Roldan vs. Villaroman

The CA's original jurisdiction under Section 145-G to issue mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and auxiliary writs is limited to writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; where the criminal case is not yet decided, the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information determines whether the CA has appellate jurisdiction for that purpose.

Petitioners Arsenio C. Roldan and Iñigo S. Daza were, respectively, the judge-at-large assigned to Bulacan and the provincial fiscal of Bulacan; respondents Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas were the accused in a murder case before the CFI of Bulacan. The dispute turns on Section 145-G of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which gives the CA original jurisdiction to issue specified writs "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," and on the CA's Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna ruling that the phrase limits only the catch-all clause.

On February 6, 1939, Provincial Fiscal Iñigo S. Daza filed an information in the justice of the peace court of San Rafael, Bulacan, charging Pedro Villaroman, Diego Cuevas, Pablo de la Cruz, and one John Doe with murder upon the person of Joaquin Venturina, committed on November 30, 1936, in San Rafael, Bulacan, with treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price or reward. Villaroman and Cuevas were arrested and at the preliminary investigation pleaded not guilty. Both were set at liberty under bail of P20,000, which each of them put up. As a result of the preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace elevated the case to the CFI of Bulacan, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7652; the provincial fiscal reproduced the same allegations in the CFI information. Upon arraignment in the CFI, Villaroman and Cuevas pleaded not guilty.

The trial went forward against the two accused, and the prosecution presented the greater part of all its evidence. While the prosecution was adducing its evidence, Cuevas was taken ill and confined in the Manila Central Hospital. The petitioner judge, who was hearing the case, denied various petitions for postponements filed indiscriminately by the attorneys for the respondents-defendants. When the fiscal rested his case, waiving the testimony of many government witnesses appearing in the list he had prepared and served upon the attorneys for the defense, the latter reiterated the petition for postponement on the ground, principally, that Cuevas was absent due to sickness. The court denied the petition and compelled the attorney for Villaroman to present the evidence in defense of Villaroman. The attorney felt bound to abide by the order and presented some witnesses for the defense; when he ran short of available witnesses because the others were not present, he again asked for postponement of the trial, which the court granted.

Before Villaroman left the courtroom, the prosecuting attorneys filed a written motion asking for the cancellation of the bonds filed by the accused. The attorneys for the accused sharply opposed the motion, but the court sustained it, cancelled the bonds, and ordered the arrest of the accused. As a result, Villaroman was rearrested, as was Cuevas, who was confined in the Bilibid Prison Hospital.

At this stage, Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas instituted certiorari proceedings in the CA against the petitioners and Fiscal Roman de Jesus, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 5295. In their petition, they impugned the jurisdiction of the petitioner judge to proceed with the criminal case for murder in the absence of Diego Cuevas and asked that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the petitioner judge from setting the continuation of the trial until further order. The CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for and ordered the petitioner judge to abstain from going forward with the trial of the case until further order. The Solicitor-General asked that the certiorari proceedings be transferred and the writ of preliminary injunction set aside; the CA resolution denying the motions, with Justice Enage dissenting and Justices Paras, Montemayor, and A. Reyes reserving their votes, led to this petition for prohibition.

Roldan and Daza then filed the present petition for prohibition, asking the CA to abstain absolutely from taking cognizance of, hearing, and deciding the certiorari proceedings and asking for a preliminary injunction to prevent the CA from executing or carrying out its injunction. The SC granted the preliminary injunction prayed for and ordered the CA to abstain from carrying out and executing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.

• Original Jurisdiction of the CA: Petitioners contended that the CA had no original jurisdiction to take cognizance of the certiorari petition filed by Villaroman and Cuevas under Section 145-G of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, because the writs it may issue must be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Appellate Jurisdiction over the Murder Case: Petitioners contended that the CA had no original jurisdiction because any decision in the criminal case, if appealed, would have to be passed upon by the SC due to the death penalty alleged in the information and the evidence presented.

