Rodriguez vs. COMELEC

A person is a "fugitive from justice" under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code only where, after conviction or after being charged, he flees to avoid punishment or prosecution, such flight presupposing knowledge of the already instituted indictment or promulgated conviction and an intent to evade. Rodriguez, having left the United States before any complaint or warrant existed, was not shown to have such intent and was therefore not disqualified from running for or holding the governorship of Quezon Province.

Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. were rival candidates for Governor of Quezon Province in the May 1992 and May 1995 elections. Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) disqualifies from running for any elective local position a fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Article 73 of its Implementing Rules had confined the term to a person convicted by final judgment, a limitation rejected in G.R. No. 112889.

Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. contested the governorship of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez filed a quo warranto petition before the COMELEC, docketed as EPC No. 92-28, alleging Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code because a charge filed on November 12, 1985 was pending against him before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.

Thereafter, Marquez elevated the COMELEC's February 2, 1993 dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 112889, which resulted in the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision defining fugitive from justice and remanding the case to the COMELEC. While that case was pending, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the May 8, 1995 elections. On April 11, 1995, Marquez filed a petition for disqualification against Rodriguez before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 95-089, based principally on the same fugitive-from-justice allegation.

When SPA No. 95-089 was heard on April 26, 1995, Rodriguez walked out after denial of his motion for postponement. The COMELEC considered him to have waived his right to disprove authenticity and allowed Marquez to present ex-parte an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1985 warrant of arrest and an authenticated copy of the felony complaint. On May 7, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089, finding Rodriguez proven to be a fugitive from justice, ordering him disqualified and to vacate the governorship, and setting aside his 1995 certificate of candidacy. According to the COMELEC, Rodriguez offered no document showing when he left the United States and returned, while his wife's November 6, 1985 arrest in a U.S. apartment paid for by him hardly rebutted presumed knowledge.

Rodriguez nevertheless emerged victorious in the May 8, 1995 election. On motion by Marquez, the COMELEC on May 11, 1995 suspended his proclamation, but the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him on May 12, 1995. On June 23, 1995, the COMELEC nullified that proclamation as void ab initio and required concerned board members to explain why they should not be cited in contempt, deferring Marquez' own proclamation pending resolution of G.R. No. 120099. Pursuant to the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution, further evidence was received, including Bureau of Immigration certifications that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, testimony on his political activities after return, and his passport showing returns to the United States on August 14 and October 7, 1985 with arrival back on October 26, 1985.

• Fugitive Status and Lack of Intent to Evade: Petitioner maintained that he was not a fugitive from justice as defined in the April 18, 1995 decision because he arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, almost five months before the November 12, 1985 felony complaint and arrest warrant, such that at departure there was no charge, warrant, or conviction to evade and no knowledge thereof.
• Reason for Return: Petitioner argued that his compulsion to return was to join and participate in political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, followed by continuous service as OIC-Board Member in 1986 and elected Governor in 1988, 1992 and 1995, negating any inference of flight.
• Forum-Shopping: Petitioner contended that SPA No. 95-089 should not have been entertained because its filing while G.R. No. 112889 was pending constituted forum-shopping.
• Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder: Petitioner claimed that applying Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code to him would partake of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
• Jurisdiction and Procedure: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction to issue the questioned resolution on the eve of the election under the seven-day rule in Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code, that denial of suspension of the April 26, 1995 hearing was improper, and that hearing by a single member and consolidation were flawed.

• Pendency of Charge and Warrant: Respondent Marquez countered that authenticated documents showing pendency of the criminal complaint in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles and an outstanding warrant amply proved Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice.
• Knowledge and Intent: Respondent argued that Rodriguez could not claim lack of awareness, pointing to the arrest of his wife on November 6, 1985 by Fraud Bureau investigators in a U.S. apartment paid for by Rodriguez and to a voluminous investigation report offered to show the magnitude of the investigation made it impossible for Rodriguez not to have known of it.
• Expanded Definition: Respondent, joined by the COMELEC's expressed discomfort, urged a broader concept culled from foreign authorities cited in the MARQUEZ Decision, under which mere departure from the jurisdiction where a charge is pending, or commission plus leaving, suffices regardless of whether the charge was filed at the time of flight or of purpose or motive.

• Fugitive from Justice: Whether Rodriguez, who left the United States on June 25, 1985 before the November 12, 1985 filing of the felony complaint and issuance of the arrest warrant, is a fugitive from justice under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
• Law of the Case: Whether the definition of fugitive from justice irrevocably established in the MARQUEZ Decision (G.R. No. 112889) governs the instant petition and forecloses an expanded re-definition.

