Romera vs. People

When provocation and passion or obfuscation arise from the same set of facts, they must be treated together as a single mitigating circumstance; however, when combined with another independent mitigating circumstance such as voluntary surrender, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code applies to impose the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, provided no aggravating circumstance is present.

Petitioner Arturo Romera and the victim Roy Mangaya-ay were acquaintances from the same locality in Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. On October 4, 1998, they were part of a group of seven men who had planned to play volleyball in Biasong but were forced to take shelter at the house of Ciriaca Capil due to rain. A verbal altercation occurred during which tensions rose among members of the group, prompting petitioner to leave with Franklin Generol after issuing a warning to the others. The stabbing incident later that evening gave rise to a criminal charge of frustrated homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera joined the victim Roy Mangaya-ay and five other men — Eligario "Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong" Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta, and Franklin Generol — on their way to Biasong to play volleyball. Rain forced the group to take shelter at the house of Ciriaca Capil. While there, Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing Zulueta's pants and remarked, "There's a monkey among us." Everyone laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who grew angry and warned Franklin to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also took offense, pointing a finger at Franklin and declaring that even if Franklin were stronger and older, a blow from his fist would make Franklin crawl. Petitioner then stood up and warned the group, "You all watch out in Balaguan," pulled Franklin Generol to join him, and left, saying, "Let's go, there are many boastful people here."

According to the prosecution, at about six o'clock that evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the house of Antonio Mangaya-ay, about one kilometer from petitioner's own house, where they saw petitioner already carrying a bolo and waiting for them. Petitioner raised the bolo and shouted, "Here are the brave ones." Roy and his companions fled, but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached, said, "Come here, brave one," held Roy up by the collar, and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy lost consciousness and awoke at the provincial hospital, where he underwent surgery and remained for more than three weeks. After the stabbing, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to Tibo Ramoso of the Citizen's Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU), who accompanied him to the Balingasag police station.

Petitioner testified to a markedly different sequence of events. He stated that he and his family were having dinner at around seven o'clock and then went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy calling out, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. Petitioner did not answer, knowing Roy was already drunk. Roy insisted on seeing petitioner; when petitioner's wife said he was asleep, Roy told her to wake him up. Petitioner went downstairs and opened the door, whereupon Roy thrust a bolo at him. Petitioner parried the blow and asked what the matter was; Roy answered that he would kill petitioner. Petitioner pushed the door shut, but Roy began hacking at the bamboo wall. Petitioner's wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit through another door. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it and rushed forward, hacking at petitioner. Petitioner parried the blow, grappled for the bolo, and stabbed Roy in the stomach. When Roy begged for forgiveness, petitioner stopped, fearing he might kill him.

The trial court discounted petitioner's claim of self-defense, finding that once petitioner gained possession of the bolo, there was no longer any danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conviction, holding that unlawful aggression had ceased once petitioner disarmed the victim, rendering self-defense — whether complete or incomplete — unavailing.

• Failure to Apply Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code: Petitioner contended that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when two or more mitigating circumstances are present.
• Sufficient Provocation: Petitioner argued that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger by waking him up and thrusting a bolo at him without warning as he opened the door.
• Passion or Obfuscation: Petitioner maintained that by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house and endangering the lives of his children, the victim obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes.

• Mitigating Circumstances Unavailing: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation were unavailing to petitioner because it was he who initiated the attack.
• Petitioner as Aggressor: The OSG insisted that it was not the victim who went to petitioner's house, but petitioner who went to where the victim was resting.

• Presence of Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation are present in this case.
• Application of Article 64(5): Whether Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied to lower the imposable penalty by one degree.

• Presence of Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. The victim's acts of thrusting a bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house constituted sufficient provocation and produced passion or obfuscation. However, because both circumstances arose from the same set of facts, they must be treated together as a single mitigating circumstance.
• Application of Article 64(5): Yes. Since the single mitigating circumstance of provocation/passion or obfuscation, combined with the independently present mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, yielded two mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code applies to impose the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law.

• Presence of Mitigating Circumstances: The Court found that the victim's acts — thrusting a bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house — were sufficient to enrage any man and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children were endangered. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a direct result of those provocations and while still in a fit of rage. Both provocation and passion or obfuscation were therefore present. However, the Court stressed the well-settled rule that when these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance, citing People vs. Pagal. Since both circumstances arose from the same set of facts in this case, they were not counted as two separate mitigating circumstances.

• Application of Article 64(5): Although provocation and passion or obfuscation constituted only one mitigating circumstance, the Court noted that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was also present, as established during trial when petitioner surrendered to the CAFGU and subsequently to police authorities. With two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code mandated that the court impose the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for consummated homicide. Since consummated homicide is penalized by reclusion temporal, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor. Applying Article 64(5), the next lower penalty became prision correccional. Following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term was set within the range of arresto mayor (one month and one day to six months), and the maximum term within the range of prision correccional in its medium period (two years, four months, and one day to four years and two months).

• Unity of Provocation and Passion or Obfuscation Arising from the Same Facts — When the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion or obfuscation are based on the same set of facts, they must be treated together as a single mitigating circumstance, not as two separate ones. This rule prevents double-counting of circumstances that spring from a common factual origin. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's provocation and passion or obfuscation, both arising from the victim's aggressive acts, constituted only one mitigating circumstance.
• Application of Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — When two or more mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance exists, the court shall impose the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable according to the number and nature of such circumstances. The Court applied this provision by combining the single mitigating circumstance of provocation/passion or obfuscation with the independent mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, yielding two mitigating circumstances warranting a one-degree reduction of the penalty for frustrated homicide.

• "Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the unity of provocation and passion or obfuscation when arising from the same facts, a rule frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on mitigating circumstances.
• "Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger." — This passage articulates the factual basis for finding both provocation and passion or obfuscation present, illustrating the standard for what constitutes sufficient provocation under the Revised Penal Code.
• "Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied" — This passage marks the Court's pivotal determination that the combination of the unified provocation/obfuscation circumstance with voluntary surrender satisfied the two-mitigating-circumstance threshold under Article 64(5), warranting a reduction of the penalty.

• People vs. Pagal, No. L-32040, 25 October 1977, 79 SCRA 570, 575 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that provocation and passion or obfuscation based on the same facts should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. The Court relied on this precedent to preclude counting the two circumstances separately.

• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. Applied to reduce the penalty for frustrated homicide by one degree, given the presence of two mitigating circumstances (provocation/passion or obfuscation as one, and voluntary surrender) and the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals of a frustrated felony. Applied to establish that the penalty for frustrated homicide is prision mayor, being one degree lower than reclusion temporal for consummated homicide.
• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides for a penalty lower by one or two degrees when the deed is not wholly excusable due to the lack of some conditions justifying or exempting from criminal liability, provided the majority of such conditions are present. The Court of Appeals ruled this provision inapplicable, as there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, absent unlawful aggression.
• Article 249, in relation to Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the Information as the statutory basis for the charge of frustrated homicide, defining the penalty for consummated homicide and the principle of frustrated felonies respectively.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty, setting the minimum within the range of arresto mayor and the maximum within the range of prision correccional in its medium period.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.