Primary Holding
A person who, without a valid license or authority from the Secretary of Labor or the POEA, promises or offers overseas employment to two or more persons for a fee is engaged in illegal recruitment under Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, regardless of whether written receipts were issued for the fees collected; and the penalty for such offense must be imposed as an indeterminate sentence pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Background
Petitioner Delia D. Romero operated a wedding gown rental stall in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Private complainant Romulo Padlan was her former college classmate, while Arturo Siapno was her nephew. Both complainants sought Romero's assistance in securing employment in Israel, drawn by representations regarding monthly salaries and the processing of travel papers. Romero's sister, Teresita D. Visperas, resided in Israel, and a certain Jonney Erez Mokra was also involved in arranging the complainants' travel. The governing statutory framework for the charge was Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, which criminalizes recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, and Article 13(b) of the same Code, which defines "recruitment and placement" to include referrals, contract services, and promising or advertising for employment, whether for profit or not.
History
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An Information dated June 18, 2001 was filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City, charging petitioner and Jonney Erez Mokra with illegal recruitment under Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018.
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RTC, February 24, 2004 — convicted petitioner of illegal recruitment, sentencing her to eight years imprisonment, a fine of ₱100,000.00, and ordering restitution of US$3,600.00 to each complainant; the case against Jonney Mokra was archived as he remained at-large.
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Court of Appeals, July 18, 2005 — affirmed in toto the RTC decision; petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated February 13, 2006.
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Supreme Court, November 23, 2011 — denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision with the modification that the penalty be imposed as an indeterminate sentence of four years minimum to seven years maximum.
Facts
Petitioner Delia D. Romero operated a wedding gown rental stall at W. A. Jones Street, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Private complainant Romulo Padlan was a former college classmate of petitioner, while private complainant Arturo Siapno was petitioner's nephew. Both complainants separately approached petitioner at her stall to inquire about securing employment in Israel, having learned that petitioner's sister, Teresita D. Visperas, resided in that country.
Sometime in September 2000, Romulo went to petitioner's stall to inquire about a job in Israel. Petitioner encouraged him with representations about a monthly salary ranging from US$700.00 to US$1,200.00 and told him that upon payment of US$3,600.00, his papers would be processed. Romulo secured a bank loan and borrowed additional funds from friends to raise the amount. He returned to petitioner and handed her the money, whereupon petitioner contacted Jonney Erez Mokra, who instructed Romulo to attend a briefing at Mokra's house in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Romulo left for Israel on October 26, 2000 and found work with a monthly salary of US$650.00, but after two and a half months he was apprehended by Israeli immigration police, detained for 25 days, and deported for lacking a working visa. Upon his return, Romulo demanded that petitioner return his money, but she refused.
Arturo's experience followed a similar course. Sometime in August 2000, he visited petitioner's stall and was told that if he could give her US$3,600.00 for processing, he could leave for Israel within one to two weeks. Arturo contacted a relative in the United States who sent US$3,000.00 to Teresita D. Visperas, petitioner's sister in Israel. Petitioner processed Arturo's papers and contacted Jonney Erez Mokra, who again instructed Arturo to attend a briefing in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Arturo departed for Israel in September 2000, worked for three months earning US$800.00 per month, and was then apprehended by immigration officials, incarcerated for ten days, and deported. After returning, Arturo sought petitioner, who promised to send him back to Israel—a promise that was never fulfilled.
Upon learning that Romulo had suffered the same fate, Arturo inquired with the DOLE Dagupan District Office whether petitioner, Teresita D. Visperas, and Jonney Erez Mokra possessed any license or authority to recruit for overseas employment. The DOLE certification confirmed that none of them was authorized. Arturo and Romulo thereafter filed a complaint with the NBI, leading to the filing of an Information dated June 18, 2001 charging petitioner and Jonney Erez Mokra with illegal recruitment. At the arraignment on August 20, 2001, petitioner pleaded not guilty, while Mokra remained at-large. The prosecution presented the testimonies of both complainants. Petitioner testified in her own defense, claiming that the complainants had merely inquired about her sister's working status in Israel and that it was her sister who communicated directly with them, with petitioner having no knowledge of the contents of their conversations or agreements. She presented Satchi Co Pontace as a corroborating witness. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, a finding affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Sufficiency of the DOLE Certification: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in relying on a mere certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office to establish her lack of license, contending that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse by not procuring a certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the agency she claimed was primarily involved.