• Fugitive from Justice: No. Intent to evade is the compelling factor, requiring proof of an already instituted charge or promulgated conviction at the time of flight, which was absent where departure preceded the complaint and warrant by almost five months.
• Law of the Case: Yes. The same parties and issue in G.R. No. 112889 and the instant petition make the MARQUEZ definition the controlling legal rule, and re-definition would foment instability in jurisprudence hardly after the ink had dried.

• Fugitive from Justice: The MARQUEZ definition includes those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment and those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution, indicating that intent to evade animates flight and presupposes knowledge of an already instituted indictment or promulgated conviction. Applied to undisputed Immigration certifications of June 25, 1985 arrival against November 12, 1985 complaint and warrant, it was impossible for Rodriguez to have known of or deliberately run from any prosecution or punishment. The attempt to infer knowledge from the magnitude of a secret investigation was rejected, since such investigations are shrouded in secrecy to preserve surprise, and the seventeen-day interval after his October 26, 1985 return could not overturn good faith. His return homeward in good faith, subsequent learning of charges while serving in the Philippines, and failure to submit to U.S. jurisdiction did not qualify him as a fugitive, there being no obligation to curtail the right to leave and return home or to bear the burden of defending abroad in the middle of public service.
• Law of the Case: The same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (fugitive status) were involved in the MARQUEZ Decision on appeal from EPC No. 92-28 and in the instant petition on appeal from EPC No. 92-28 as consolidated with SPA No. 95-089, with identical facts, evidence, and common issue. Whatever was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule continues as the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, covering questions necessarily involved although not expressly treated. Crafting an expanded definition at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision and resolving the petition therefrom was therefore forbidden, particularly where the broader foreign authorities were merely persuasive and the local statute contained no further circumscription beyond its bare mandate.

• Fugitive from justice under Section 40(e), Local Government Code — A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of the candidate must be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least a charge already filed at the time of flight. Mere presence in the Philippines while charges are pending abroad, without such prior charge and knowledge at departure, does not satisfy the definition.
• Law of the case — Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court. Where after definite determination the cause is remanded for further action below, only questions arising subsequently or the propriety of compliance with the mandate will be examined; if the court below proceeded in substantial conformity, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal. Questions necessarily involved in the former appeal are regarded as law of the case although not expressly treated.

• "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." — States the controlling MARQUEZ definition adopted as the ratio for disqualification under Section 40(e).
• "The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction." — Defines the decisive element requiring knowledge of an already instituted charge or conviction at the time of flight.
• ""Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal." — Anchors refusal to re-define fugitive from justice differently from the prior appeal between the same parties and issue.
• "When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice." — Adopted from the COMELEC evaluation to explain why non-submission after subsequent knowledge does not constitute flight.

• Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995, 243 SCRA 538 — Controlling precedent that defined fugitive from justice, rejected confinement to conviction by final judgment under Article 73 of the Implementing Rules, and remanded EPC No. 92-28; applied as law of the case.
• People vs. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999 — Source of the various definitions of law of the case relied upon to forbid expanded re-definition.
• Roberts vs. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80; King vs. Noe; Hughes vs. Pflanz; Tobin vs. Casaus — Foreign authorities cited in the MARQUEZ Decision on the general and ordinary connotation of fugitive from justice; invoked by Marquez and COMELEC to urge a broader definition but not adopted as controlling.

• Section 40(e), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Disqualifies fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad from running for any elective local position; applied to hold that Rodriguez, lacking intent to evade at flight, was not disqualified.
• Article 73, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code — Provided that fugitive from justice refers to a person convicted by final judgment; held in the MARQUEZ Decision to be an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
• Section 72, Omnibus Election Code — Requires priority to disqualification cases so final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election; raised against COMELEC's eve-of-election resolution but resolved as governing the Omnibus Election Code rather than the Local Government Code and as directory.
• Section 9, Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Allows consolidation when actions involve similar or common questions of law and fact; supported joint resolution of EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089.
• Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, Rules of Court — Authorized to be applied in the Court-ordered reception and evaluation of additional evidence by the COMELEC.

Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on leave. Torres, Jr., J., in a separate concurring opinion, agreed Rodriguez is not a fugitive because no case existed to avoid at departure, noting his two returns to the United States, leaving his wife there, natural homecoming, duty as incumbent governor to remain, the provision's history as a camaraderie provision, and deference to the 285,202 votes and popular mandate.

• Vitug, J., dissenting (joined by Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Mendoza, JJ.) — Would have dismissed the petition, reasoning that forum-shopping did not exist because quo warranto for 1992-1995 differs from disqualification for 1995-1998, Section 40(e) is neither ex post facto nor a bill of attainder, Section 40(e) rather than Section 72 governs with the seven-day rule merely directory, denial of suspension and ex-parte reception after walk-out and consolidation were proper, and under the ordinary connotation and U.S. extradition authorities motive need not be inquired into so that pending U.S. charges plus presence in the Philippines suffice to make petitioner a fugitive from justice.