Rodriguez vs. COMELEC

A complaint charging the election offense of vote-buying under Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code must, at the preliminary investigation stage, be supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer, promise, or acceptance of money or other consideration, as mandated by Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646; self-serving statements, uncorroborated video recordings, and photographs, standing alone, cannot substitute for the proof required to establish probable cause. Vote-buying is a crime mala in se—requiring proof of criminal intent (mens rea) to induce voting behavior—not a malum prohibitum offense merely because it is penalized by a special law.

In the May 2019 National and Local Elections, respondents Belmonte, Sotto, and Delarmente were candidates for Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Representative of the First District of Quezon City, respectively. Respondent Revillame is a well-known television host. Their political party held a campaign rally on 11 May 2019 along Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, where Revillame appeared and, as part of an entertainment segment, gave cash to members of the audience. Petitioners, residents of Quezon City, filed a verified complaint before the COMELEC alleging that Revillame’s giving of cash and subsequent endorsement of the candidates constituted vote-buying. Belmonte and Sotto won the elections and were re-elected in 2022.

• Nature of the Complaint: Petitioners Edwin D. Rodriguez and Michael T. Defensor, residents of Quezon City, filed a verified Complaint Affidavit before the COMELEC charging respondents—Ma. Josefina G. Belmonte-Alimurung, Gian Carlo G. Sotto, Elizabeth A. Delarmente, and Wilfredo B. Revillame—with the election offense of vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code.

• The 11 May 2019 Campaign Rally: On 11 May 2019, respondents Belmonte, Sotto, and Delarmente (candidates for Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Congresswoman of the First District of Quezon City), along with their political party, held a miting de avance along Roosevelt Avenue, Pitimini, Quezon City. A stage was erected, and candidates presented their platforms. To attract voters, television host Willie Revillame was invited. Revillame went on stage, addressed the crowd, and performed a production number with “wowowee girls.” Petitioners alleged that during the rally, Revillame, on multiple occasions, gave cash to the crowd and thereafter endorsed respondents Belmonte, Sotto, and Delarmente, thereby inducing voters to vote for them. The event was broadcast live on Belmonte’s Facebook account. Petitioners attached a DVD containing the video footage and still photographs showing Revillame giving cash while the candidates were on stage.

• Respondents’ Defenses: All respondents denied vote-buying. Belmonte, Sotto, and Delarmente stated they did not give money to anyone. Revillame admitted giving small amounts of cash sourced from his personal funds, but asserted it was part of his entertainment show and not intended to induce votes; he claimed he did not ask recipients whether they were registered voters, and the money was given to fans—minors, senior citizens, and persons with disabilities—for basic necessities. The candidate respondents maintained that the miting de avance and Revillame’s entertainment program were two separate events; they stayed only as spectators after the political rally. Respondents also challenged the admissibility of the video and photographs, arguing there was no authenticating witness.

• COMELEC’s Evaluation: The Investigating Officer found that petitioners failed to establish probable cause. The video and photographs, absent corroborating testimonies from the person who took them or from the alleged recipients, were hearsay with weak evidentiary value. No evidence showed that respondents Belmonte, Sotto, and Delarmente gave money or were aware of Revillame’s giving. The Law Department opined that the miting de avance and the entertainment show were distinct events, and the candidate respondents were mere spectators. It recommended dismissal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause. The COMELEC En Banc adopted the recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on the same grounds. Notably, respondent Revillame presented affidavits of five recipients; one was a resident of Antipolo City (not a Quezon City voter), and all affirmed that Revillame, not the candidates, was the source of the cash and that he did not inquire about their voter registration.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Probable Cause: Petitioners contended that the video footage and still photographs—showing Revillame distributing cash while the candidates were on stage and endorsing them—constituted sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for vote-buying. They characterized the COMELEC En Banc’s dismissal as hasty and one-sided, arguing that to accept the reasoning that Revillame’s brand of entertainment negated criminal intent would allow any candidate to circumvent the vote-buying prohibition by simply hiring a popular figure to distribute money.

• Prematurity of Evidentiary Defenses: Petitioners argued that respondents’ defenses—such as the alleged separation of events, lack of intent, and the admissibility of evidence—were matters properly ventilated at trial, not at the preliminary investigation stage where only probable cause is determined.