- Admissibility of the Certification: Petitioner claimed the certification was inadmissible because it was not properly identified and testified to by the issuing officer.
- Nature of Her Conduct: Petitioner maintained that the accommodation she extended to the private respondents did not constitute "referral" as contemplated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, characterizing her actions as mere gestures of good faith rather than recruitment activity.
- Absence of Receipts: Petitioner contended that Arturo Siapno's testimony regarding payment of money should not be credited due to the absence of any receipt or documentary evidence proving such payment.
- Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that the conviction was based on speculations and probabilities rather than evidence on record, and that she should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Admissibility of the Certification: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the certification at the time it was offered, rendering the objection waived, and that the certification was properly admitted and considered by the trial court.
- Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution maintained that the testimonies of the private respondents clearly and convincingly established that petitioner engaged in recruitment activities by promising employment in Israel for a fee, satisfying the elements of illegal recruitment.
Issues
- Sufficiency of the DOLE Certification: Whether the certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office, as opposed to one from the POEA, was sufficient to establish that petitioner was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority for purposes of illegal recruitment.
- Admissibility of the Certification: Whether the DOLE certification was admissible as evidence despite not having been identified or testified to by the issuing officer.
- Existence of Recruitment Activity: Whether petitioner's conduct of encouraging and promising overseas employment to the complainants in exchange for a fee constituted recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.
- Absence of Receipts: Whether the failure to present receipts for the fees paid was fatal to the prosecution's case for illegal recruitment.
- Propriety of the Penalty: Whether the straight penalty of eight years imprisonment imposed by the trial court was proper, or whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law should have been applied.
Ruling
- Sufficiency of the DOLE Certification: Yes. The certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office was sufficient, as the Secretary of Labor retains jurisdiction over recruitment and placement activities, and a DOLE office may properly certify the absence of a license or authority.
- Admissibility of the Certification: Yes. The certification was admissible because petitioner failed to object to its admissibility at the time it was offered, resulting in a waiver of the objection.
- Existence of Recruitment Activity: Yes. Petitioner's acts of promising employment in Israel for a fee of US$3,600.00 to two complainants fell within the definition of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.
- Absence of Receipts: No, the absence of receipts was not fatal. The prosecution's evidence was sufficient where the payment of fees was established through the clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.
- Propriety of the Penalty: No, the straight penalty was improper. The Indeterminate Sentence Law was mandatory, requiring the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with a minimum and maximum term within the range prescribed by the special law.
Ruling Rationale
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Sufficiency of the DOLE Certification: The Court explained that a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person who has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license has been suspended, revoked, or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. The creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction over recruitment and placement activities, as Article 35 of the Labor Code remains the governing rule. Citing Trans Action Overseas Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor and People vs. Diaz, the Court confirmed that the Secretary of Labor and the POEA both possess authority over the issuance, suspension, and cancellation of licenses. Accordingly, a certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office stating that petitioner had not been issued any license by the POEA and was not a holder of authority was sufficient to establish the first element of illegal recruitment.
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Admissibility of the Certification: The Court adopted the OSG's observation that nothing in the record showed that petitioner objected to the admissibility of the certification at the time it was offered. Citing settled evidentiary doctrine, the Court held that objections to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection becomes apparent; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Because petitioner failed to object, the certification was properly admitted and considered by the trial court.
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Existence of Recruitment Activity: The Court held that factual findings of trial courts, including their assessment of witness credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect, particularly when affirmed by the CA. The testimonies of both complainants clearly established that petitioner convinced them to part with US$3,600.00 each in exchange for processing their papers for employment in Israel. Romulo testified that petitioner told him, "If you can produce $3,600.00 dollars then I will begin to process your papers." Arturo testified that petitioner told him that with US$3,600.00 he could easily depart within one to two weeks. These acts—canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, and promising or advertising for employment—fall squarely within the definition of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The Court further noted that any person who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons is deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
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Absence of Receipts: Citing People vs. Alvarez and People vs. Pabalan, the Court ruled that the failure to present written receipts for money paid in connection with recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses. The Court emphasized that a case for illegal recruitment is made not by the issuance or signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. Neither the Statute of Frauds nor the rules of evidence require the presentation of receipts to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees; such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.
