Rolando D. Cortez vs. Luz G. Cortez

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code requires a grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable mental illness or psychological abnormality that renders a spouse truly unable to assume the essential marital obligations; mere difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will in the performance of those obligations, and the absence of love as a motive for marrying, do not constitute such incapacity.

Petitioner Rolando D. Cortez and respondent Luz G. Cortez were married on March 5, 1990 before a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and two children were born during the union. Petitioner worked overseas as a seaman, and respondent was designated as his allotee, receiving the allotment remittances for the family. The dispute turns on Article 36 of the Family Code, which renders void a marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.

Petitioner Rolando D. Cortez and respondent Luz G. Cortez were married on March 5, 1990 before a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan. According to petitioner, respondent was introduced to him by his brother and her friend, and in February 1990 he was invited to the birthday party of respondent's cousin at the latter's house, where after consuming three bottles of beer he became dizzy and passed out. When he woke, he was already in a room with respondent, clad only in his underwear and covered with a blanket; respondent's brother, a policeman, suddenly entered and said, "May nangyari na pala sa inyo, dapat panagutan mo iyan." He went home to his mother's house in disbelief. Respondent, for her part, alleged that they were introduced by a common friend in 1988, that they began a deep relationship in which they shared each other's pains and secrets, that she intimated to petitioner that she had been sexually abused before and had borne a child, and that they became sweethearts, with petitioner sleeping over at her apartment; when she got pregnant, they decided to marry.

Petitioner claimed that he was already scheduled to work abroad as a seaman, but while at the airport he was stopped by a hold-departure order issued by the POEA because of respondent's complaint, she being then pregnant. He was forced by respondent's brothers to marry her, and after the ceremony the two went to his agency where he designated her as his allottee; they then submitted their marriage contract and the allotment paper to the POEA, and he was able to leave for his seaman duty. According to petitioner, they never had a honeymoon nor sexual intercourse. Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that when petitioner left for overseas work they stayed in touch and that he was a responsible husband who saw to it that she was named as his allottee.

While petitioner was abroad, respondent gave birth to a son, John Rol G. Cortez, on September 14, 1990. Petitioner alleged that when he returned to the Philippines in March 1991, he was forced by respondent and her brothers to attend the child's baptism on March 31, 1993 and to pay for it, and that he never lived with respondent, staying instead in his sister's house in Valenzuela City until his departure for abroad on October 16, 1991. While overseas, he learned from respondent that she had given birth to a baby girl, Rose Lyn G. Cortez, on February 3, 1992; the child was baptized upon his return in October 1992 and he paid the expenses. He claimed he tried to give support religiously despite his doubts and reservations, but in 1994 he came to know that respondent had a husband and a child in Samar by the name of Nida Guimbaolibot, and he thereupon suspended support. Respondent filed a case of abandonment against him, which was later dismissed after they executed a compromise agreement for the support of the children. Petitioner further claimed that upon his return in 1998 he underwent a semenal examination which showed that he had a low sperm count and did not have the capacity to impregnate a woman, that he continued giving financial support only to avoid harassment, that he never cohabited with respondent, and that they married not out of love but because of respondent's desire to ensure material support for herself and the children. Respondent countered that their marital woes began in 1994, when petitioner told her that his new year's wish was to be with another woman, Susan Barry; that they began to fight and petitioner left their apartment in 1995; that she filed a complaint for abandonment and demanded support for their children; and that she later learned petitioner and Susan Barry were living together.

Petitioner consulted Dr. Felicitas Artiaga-Soriano, a psychiatrist, whose evaluation report stated that petitioner was a person with dependency inclination and a passive aggressive personality disorder, emotionally scarred and bitter for having been forced to marry respondent without love, and hence had no intention whatsoever to do the duties and obligations of a husband and a father. Dr. Soriano found respondent to be suffering from an anti-social personality disorder, and declared that her deceitfulness and persistence in getting money from petitioner had further traumatized him; she concluded that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.

The trial court found the evidence contrary to petitioner's portrayal of the marriage. It relied on a postcard dated August 28, 1988 in which petitioner wrote to respondent, "Pls. take care of yourself and always pray to GOD"; on the Application for Marriage License which petitioner personally applied for and subscribed on February 22, 1990; and on the allotment slip he signed on March 5, 1990, in which both parties were listed at the same address, 3rd Floor St. Cruz Apartment, Doña Mercedes II Subd., Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Petitioner likewise made respondent his allottee when he left abroad in 1992 and 1994, attended the baptisms of both children, and invested in educational plans for them; his mother was present at the baptismal party of his son. Photographs depicted petitioner and respondent together on a bed, respondent wearing skimpy clothes, taken sometime between March 1991 and October 1991, and his letters from abroad asked for her understanding and promised to save money so they could put up a business. The trial court found respondent to be a caring wife and a loving mother, and held that her filing of the abandonment case was merely an attempt to compel petitioner to support their children, which was his obligation as a father. It also found petitioner's denial of paternity unsubstantiated, since the doctor who allegedly examined his sperm count was not presented in court, and noted that in an authorization dated November 21, 2000 addressed to Scholarship Plan Phils., Inc., petitioner described John Rol Cortez and Rose Lyn Cortez as "my children" and "our children."