• Basis of Original Jurisdiction: Respondents countered that the appeal which may be interposed should not be the basis for determining the CA's original jurisdiction to entertain the certiorari petition, because if no appeal is taken from the decision to be rendered, there would be no way of determining whether the CA has original jurisdiction to act upon the certiorari proceedings.
• Legality of Bond Cancellation: Respondents asked the SC to pass upon the legality of the petitioner judge's order cancelling their bonds and ordering their re-arrest.

• Original Jurisdiction of the CA: Whether the CA has original jurisdiction under Section 145-G of the Revised Administrative Code, as inserted by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, to entertain the certiorari petition and issue the preliminary injunction, given that its writ jurisdiction is limited to writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Appellate Jurisdiction over the Murder Case: Whether the CA's original jurisdiction over the certiorari petition is determined by the appeal that may be taken in the murder case or by the right to appeal and, where no decision has been rendered, by the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information.
• Legality of Bond Cancellation: Whether the SC should pass upon the legality of the judge's order cancelling the bonds and ordering the re-arrest in this petition for prohibition.

• Original Jurisdiction of the CA: No. Section 145-G grants the CA original jurisdiction to issue the enumerated writs only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the murder case because any appeal would lie to the SC.
• Appellate Jurisdiction over the Murder Case: The basis is the right to appeal, not the contingency that an appeal is taken; where no decision has been rendered, the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information controls. The information charged a capital offense, so appellate jurisdiction would be in the SC.
• Legality of Bond Cancellation: No. The SC held that it was not in order to pass upon that question in the prohibition petition, as it was not necessarily included and was a ground in the certiorari petition that had to be dismissed for having been filed in an incompetent court.

• Original Jurisdiction of the CA: The SC first resolved the meaning of Section 145-G. The English text governs because Commonwealth Act No. 3 was approved in English by the First National Assembly, and the Spanish translation did not convey the idea expressed in the English phrase. The phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" limits all the enumerated writs, not just the catch-all clause. The general rule that a qualifying phrase refers to the nearest antecedent is only an aid; the exception applies where the intent of the law requires the phrase to cover all antecedents, and slight indication of legislative intent suffices. The SC examined Commonwealth Act No. 3 and No. 259: the CA has a special and limited appellate jurisdiction, no power of supervision, and its decisions are final only on disputed facts, while questions of law are appealable to the SC; special remedies generally raise legal questions. Thus the National Assembly intended the limitation to apply to all writs. Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna relied on California cases, but the California constitutional provision did not contain the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," so those cases were not precedent. Louisiana and Indiana decisions with similar provisions supported the SC's reading. The CA therefore had no original jurisdiction to entertain the certiorari petition or issue the preliminary injunction because the writs were not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Appellate Jurisdiction over the Murder Case: The SC rejected the respondents' argument that the basis should be the appeal actually interposed. Following Re Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., the basis of the CA's original jurisdiction is the right to appeal, not the contingency that an appeal is taken. Paragraph (4) of Section 138, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 259, gives the SC appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases involving offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment and related offenses. Where the criminal case has not yet been decided, the court with original jurisdiction over a certiorari petition founded on questions from that case is determined by the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information. The information charged murder with treachery, evident premeditation, and price or reward; the penalty imposable under the allegations was capital. Any appeal from a conviction would therefore lie to the SC, and the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to which its certiorari and injunction could be in aid.
• Legality of Bond Cancellation: The SC declined to pass upon the legality of the order cancelling the bonds and ordering the re-arrest. It held that the question was not necessarily included in the prohibition petition; for all that appeared, it was one of the grounds of the certiorari petition, which had to be dismissed because it was filed before an incompetent court.

