acquittal does not necessarily extinguish civil liability unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which civil liability might arise did not exist; courts can acquit on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages, and a separate civil action is not even necessary. In Romero's case, the MTC could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner by which he drove the bus because of the condition of the highway and the short distance between the bus and the taxi before the collision, but it categorically stated that while he may be acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable. The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which Romero's civil liability may arise did not exist, so the MTC correctly held him civilly liable for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma, and expenses during the wake and interment. The CA agreed that Romero was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the MTC and RTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which he drove the bus; the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but his civil liability for the death, injuries, and damages was another matter. While Romero was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. The failure to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate, and is compatible with, a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of negligence, which is sufficient for civil liability. The MTC, as affirmed by the RTC and CA, correctly imposed civil liability despite the acquittal; simple logic dictated that Romero would not have been held civilly liable if the act from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist.
• Actual Driver and Factual Review: The SC reminded Romero of the time-honored doctrine that the SC is not a trier of facts. The rule found greater relevance because the MTC, RTC, and CA uniformly held that it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident. Although there are instances when the SC can embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced during trial, none of those instances was present. The SC therefore did not disturb the uniform factual finding.

• Civil liability ex delicto survives acquittal based on reasonable doubt — Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, and every crime gives rise to a criminal action for punishment and a civil action for restitution, repair, and indemnification. The acquittal of an accused does not necessarily extinguish civil liability unless the final judgment declares that the fact from which civil liability might arise did not exist. Applied: Romero was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and no final judgment declared that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist; the civil liability was upheld.
• Preponderance of evidence may establish civil liability despite acquittal — Failure to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate, and is compatible with, a finding of preponderant evidence of negligence; such preponderance is sufficient for civil liability. Applied: the MTC, RTC, and CA held Romero civilly liable for the death, injuries, and damages from the collision despite his acquittal.
• SC is not a trier of facts — Factual findings of the CA are conclusive and binding on the SC, subject to recognized exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case or its findings are contrary to the admissions of the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition and in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Applied: the MTC, RTC, and CA uniformly found that Jimmy Padua, not Gerardo Breis, Sr., was driving the taxi; none of the exceptions was present, so the SC declined to re-examine the evidence.
• Dual character of crime — A crime has a dual character: an offense against the State because it disturbs social order, and an offense against the private person injured by the crime, unless the crime involves treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt, and others where no civil liability arises because there are no damages to compensate or no private person injured. Applied: the collision gave rise to both criminal and civil liability, and the civil action survived the acquittal.

• "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." — The SC quotes Section 2, Rule 111 to establish that an acquittal does not automatically extinguish the civil action based on delict.
• "Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." — This is the SC's formulation of the controlling rule applied to Romero's acquittal.
• "While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence." — The SC distinguishes the criminal standard of proof from the civil standard of preponderance of evidence.
• "The rule finds greater relevance in this case because the MTC, the RTC and the CA uniformly held that it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident." — The SC explains why it declined to re-examine the factual finding on who was driving the taxi.

• Occena vs. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328, 333 — Cited for the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable and for the dual character of a crime.
• Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-78911-25, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 325 — Cited for the rule that criminal liability gives rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
• United States vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265 (1911) — Cited for the rule that every crime gives rise to a criminal action for punishment and a civil action for restitution, repair of damage, and indemnification.
• Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46025, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 231, 236 — Cited for the rule that acquittal does not necessarily extinguish civil liability unless the final judgment declares that the fact from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
• Calalang vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74613, 27 February 1991, 194 SCRA 514 — Cited with Bautista for the same rule on acquittal and civil liability.
• Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 558, 567 — Cited for the rule that courts can acquit on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages, and that a separate civil action is not necessary.
• Manantan vs. CA, 403 Phil. 298 (2001) — Cited for the point that civil liability remains ex delito where negligence is established by preponderance of evidence.
• Sampayan vs. CA, G.R. No. 156360, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229 — Cited for the rule that the SC is not a trier of facts and for the recognized exceptions.

• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable; applied to affirm Romero's civil liability despite his acquittal.
• Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court — The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action, but the civil action based on delict is deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist; applied because no such finding was made.
• Section 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court — An acquittal judgment must state whether the prosecution's evidence absolutely failed to prove guilt or merely failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and must determine if the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist; applied to show that Romero's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petitioner appealed to the SC via Rule 45; the SC denied the petition.