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Propriety of the Penalty: The Court found that the trial court, by imposing a straight penalty of eight years, disregarded the mandatory application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Citing Argoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one year, and that it applies to both the Revised Penal Code and special laws. For offenses punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court must impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed. Because Article 39(c) of the Labor Code prescribes imprisonment of not less than four years but not more than eight years, the proper penalty was an indeterminate sentence within that range. The Court accordingly modified the penalty to four years, as minimum, to seven years, as maximum.
Doctrines
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Elements of Illegal Recruitment — The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34. Both elements were satisfied: the DOLE certification established the absence of a license, and petitioner's acts of promising employment for a fee constituted recruitment and placement.
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Definition of Recruitment and Placement — Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and placement" means any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
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Non-Licensee or Non-Holder of Authority — A non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation, or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. The creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction over recruitment and placement activities.
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Waiver of Evidentiary Objections — Every objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection becomes apparent; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Petitioner's failure to object to the DOLE certification at the time it was offered precluded her from later challenging its admissibility on appeal.
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Absence of Receipts in Illegal Recruitment Cases — The failure to present written receipts for money paid in connection with recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses. A case for illegal recruitment is established by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority, not by the issuance or signing of receipts.
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Mandatory Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law — The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one year, applying to both the Revised Penal Code and special laws. For offenses punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. The purpose is to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused.
Key Excerpts
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"In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses." — This passage, drawn from People vs. Alvarez, articulates the doctrine that testimonial evidence suffices to prove payment of recruitment fees even without receipts, a principle frequently invoked in illegal recruitment prosecutions.
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"The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record." — This passage states the rationale for the Indeterminate Sentence Law's mandatory application, explaining why courts must impose indeterminate sentences even for offenses penalized by special laws.
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"Clearly, the trial court, by imposing a straight penalty, disregarded the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law." — This sentence identifies the specific error committed by the trial court and signals the modification of the penalty on appeal, illustrating the mandatory nature of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in special-law offenses.
Precedents Cited
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People vs. Naparan, Jr., G.R. No. 98443, August 30, 1993 — Cited for the proposition that the crime of illegal recruitment requires the concurrence of two elements: lack of valid license or authority, and undertaking of recruitment and placement activities or prohibited practices under the Labor Code.
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Trans Action Overseas Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 109583, September 5, 1997 — Followed for the ruling that the creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction over recruitment and placement activities, and that the Secretary retains the power to suspend or cancel licenses and authorities.
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People vs. Diaz — Cited to confirm the definition of a non-licensee or non-holder of authority as any person not issued a valid license or authority by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license has been suspended, revoked, or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.
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People vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 142981, August 20, 2002 — Followed for the doctrine that the absence of receipts in illegal recruitment cases is not fatal to the prosecution where payment is established by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.
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People vs. Pabalan, G.R. Nos. 115350 and 117819-21, September 30, 1996 — Cited in support of the proposition that neither the Statute of Frauds nor the rules of evidence require the presentation of receipts to prove a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees; testimonial evidence suffices.
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Argoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118806, July 10, 1998 — Followed for the ruling that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory for both Revised Penal Code offenses and special-law offenses, and for the enumeration of exceptions to its application.
Provisions
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Article 38(a), Labor Code (P.D. No. 442), as amended by P.D. No. 2018 — Defines illegal recruitment as any recruitment activity undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority. Petitioner was charged and convicted under this provision for undertaking recruitment activities without a valid license or authority.
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Article 13(b), Labor Code — Defines "recruitment and placement" as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. The Court applied this provision to classify petitioner's conduct—promising employment in Israel for a fee—as recruitment and placement activity.
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Article 35, Labor Code — vests the Secretary of Labor with the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment. The Court cited this provision to confirm that the Secretary of Labor retains jurisdiction over recruitment and placement activities notwithstanding the creation of the POEA.
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Article 39(c), Labor Code — prescribes the penalty for illegal recruitment: imprisonment of not less than four years but not more than eight years, or a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 nor more than ₱100,000.00, or both. The Court applied this provision in determining the proper range for the indeterminate sentence.
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Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — requires that for offenses punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court impose an indeterminate sentence with a maximum not exceeding the maximum fixed by law and a minimum not less than the minimum prescribed. The Court applied this law to correct the trial court's imposition of a straight penalty.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Roberto A. Abad, Jose Portugal Perez, and Jose Catral Mendoza concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.