Rodriguez vs. Government of the United States of America

A court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default; the rules require the claiming party to file a written motion with notice to the defending party and proof of failure to answer. An order of default issued in violation of these requirements is a patent nullity, and any decision rendered pursuant to such void order is likewise null and void.

The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, sought the extradition of spouses Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda G. Rodriguez pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069. The spouses were wanted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, California for offenses including presenting fraudulent claims, grand theft, attempted grand theft, and bribery. Eduardo voluntarily returned to the US in 2003, leaving petitioner to contest the extradition proceedings in the Philippines.

In 2001, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed a Petition for Extradition before the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 against spouses Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda G. Rodriguez. The petition sought their extradition to stand trial in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, California for presenting fraudulent claims (five counts), grand theft of personal property (two counts), and attempted grand theft of personal property (three counts), with petitioner additionally charged with bribery (two counts). Respondent alleged that the spouses fraudulently collected $51,134.65 on a life insurance policy taken out on Gloria Gener, petitioner's mother, claiming she died from stroke when she was actually alive and living with them in Los Angeles County. Eduardo also filed false claims with four life insurance companies and collected $100,000.00 from one policy, indicating petitioner had been killed while in the Philippines when she was still alive. After her arrest on November 6, 1985, petitioner allegedly offered a bribe of $5,000.00 to each law enforcer transporting her to jail if they would release her.

Spouses Rodriguez did not file an Answer to the petition. Instead, from 2001 to 2009, they filed several motions touching on matters they alleged were necessary for them to file an answer, would warrant dismissal of the petition, for inhibition of presiding judges, and regarding bail. On June 4, 2003, Eduardo went to the US on voluntary extradition, and his case was declared closed. Petitioner opted to stay in the Philippines. The RTC repeatedly ordered petitioner to file her answer, warning that failure to do so would constitute a waiver. Petitioner nonetheless continued filing motions from 2009 to 2013 on procedural rules, deferments, clarifications, and declaration of respondent in default.

On August 13, 2013, respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default, which the RTC denied on January 5, 2015, but gave petitioner 15 days to file her answer. Petitioner still did not file an answer. On November 3, 2016, the RTC reiterated its directive and stated that presentation of evidence would proceed on November 18, 2016. On that date, the RTC directed respondent's counsel to present evidence, but counsel was found unprepared, and the RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition. The RTC, however, reconsidered on April 25, 2017, reinstated the case, and scheduled reception of respondent's evidence on June 15, 2017, or alternatively on June 29, 2017, in the event of the unavailability of either counsel. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the reinstatement order and a motion for inhibition, and her main counsel manifested unavailability for the June 15 hearing due to a conflict of schedule.

On June 15, 2017, the RTC conducted the hearing despite petitioner's counsel's unavailability. Respondent's counsel prayed that petitioner be declared in default for failure to file her responsive pleading. The RTC stated that its previous orders directing respondent to present evidence despite the non-filing of any responsive pleading were, in effect, a declaration of default. Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the order of default, which the RTC denied on November 22, 2017, holding that the oral motion was not prohibited by the rules, that petitioner's counsels did not object, and that the oral motion was a reiteration of the August 13, 2013 written motion. The RTC also ruled that petitioner had no meritorious defense. After presenting evidence ex parte, respondent filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, which the RTC admitted. On April 19, 2018, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the petition for extradition and ordering petitioner's deportation to the US.

• Mootness of Certiorari Petition: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in disregarding the issue on the validity of the RTC's order declaring her in default when it rendered the assailed decision, as the certiorari petition had not been rendered moot by the subsequent decision in the extradition case or by the filing of the appeal.
• Invalidity of Default Order: Petitioner maintained that the RTC wrongfully declared her in default because there was no written motion filed and no notice given, and the oral motion made in open court violated the requirements of Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
• Violation of Due Process: Petitioner argued that the RTC violated her right to be heard when it proceeded with the hearing on June 15, 2017 despite her main counsel's unavailability, and when it declared her in default without giving her the opportunity to oppose the motion.
• Error in Affirming Extradition: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision granting the petition for extradition, which was based exclusively on respondent's evidence presented ex parte.