• Forced Marriage and Absence of Love: Petitioner maintained that he married respondent not out of love but because he was forced to marry her in order to lift the hold-departure order issued by the POEA and to be able to work abroad as a seaman, and that this circumstance rendered him psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
• Lack of Realization of Marital Obligations: Petitioner argued that although he might have neglected or refused to act in accordance with the norms imposed or expected by society, or found difficulty in performing such acts, his neglect, refusal, or difficulty was committed without his realizing that he had marital obligations to perform as a husband to respondent.
• Reliance on the Psychiatric Evaluation Report: Petitioner relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Soriano, which purportedly showed the antecedence, gravity, and incurability of his psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage, tracing it to his rearing and family environment, which made him a person with dependency inclination and passive-aggressive traits, and to his not loving respondent from the very beginning.
• Respondent's Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner claimed that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, as shown by her deceitfulness and persistence in getting money from him.

• Initially Loving Relationship: Respondent countered, in her Answer, that she and petitioner were introduced by a common friend in 1988, began a deep relationship, became sweethearts, and decided to marry when she got pregnant; that petitioner was a responsible husband who saw to it that she was named as his allottee; and that their marital woes began only in 1994 when petitioner told her that his new year's wish was to be with another woman, Susan Barry.
• Abandonment and Support: Respondent alleged that petitioner left their apartment in 1995 after they began to fight, prompting her to file a complaint for abandonment and to demand support for their children, and that she later learned petitioner and Susan Barry were living together.
• Opposition to the Petition: Respondent opposed the petition for annulment and participated in the trial of the case, conduct which the courts took as evidence that she valued the marriage and was capable of fulfilling her marital obligations.

• Psychological Incapacity of Either or Both Parties: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's finding that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations, which would result in the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Sufficiency of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report: Whether the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Soriano sufficiently established the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity of the parties.

• Psychological Incapacity of Either or Both Parties: No. Article 36 of the Family Code requires a true inability to assume the essential marital obligations amounting to a psychological abnormality, characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; the evidence established at most difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will, and the absence of love is not a ground for nullity.
• Sufficiency of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report: No. The report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage, and its conclusions as to respondent rested on information supplied by petitioner alone, which is no different from hearsay evidence.

• Psychological Incapacity of Either or Both Parties: Article 36 of the Family Code voids a marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. Following Yambao vs. Republic of the Phils., the provision contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in their performance or ill will; the incapacity consists of (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) an inability referring to the essential obligations of marriage — the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) an inability tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. Under Republic of the Philippines vs. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico, the incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Here, both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner failed to show that he and respondent were psychologically incapable of knowing and performing their marital and parental obligations, and that finding is supported by the evidence. The postcard dated August 28, 1988 supported respondent's claim of a pre-existing relationship; petitioner's signature on the Application for Marriage License dated February 22, 1990 belied his claim that he was forced to marry on March 5, 1990; the photographs, letters, and educational plans depicted filial cohabitation and genuine care; and his continued support of the children after separation was inconsistent with his allegations. Even assuming petitioner's contentions to be true, the petition would still fail because the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of the alleged incapacity were not proven — the complained acts occurred after the marriage, and no underlying cause rooted in the parties' childhood or adolescence was shown. Mere stubbornness or refusal to cohabit, or cohabiting with another woman, is not automatically a psychological disorder, and demanding financial support for one's own children cannot be considered a disorder. Petitioner's claim that he married without love does not rise to the level of psychological incapacity; under Republic of the Phils. vs. Spouses Romero, quoting Republic vs. Albios, motives for entering into marriage are varied and complex, and marriages entered into for other purposes such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title are equally valid provided all legal requisites are complied with, love not being the only valid cause for marriage. Petitioner's showing of ill-will and refusal to perform marital obligations does not amount to psychological incapacity, and his claim of lack of realization that he had marital obligations is not a consideration under Article 36, which requires a mental illness leading to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations. As to respondent, the CA and RTC correctly found that she was not shown to be psychologically incapacitated; she was a caring wife and a loving mother, and Dr. Soriano's contrary conclusion had no basis other than information supplied by petitioner. The burden of proving psychological incapacity falls upon petitioner, and he failed to discharge it.

