Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada

The offended party may intervene via a private prosecutor in an estafa case to recover civil liability arising from the issuance of a bouncing check, notwithstanding the pendency of a BP 22 case involving the same check, because the single civil liability may be pursued in both actions until actual recovery is had in one.

Mary Ann Rodriguez issued bouncing checks to private complainant Gladys Nocom. Based on a prosecutor's resolution, separate informations were filed against Rodriguez for both Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Estafa cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, while the BP 22 cases were raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42.

• Prosecutorial Resolution: Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo found probable cause to charge Rodriguez with Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818, and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
• Filing of Informations: Separate informations were filed. The BP 22 cases were raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 42 (Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36). The Estafa cases were raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104 (Criminal Cases Nos. 01-106256 to 59). The private complainant paid the required docket and filing fees for the civil aspect of the estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases.
• Dispute over Intervention: Private prosecutor Atty. Felix R. Solomon entered his formal appearance in the RTC estafa cases. Rodriguez opposed the appearance, contending that the private prosecutor's intervention was limited to the civil aspect, which must be asserted in the BP 22 cases pending before the MeTC. The RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear upon payment of legal fees, prompting the present petition.

• Preclusion of Civil Action: Petitioner argued that the civil action necessarily arising from the BP 22 case pending before the MeTC precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the estafa case pending before the RTC.
• Rule 111 Interpretation: Petitioner maintained that because Rule 111, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action in BP 22 cases, the civil aspect must be litigated exclusively therein, thereby barring private prosecutor intervention in the estafa cases.

• Deemed Institution of Civil Action: Respondent countered that the civil action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action under Rule 111, Section 1(a), unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
• BP 22 Without Prejudice to RPC: Respondent argued that Section 5 of BP 22 expressly provides that prosecution under the law is without prejudice to any liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code, justifying private prosecutor intervention in the estafa cases.

• Intervention of Private Prosecutor: Whether a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene in estafa cases to prosecute the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of checks that is also the subject matter of pending BP 22 cases.

• Intervention of Private Prosecutor: The private prosecutor was properly allowed to intervene. The single act of issuing a bouncing check gives rise to two distinct criminal liabilities (estafa and BP 22) but only one civil liability, because the offended party sustained only a single injury. Both the estafa and BP 22 actions automatically include the corresponding civil action without need of election by the offended party; hence, there is no forum shopping. The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply at this pre-judgment stage, as the institution of civil actions in both cases is not repugnant or inconsistent. Actual recovery under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other to prevent unjust enrichment and double recovery. Furthermore, Section 1(b) of Rule 111 was intended to require payment of filing fees in BP 22 cases to prevent creditors from using courts as free collection agencies, not to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the civil aspect in the BP 22 court.

• Election of Remedies — The choice by a party of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights arising from the same facts. It applies when the remedies are inconsistent, meaning the assertion of one is necessarily repugnant to the other. No binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is reached or before detriment to the other party supervenes. The pursuit of civil liability in both estafa and BP 22 cases is not inconsistent until actual recovery is had in one.
• Civil Liability Arising from Crime — While every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, civil liability arises not because the act is felonious, but because it caused damage to another. A single act causing a single injury gives rise to only one civil liability, even if it gives rise to multiple criminal offenses.

• "While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it."
• "As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong."
• "[T]he better rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes."

• Banal v. Tadeo, 156 SCRA 325 (1987) — Followed. Explained that civil liability arises from the damage caused by the act, not from the criminal nature of the act itself.
• Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, 190 SCRA 629 (1990) — Followed. Defined the doctrine of election of remedies and its purpose to prevent double redress for a single wrong.
• Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540 (1989) — Followed. Established that a single act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the single injury sustained, and recovery in one action bars recovery in the other.
• Gorospe v. Gamaitan, 98 Phil. 600 (1956) — Followed. Enumerated the exceptions to the intervention of the offended party in a criminal action.

• Rule 110, Sec. 16, Rules of Court — Allows the offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action.
• Rule 111, Sec. 1(a), Rules of Court — Deems the civil action for recovery of civil liability instituted with the criminal action, unless waived, reserved, or previously instituted.
• Rule 111, Sec. 1(b), Rules of Court — Deems the criminal action for violation of BP 22 to include the corresponding civil action, disallowing reservation to file separately. Interpreted not to preclude the prosecution of the civil action in an estafa case, but to require payment of filing fees to prevent abuse of courts as collection agencies.
• Art. 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
• Sec. 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — States that prosecution under BP 22 is without prejudice to any liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Garcia