• Authority to Declare Default: Respondent argued that the RTC had the authority and discretion to motu proprio declare petitioner in default, and that the motion and notice requirements should not be strictly applied in extradition cases because the Rules of Court applies only insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings.
• Validity of Oral Motion: Respondent contended that the oral motion to declare petitioner in default was a mere reiteration of the earlier written motion filed on August 13, 2013, and that the presence of petitioner's counsels during the hearing negated any claim of denial of due process.

• Mootness of Certiorari Petition: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as moot and academic by virtue of the rendition of the RTC decision and the filing of the appeal.
• Validity of Default Order: Whether the RTC wrongfully declared petitioner in default and erred in denying her motion to set aside the order of default.
• Propriety of Extradition: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision granting the petition for extradition.

• Mootness of Certiorari Petition: No. The issues raised in the certiorari petition assailing the RTC orders declaring petitioner in default were not rendered moot by the Decision rendered in the extradition case nor by the filing of the appeal, and the CA should have resolved them in the consolidated cases.
• Validity of Default Order: No. The RTC erred in declaring petitioner in default because there was no written motion filed and no notice given to petitioner, as required by Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court; the oral motion made in open court fell short of these requirements, and the RTC could not motu proprio declare petitioner in default.
• Propriety of Extradition: The Court refrained from ruling on this issue because the ex parte reception of evidence and the Decision rendered thereon, predicated on a void order of default, are themselves a nullity.

• Mootness of Certiorari Petition: The Court explained that a party declared in default has several remedies, including filing a motion to set aside the order of default, a motion for new trial, a petition for relief, an appeal from the judgment, or a petition for certiorari. The grounds that may be raised in an appeal from a judgment by default are restricted to: (1) failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; (2) the decision is contrary to law; and (3) the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. In this case, the CA only considered the evidence presented by respondent during the ex parte presentation and the issues of law in extradition cases, without considering the validity of the default order. The Court held that if the certiorari petition were granted, petitioner would have been allowed to file her answer and present evidence, which would bear an overriding effect on the resolution of the main case. The Court distinguished Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, noting that in that case, the Court suggested that respondents should have withdrawn their certiorari petition or informed the CA of the supervening decision. Here, the CA was already notified and was well-aware of the RTC Decision and the filing of petitioner's appeal, hence the consolidation. The Court held that since the petition for certiorari and the appeal were consolidated, the issue pertaining to the validity of the order of default should have been resolved as part of the appeal. The ruling on the validity of the default order is essential before delving into the propriety of the RTC's decision to extradite petitioner, because if the order of default was wrongfully issued, the RTC's decision would become a nullity.

• Validity of Default Order: The Court cited Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides three requirements before a court may declare a defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion; and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer within the period provided. The Court held that "filing" presupposes a written motion, since filing under Section 2, Rule 13 means the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court. The purpose of notice is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments. The Court emphasized that the trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default, as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. In this case, the RTC had already motu proprio declared petitioner in default even before the oral motion was made, as shown by its Order stating that its previous orders directing respondent to present evidence were "in effect a declaration of default." The previously filed written motion of August 13, 2013 had already been denied on January 5, 2015, so there was no existing motion that could be validly acted upon. The oral motion made during the June 15, 2017 hearing fell short of the requirements, and the presence of petitioner's counsel who was making only a special appearance for the motion for inhibition could not justify the declaration of default. The Court also noted two additional reasons that should have cautioned the RTC: (1) petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order reinstating the case, which the RTC should have resolved first; and (2) the RTC violated its own Order dated April 25, 2017, which provided that the hearing would be moved to June 29, 2017 in the event of the unavailability of either counsel, and petitioner's main counsel had manifested his unavailability. The Court held that the RTC erroneously denied the verified motion to set aside the order of default, as the order was a patent nullity for being issued in violation of the rules and of petitioner's right to due process. The Court also held that the absence of an affidavit of merit would not warrant denial of the motion, as an affidavit of merit is not necessary where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very root of the proceedings.

• Propriety of Extradition: The Court refrained from ruling on the merits of the extradition because the ex parte reception of evidence and the Decision rendered thereon, predicated on a void order of default, are themselves a nullity. It would be improper for the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and resolve the merits of the CA decision when the proceedings subsequent to the RTC's order of default are without any binding legal effects.

• Requirements for a Valid Declaration of Default — Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, three requirements must be complied with before a court may declare a defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion; and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer within the period provided. "Filing" presupposes a written motion, and the trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default. The Court applied this doctrine to find that the RTC's declaration of default was void because it was based on an oral motion made in open court without prior written motion and notice.