• Sufficiency of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report: The report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, it established only that because petitioner was forced to marry respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full obligations as a husband — which is precisely the "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations, or "ill will," that is distinct from "incapacity" rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Petitioner's admission that he stopped giving support only in 1994, when he learned that respondent had a child prior to their marriage, and that he entered into a compromise agreement on support only because of the abandonment case and threats from respondent's brothers, while still refusing to live with her, demonstrated ill-will and refusal rather than incapacity. As to respondent, the findings and conclusions of Dr. Soriano that she lacked the mind, will, and heart to perform the obligations of marriage, and was content merely to get money from petitioner, cannot be given credence, there being no basis other than the information supplied by petitioner; to make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on information fed by only one side is no different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of its content. Such findings were contradicted by respondent's letters to petitioner, in which she expressed her wish for his good health and safety, explained that the money from his allotment was used for house rental, the children's education, and other incidental expenses, expressed her desire to save money to buy a house for their children's future, asked forgiveness for nagging him out of jealousy, and affirmed that she still loved him. Respondent thus showed herself capable of fulfilling her marital obligations and valued the marriage, as demonstrated by her opposition to the petition and her participation in the trial.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Article 36 voids a marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. The incapacity contemplated is an inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in their performance or ill will. It consists of (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) an inability referring to the essential obligations of marriage — the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) an inability tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The Court applied this formulation in holding that petitioner's forced-marriage narrative and his refusal to cohabit with or support respondent established at most difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will, not the psychological illness required by law.
• Gravity, Juridical Antecedence, and Incurability — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, meaning it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, meaning it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and (c) incurability, meaning it must be incurable or, even if otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court held that these requisites were not proven, since the complained acts occurred after the marriage and no underlying cause rooted in the parties' childhood or adolescence was shown.
• Absence of Love as a Ground for Nullity — Motives for entering into marriage are varied and complex, and the State cannot dictate the kind of life a couple chooses to lead; marriages entered into for other purposes, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, are equally valid provided they comply with all the legal requisites. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage, and other considerations not precluded by law may validly support a marriage. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioner's contention that his marriage was void because he contracted it without love and under compulsion to lift a hold-departure order.
• Hearsay-Based Psychiatric Evaluation — To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. The Court refused to credit Dr. Soriano's findings on respondent's alleged anti-social personality disorder because they rested solely on information supplied by petitioner and were contradicted by respondent's own letters.
• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings on Appeal — Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when they coincide with those of the Regional Trial Court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court and must remain undisturbed unless not supported by the evidence on record. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is not a trier of facts and will not re-examine and weigh anew the parties' respective evidence. The Court found no reason not to apply the doctrine, the CA having concurred with the RTC's finding that petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity.
• Burden of Proof in Nullity Petitions — The burden of proving psychological incapacity falls upon the petitioner, who must prove that he or a respondent suffers from a psychological disorder rendering them incapable of taking cognizance of the basic marital obligations. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

• "Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness." — This passage, drawn from Yambao vs. Republic of the Phils. and adopted by the Court, supplies the canonical three-part formulation of psychological incapacity and the threshold distinction between incapacity and mere failure to perform marital duties.
• "The psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." — Quoted from Republic of the Philippines vs. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico, this is the controlling statement of the three requisites that petitioner failed to establish, and it is the formulation most frequently cited in subsequent nullity cases.
• "Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage." — Quoted from Republic vs. Albios through Republic of the Phils. vs. Spouses Romero, this passage disposes of petitioner's central premise that a marriage contracted without love is void, and grounds the validity of marriages entered into for other lawful considerations.
• "To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence." — This statement fixes the evidentiary standard for psychiatric evaluations in nullity cases and explains why Dr. Soriano's findings on respondent's alleged anti-social personality disorder were rejected.

• Yambao vs. Republic of the Phils., 655 Phil. 346 (2011) — Controlling precedent supplying the three-part formulation of psychological incapacity under Article 36, quoted at length and applied to reject petitioner's claim.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018 — Followed for the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and cited again for the rule that conclusions on a spouse's psychological condition based on one-sided information amount to hearsay.
• Republic of the Phils. vs. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) — Followed for the ruling that a marriage contracted not out of love but out of reverence for the other party's parents does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
• Republic vs. Albios — Quoted within Spouses Romero for the doctrine that motives for marriage are varied and complex and that marriages entered into for convenience, companionship, money, status, or title are equally valid if they comply with the legal requisites.
• Navales vs. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) — Cited for the distinction between mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will, on the one hand, and incapacity rooted in a debilitating psychological condition or illness, on the other.
• Tani-Dela Fuente vs. De la Fuente, 807 Phil. 32 (2017) — Cited for the requirement that what the law contemplates is a mental illness leading to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
• Villanueva vs. CA, 536 Phil. 404 (2006) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when they coincide with those of the trial court.
• Valdez vs. Reyes, 530 Phil. 605 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 does not permit a re-examination of the parties' evidence.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court held that the provision was not satisfied because petitioner failed to prove a grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable psychological incapacity in either himself or respondent.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — Governs the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner. The Court applied the rule to hold that it may not review the findings of fact of the lower courts all over again, and that the CA's factual findings, which coincided with those of the RTC, were binding absent a showing that they were unsupported by the evidence on record.

Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang, JJ., concur. (Justice Carandang was designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.)