• Writ jurisdiction in aid of appellate jurisdiction — Section 145-G gives the CA original jurisdiction to issue mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and auxiliary writs, but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The SC applied this by holding that the CA could not entertain the certiorari petition or issue the injunction because it had no appellate jurisdiction over the murder case, which would be appealable to the SC.
• Interpretation of qualifying phrases — The general rule that a qualifying phrase refers to the nearest antecedent is only an aid to construction; it yields where the intent of the law requires the phrase to apply to all antecedents, and slight indication of legislative intent is enough. The SC applied this to read "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" as limiting all the enumerated writs, not just the catch-all clause.
• Right to appeal as basis of original jurisdiction — The CA's original jurisdiction to issue writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction is determined by the right to appeal, not by the contingency that an appeal is actually taken. The SC applied this to the pending murder case.
• Penalty fixed by law before decision — Where a criminal case has not yet been decided, the court with appellate jurisdiction over a related certiorari petition is determined by the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information. The SC applied this because the information charged a capital offense, making the SC the appellate court.
• English text controls — Where a law is approved in English, the English text governs over an incorrect Spanish translation. The SC applied this to Section 145-G, rejecting the Spanish translation's rendering of "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."

• "Section 145-G is the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which confers on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, and habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs known and permitted by the law of procedure; but the granted power or jurisdiction is subject to the condition that such writs should be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." — The SC states the statutory limitation it enforced against the CA's assumption of jurisdiction.
• "The cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislator" — The SC invokes the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation in reading Section 145-G.
• "Where several words are followed by a clause as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last, the clause should be read as applicable to all." — The SC states the exception to the nearest-antecedent rule, which it used to apply the limitation to all the writs.
• "Where criminal case has not yet been decided, the bases in determining what court has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari founded upon questions arising from said criminal case, should be the penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information." — The SC lays down the test for determining the CA's original jurisdiction before the criminal case is decided.

• Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, CA-G.R. No. 613 (September 21, 1936) — CA precedent relied upon by the CA and respondents; the SC held it inapplicable because the California cases it cited involved a constitutional provision without the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
• Hyatt vs. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 357 — Cited in Mujer; distinguished by the SC because the California constitutional provision differed from Section 145-G.
• Tyler vs. Houghton, 25 Cal. 26 — Cited with approval in Hyatt vs. Allen; distinguished on the same ground.
• Riccobono vs. Kearney, 114 So. 707 — Louisiana Supreme Court decision interpreting a similar "in aid of" provision; relied on by the SC to hold that the CA's writ jurisdiction is limited to aid of appellate jurisdiction.
• Re Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 67 L.T.A. 761, 768, 769 — Relied on by the SC for the rule that the basis of the CA's original jurisdiction is the right to appeal, not the contingency that an appeal is taken.
• Kesinger vs. Cox, 141 N.E. 225 — Indiana Supreme Court decision; relied on by the SC for the rule that mandamus lies only when necessary for the exercise of appellate powers.
• State ex rel. Hanrahan vs. Chambers, 181 N.E. 282 — Indiana Supreme Court decision; relied on by the SC in interpreting the "in aid of" limitation on writ jurisdiction.
• Frankel vs. Woodrough, 7 Fed. (2d) 796, 797 — Federal Court of Appeals decision; relied on by the SC for the rule that Courts of Appeals have no original jurisdiction except such as is necessary to aid, protect, or enforce their appellate jurisdiction.

• Section 145-G, Revised Administrative Code, as inserted by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 — Grants the CA original jurisdiction to issue mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and auxiliary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; applied to deny the CA jurisdiction over the certiorari petition and injunction because it had no appellate jurisdiction over the murder case.
• Section 15, Revised Administrative Code of 1917 — Provides that the English text governs where a law was approved in English; applied to reject the Spanish translation of Section 145-G.
• Section 138, Revised Administrative Code, paragraph (4), as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 259 — Gives the SC appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases involving offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment and related offenses; applied because the information charged a capital offense, so appeal would lie to the SC.
• Section 145-F, Revised Administrative Code, as inserted by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 — Gives the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases not enumerated in Section 138; applied to show the CA's appellate jurisdiction is special and limited.