• Effect of a Void Order of Default — An order of default issued in violation of the rules on default and of the right to due process is a patent nullity, and any decision rendered pursuant to such void order is likewise null and void. The Court applied this doctrine to nullify the ex parte reception of evidence and the RTC Decision granting the extradition.

• Remedies of a Party Declared in Default — A party declared in default may: (a) file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has meritorious defenses; (b) file a motion for new trial if judgment has been rendered but not yet final and executory; (c) file a petition for relief if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law. A petition for certiorari is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default or if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.

• Affidavit of Merit Not Required When Motion Attacks the Root of Proceedings — An affidavit of merit is not necessary where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very root of the proceedings. When a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and is sworn to by the defendant, neither a formal verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary.

• "The rule on default is clear in that it requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. In this case, there was no existing motion filed which could be validly acted upon by the RTC when it declared petitioner in default." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the invalidity of the default order, emphasizing the mandatory requirements of a written motion and notice before a defendant may be declared in default.

• "Since the rules require filing of a motion and notice of such motion, it is thus clear that the trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the claiming party." — This passage articulates the prohibition against a trial court declaring a defendant in default on its own initiative, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The trial court's issuance of an invalid order of default and effectively disallowing a defendant to file, answer and present evidence, and to participate in the proceedings - to defend his or her case - is tantamount to a violation of one's right to due process, a violation of the right to be heard. Such order of default is null and void and any decision rendered in relation thereto should perforce be likewise nullified." — This passage defines the due process dimension of a void default order and its effect on subsequent proceedings.

• Otero vs. Tan, 692 Phil. 714 (2012) — Cited as controlling authority on the consequences of an order of default, the remedies available to a party declared in default, and the restricted grounds that may be raised in an appeal from a judgment by default.
• Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, 705 Phil. 312 (2013) — Distinguished by the Court; the CA cited it to support dismissal of the certiorari petition as moot, but the Court held that the attendant circumstances in this case aligned with the suggestions in Cailipan aimed at avoiding a procedural impasse, and that the CA should have resolved the default issue in the consolidated cases.
• Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Muñoz, 793 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited by the CA for the two stages of extradition proceedings; the Court did not rely on it in its ruling.
• Lina vs. CA, 210 Phil. 311 (1985) — Cited in Otero for the enumeration of remedies available to a party declared in default.
• Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 479 Phil. 43 (2004) — Cited for the rule that a party declared in default is proscribed from seeking modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of evidence submitted only in the appellate court.
• Sablas vs. Sablas, 553 Phil. 271 (2007) — Cited for the rule that the trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default and that judgments by default are frowned upon.
• Delos Santos vs. Carpio, 533 Phil. 42 (2006) — Cited for the purpose of notice of a motion and for the rule that an affidavit of merit is not necessary where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very root of the proceedings.
• Viacrucis vs. Estenzo, 115 Phil. 556 (1962) — Cited for the rule that ex parte reception of evidence and a decision rendered thereon, predicated on a void order of default, are themselves a nullity.
• David vs. Judge Gutierrez-Fruelda, 597 Phil. 354 (2009) — Cited for the availability of a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default.
• Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Janolo, Jr., 640 Phil. 33 (2010) — Cited for the rule that a party declared in default may alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment of default.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Orilla, 703 Phil. 565 (2013) — Cited for the rule that a void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect or efficacy for any purpose.

• Section 3, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Court — Governs the declaration of default; requires a motion by the claiming party with notice to the defending party and proof of failure to answer. The Court applied this provision to find that the RTC's declaration of default was void for lack of a written motion and notice.
• Section 2, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Court — Defines "filing" as the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court; the Court cited this to support its holding that the motion to declare default must be in writing.
• Section 3, Rule 9, 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Essentially retained the provisions on default; the Court noted that the rule was retained in the amended rules.
• Presidential Decree No. 1069 — The Philippine Extradition Law; cited by the CA in affirming the RTC's grant of the extradition petition.
• Article 2, RP-US Extradition Treaty — The treaty provision under which respondent averred that the offenses charged against spouses Rodriguez are extraditable offenses.

• Justice Leonen (Chairperson)
• Justice Hernando
• Justice Carandang (designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez per Raffle dated June 9, 2021)
• Justice Inting