Rodriguez vs. Elorde

The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes their criminal liability, as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable, and generally cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari because the remedy is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the denial of the motion to quash as an assignment of error on appeal.

The case involved a criminal prosecution for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, filed against Rodriguez by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Sheilani L. Baes on behalf of complainant Elorde. The Information alleged that Rodriguez obtained numerous loans from Elorde using as collateral a parcel of land under TCT No. 95635 (88062), representing herself to be the owner thereof, and later obtained more loans with the property itself as payment, but failed to transfer the title to Elorde's name despite demands. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15-1124 and raffled to RTC Branch 257, Parañaque City, presided by Judge Rolando G. How.

The case stemmed from an Information dated August 5, 2015 for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, filed by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Sheilani L. Baes against Perlita Rodriguez, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15-1124 and raffled to RTC Branch 257, Parañaque City, presided by Judge Rolando G. How. The accusatory portion alleged that sometime beginning the year 1961 and subsequent thereto until the year 2009, Rodriguez, by means of false pretenses, deceits, and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, defrauded complainant Laura Elorde by obtaining numerous loans from her, using as collateral a parcel of land located at Barangay San Antonio, Parañaque City under TCT No. 95635 (88062), with Rodriguez representing herself to be the owner thereof, then later obtaining more loans, the payment of which was the property itself. Rodriguez allegedly collected and received the total amount of ₱1,060,185.57 from Elorde, but once in possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied, and converted it to her own personal use and benefit, and did not transfer the title to Elorde's name, and despite repeated demands failed to return the amount or transfer the title.

On September 16, 2015, Judge How issued an Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 15-1124 for failure of the evidence on record to establish probable cause. On October 29, 2015, Elorde filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration, and on November 29, 2015, she filed a Motion to Inhibit grounded on Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the criminal case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 196, Parañaque City, presided by Judge Brigido Artemon M. Luna. On December 7, 2015, Judge Luna issued an Order granting Elorde's Motion for Reconsideration, ordering the continuation of litigation, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Rodriguez.

Aggrieved, Rodriguez filed a Submission of Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 7, 2015 and to Quash the Information dated August 5, 2015, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In her Comment/Opposition filed on January 18, 2016, Elorde maintained that the Information sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged, that the actions of Rodriguez are within the ambit of Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that there is probable cause for the issuance of the Information, and that the grant of the Motion for Reconsideration was properly within the RTC's discretion. On February 18, 2016, RTC Branch 196 issued an Order denying Rodriguez's Motion for Reconsideration/Motion to Quash.

Rodriguez filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, alleging that RTC Branch 196 gravely abused its discretion when it found probable cause against her for estafa when the facts as stated in the Information do not constitute the crime as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code; that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion when it found probable cause against her for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), since she did not receive the money from Elorde in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; and that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it reconsidered/reversed the Order dated September 16, 2015 issued by Judge How when the records clearly show that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Elorde was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, that the remedy of Rodriguez was to proceed to trial and appeal if convicted, and that trial proper is a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy. Rodriguez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA.

Rodriguez then filed the instant Petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA seriously erred in upholding the reconsideration/reversal of the Order dated September 16, 2015 when the motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period; in upholding Judge Luna's finding of probable cause for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) when the facts do not constitute the crime since petitioner owned the real property in question; and in upholding Judge Luna's finding of probable cause for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) since petitioner did not receive the money in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same. Respondent countered that the Petition does not raise questions of law and is a mere rehash of the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. In a Manifestation, respondent stated that the instant Petition had become moot due to the death of petitioner on January 28, 2018, and a Certificate of Death was subsequently submitted by petitioner's counsel to prove such fact.

• Reconsideration Beyond Reglementary Period: Petitioner argued that the CA seriously erred when it upheld the reconsideration/reversal of the Order dated September 16, 2015 when the records clearly show that the motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent beyond the reglementary period.
• Facts Do Not Constitute Estafa Under Article 315(2)(a): Petitioner argued that the CA seriously erred when it upheld Judge Luna's finding of probable cause for the crime of estafa when the facts as stated in the Information do not constitute the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, since petitioner owned the real property in question.
• No Estafa Under Article 315(1)(b): Petitioner argued that the CA seriously erred when it upheld Judge Luna's finding of probable cause for the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, since petitioner did not receive the money from respondent in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.

• No Question of Law: Respondent countered that the Petition does not raise questions of law, as the question sought to be resolved is whether there was prior criminal intent at the time the contract was entered into as to constitute the elements of the crime of estafa, and there could be no question of law at this instance as the facts of the case have yet to be presented during trial.
• Petition is a Mere Rehash: Respondent argued that the Petition is patently without merit as it is a mere rehash of the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA.
• Mootness Due to Death: Respondent stated in a Manifestation that the instant Petition had become moot due to the death of petitioner on January 28, 2018, and a Certificate of Death was submitted to prove such fact.