• Unwarranted Assumptions: Petitioners asserted that the assailed resolutions rested on unwarranted assumptions: that the entertainment show was separate from the miting de avance, and that Revillame’s popularity and charitable persona automatically negated any intent to buy votes.

• Lack of Probable Cause and Non-Compliance with Section 28 of RA 6646: The COMELEC En Banc countered that the complaint was fatally deficient because it was not supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer, promise, or acceptance of money or other consideration, as explicitly required by Section 28 of RA 6646. Uncorroborated video footage and photographs, without authenticating testimony, were insufficient to establish probable cause.

• Separate Events and Absence of Intent: Private respondents maintained that the miting de avance and Revillame’s entertainment program were separate and distinct; the candidate respondents were mere spectators who did not give money, and they had no knowledge of or consent to Revillame’s cash distributions. Revillame stressed that his cash gifts came from his own pocket, were intended as charitable assistance, and were given without any condition or endorsement that the recipients vote for the candidates. No explicit statement to vote for the candidates was proven.

• Evidentiary Deficiencies: Respondents argued that petitioners had no personal knowledge of the alleged vote-buying; the video and photographs were hearsay absent testimony from the camera operator or the recipients; and the complaint was based on speculation rather than concrete proof.

• Probable Cause and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause, given that the complaint was not supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses as required under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646 and relied solely on uncorroborated video and photographs.

• Nature of Vote-Buying and Proof of Intent: Whether vote-buying under Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code is a malum prohibitum offense that does not require proof of criminal intent, or is mala in se, such that intent must be established to find probable cause.

• Scope of Judicial Review over COMELEC’s Probable Cause Determination: Whether the Supreme Court may substitute its own judgment for that of the COMELEC on the sufficiency of evidence to support probable cause, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

• Probable Cause and Sufficiency of Evidence: The COMELEC En Banc did not gravely abuse its discretion. Section 28 of RA 6646 explicitly requires that a complaint for vote-buying be “supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter’s acceptance of money or other consideration.” Petitioners’ Complaint Affidavit was unaccompanied by any such affidavits; their allegations rested on self-serving statements and uncorroborated video clips and screenshots. Such evidence is not direct, strong, convincing, and indubitable, and cannot substitute for the statutorily prescribed affidavits. The absence of supporting affidavits rendered the complaint vulnerable to dismissal for insufficiency of evidence, consistent with Bernardo v. Abalos, Sr. The COMELEC’s finding that the video and photographs were insufficient to establish probable cause fell well within its discretion.

• Nature of Vote-Buying and Proof of Intent: Vote-buying under Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code is mala in se because the act is inherently immoral—it destroys the sanctity of votes and prostitutes the electoral process. Consequently, criminal intent (mens rea) to induce voting behavior is an essential element. The COMELEC correctly determined that petitioners’ evidence failed to show such intent. The video and photographs, without testimonies from recipients, did not establish that the cash was given to induce votes, especially when respondent Revillame presented affidavits of five recipients who confirmed he gave cash as charitable assistance without asking about voter registration and that the candidate respondents were not the source. The mere presence of the candidates on stage did not transform Revillame’s personal acts into vote-buying by the candidates, following the principle in Lozano v. Yorac that physical presence during the distribution of gifts does not necessarily make one the giver.

• Scope of Judicial Review over COMELEC’s Probable Cause Determination: The Supreme Court’s power to review factual findings of the COMELEC, made pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses, is limited. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law, the Court will not disturb the COMELEC’s determination of probable cause nor substitute its own judgment on the sufficiency of evidence. No such grave abuse was demonstrated in this case.

• Mandatory Supporting Affidavits for Vote-Buying Complaints — Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) mandates that a complaint for vote-buying or vote-selling under Section 261(a) or (b) of the Omnibus Election Code must be supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by, or the voter’s acceptance of, money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders, or sympathizers of a candidate. This requirement is a prerequisite to a valid preliminary investigation; uncorroborated video recordings, screenshots, and self-serving allegations are not sufficient substitutes. The rule was applied to affirm the dismissal of a complaint that relied exclusively on unauthenticated video and photographs without witness affidavits.