• Mootness Due to Death: Whether the death of petitioner during the pendency of the case rendered the case moot and academic, thereby extinguishing her criminal liability.
• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: Whether the CA correctly dismissed Rodriguez's Petition for Certiorari and ruled that RTC Branch 196 did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the Orders reinstating the criminal case for estafa against petitioner.

• Mootness Due to Death: Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes their criminal liability, as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Petition questions the propriety of the reinstatement of the criminal case for estafa against Rodriguez, her death pending the resolution of the same extinguished the criminal action before the RTC inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused therein.
• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: No. An order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable, and generally cannot even be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari in view of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash, unless special or exceptional reasons obtain.

• Mootness Due to Death: The Court noted at the outset that in view of petitioner's death, the case before it had become moot and academic. It is well-settled, both in law and in jurisprudence, that the death of the accused extinguishes their criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides how the criminal liability of an accused is totally extinguished, including by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor being extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Citing People vs. Monroyo, which in turn cited People vs. Culas, the Court explained that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, which is civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts, but such separate civil action may be enforced only against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused. Since the Petition before the Court essentially questions the propriety of the reinstatement of the criminal case for estafa against Rodriguez, her death pending the resolution of the same extinguished the criminal action before the RTC inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused therein.
• Propriety of Certiorari as Remedy: In the absence of any exceptional reason to allow immediate resort to filing of a petition for certiorari, the Court agreed with the CA's ruling that petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when she filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to question the denial of her Motion to Quash the Information. Citing People vs. Ramoy, the Court reiterated that an order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable, and in general, the same cannot even be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari in view of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. However, when special or exceptional reasons obtain, immediate resort to filing of a petition for certiorari may be allowed.

• Extinguishment of Criminal Liability by Death — Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor being extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the criminal case against Rodriguez, who died on January 28, 2018, during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, since there was no longer a defendant to stand as the accused therein.
• Civil Liability Ex Delicto and Its Survival — Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, which is civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. However, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, as enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts), in which case an action for recovery may be pursued by filing a separate civil action against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused.
• Interlocutory Nature of Denial of Motion to Quash — An order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable, and in general, the same cannot even be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari in view of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash, unless special or exceptional reasons obtain.

• "It is well-settled, both in law and in jurisprudence, that the death of the accused extinguishes their criminal liability." — This passage states the foundational principle upon which the Court based its dismissal of the criminal case against Rodriguez, citing Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as the governing provision.
• "Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon." — This excerpt, quoted from People v. Monroyo citing People v. Culas, articulates the scope of the effect of death on both criminal and civil liabilities, distinguishing civil liability ex delicto from civil liability predicated on other sources of obligation.
• "An order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable. In general, the same cannot even be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari in view of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law." — This passage, quoted from People v. Ramoy, states the controlling rule on the remedy available to an accused whose motion to quash has been denied, which the Court adopted in affirming the CA's dismissal of Rodriguez's petition for certiorari.

• People vs. Monroyo, 864 Phil. 1027 (2019) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability as well as civil liability based solely thereon, and that civil liability may survive if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
• People vs. Culas, 810 Phil. 205 (2017) — Cited in People vs. Monroyo for the summary of the effects of the death of the accused pending appeal on their liabilities, including the survival of civil liability based on sources other than delict.
• People vs. Ramoy, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that an order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory and not appealable, and generally cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari absent special or exceptional reasons.
• People vs. De Chavez, 822 Phil. 879 (2017) — Cited in support of the proposition that the death of the accused extinguishes their criminal liability.

• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor being extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. The Court applied this provision to dismiss the criminal case against Rodriguez in view of her death.
• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which Rodriguez was charged with estafa by means of false pretenses, deceits, and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The Court did not reach the merits of whether the Information sufficiently alleged the elements of this offense because the case was dismissed on the ground of the accused's death.
• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — The provision under which Rodriguez argued the RTC also found probable cause for estafa, involving the misappropriation or conversion of money received in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.
• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates the sources of obligation from which civil liability may arise: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts. The Court cited this provision in explaining that civil liability may survive the death of the accused if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
• Article 1155, Civil Code — Cited in People vs. Monroyo for the proposition that the statute of limitations on civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case where the private offended party instituted the civil action together therewith.
• Rule 137, Section 1, Rules of Court — The ground cited by Elorde in her Motion to Inhibit filed before the RTC, relating to the disqualification of judges.
• Section 1, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cited in People vs. Monroyo for the rule that where civil liability survives the death of the accused, an action for recovery may be pursued by filing a separate civil action.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concurred. Hernando, J., was on official business.