• Vote-Buying as Mala in Se — An offense is mala in se when the acts complained of are inherently immoral, regardless of whether the penalty is found in a special law or the Revised Penal Code. Vote-buying under Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code is mala in se because it subverts the sanctity of the ballot and corrupts the electoral process. As a result, criminal intent (mens rea)—the purpose of inducing anyone to vote for or against a candidate—is an indispensable element that must be alleged and proven, even at the preliminary investigation stage. The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita rests on the inherent immorality or vileness of the act, not on the source of the penal provision (Cardona v. People, citing Garcia v. Court of Appeals and Dungo v. People).

• Limited Judicial Review of COMELEC’s Probable Cause Findings — Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the COMELEC’s factual findings on the existence of probable cause are accorded great respect. The Supreme Court will not reverse such findings absent proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law. The sufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause is a matter entrusted primarily to the COMELEC’s sound discretion (Malinias v. COMELEC).

• Transactional Immunity for Vote-Sellers — The last paragraph of Section 28 of RA 6646 vests the COMELEC with exclusive authority to grant transactional immunity to any person who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies regarding violations of Section 261(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The immunity operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to which the testimony relates, encouraging vote-sellers to denounce vote-buyers and ensuring successful prosecutions. The exercise of this power cannot be interfered with by the courts absent grave abuse of discretion (COMELEC v. Español).

• “Any complaint that charges the election offense of vote-buying must be supported by credible evidence that substantiates the elements of the offense. General averments of vote-buying, when accompanied by uncorroborated video clips and screenshots from such video clips, will be adjudged as mere speculation because they cannot substitute for proof required to establish probable cause.” — The decision’s opening thesis, encapsulating the ratio decidendi.

• “The absence of supporting affidavits shows the frailty of petitioners’ Complaint Affidavit and makes it vulnerable to dismissal. Submission of self-serving statements, uncorroborated audio and visual recordings, and photographs are not considered as direct, strong, convincing and indubitable evidence.” — Underscores the mandatory nature of the affidavit requirement under Section 28 and the low probative weight of unauthenticated electronic evidence.

• “When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. … The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.” — Clarifies the proper analytical framework for classifying crimes, rejecting the notion that all special penal laws define mala prohibita offenses.

• Lozano v. Yorac, 280 Phil. 280 (1991) — Followed. The physical presence of a mayoralty candidate during the distribution of Christmas gifts by the local government did not, without more, make the candidate the giver. Applied here: the candidates’ presence on stage while Revillame gave cash from his own pocket did not equate to vote-buying by the candidates.

• Bernardo, et al. v. Abalos, Sr., et al., 422 Phil. 807 (2001) — Cited as controlling authority that a complaint lacking supporting affidavits and relying on self-serving statements and unauthenticated recordings must be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

• Commission on Elections v. Español, 463 Phil. 240 (2003) — Relied upon to explain the COMELEC’s exclusive power to grant transactional immunity to voluntary witnesses under Section 28 of RA 6646, and the corollary rule that courts should not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless grave abuse of discretion is shown.

• Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319 (2002) — Applied for the standard of judicial review: the Supreme Court will not disturb the COMELEC’s factual findings on probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law.

• Cardona v. People, G.R. No. 244544, 06 July 2020 (citing Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 591 (2006) and Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630 (2015)) — Adopted to establish that vote-buying is mala in se because the act is inherently immoral; the classification turns on the character of the act, not on whether the penal provision is found in the Revised Penal Code or a special law.

• Section 261(a)(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Defines the offense of vote-buying. The Court parsed the provision to confirm that it requires an act of giving, offering, or promising money or anything of value “in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate,” thereby making intent an explicit element of the crime and reinforcing its character as mala in se.

• Section 28, Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Prescribes the procedure for prosecuting vote-buying and vote-selling. The first paragraph mandates that a complaint must be “supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter’s acceptance of money or other consideration.” The Court applied this provision strictly, holding that failure to attach such affidavits is fatal. The last paragraph, vesting the COMELEC with authority to grant transactional immunity, was discussed to highlight the legislative design to encourage vote-sellers to come forward.

• Section 4, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Requires that a complaint not initiated motu proprio be verified and supported by affidavits and/or any other evidence. This rule was cited to reinforce the basic evidentiary standard that petitioners’ complaint failed to meet.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., on leave.
Kho, Jr., J., no part (with prior participation).