Rodil vs. Garcia

An application for bail requires a hearing at which the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; the hearing may be summary in character but must not be a mere sham or pretense. The right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary investigation is not guaranteed to the accused; it is a matter of sound judicial discretion, and its denial is a refusal of a privilege rather than a deprivation of a right.

Reynaldo Rodil was the accused in a murder case pending before the Municipal Court of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, presided by respondent Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia; PC TSGT. Ireneo Dellosa was impleaded as the other respondent. The proceedings implicated the constitutional right to bail and the conduct of a preliminary investigation, including whether an accused may recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at that stage. The case reached the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Reynaldo Rodil was charged with murder, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him. The case was pending before respondent Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. PC TSGT. Ireneo Dellosa was the other respondent.

During the preliminary investigation, counsel for Rodil insisted that the prosecution witnesses be recalled so that he could cross-examine them on "clarificatory and amplificatory matters." Respondent Judge denied the request. Rodil then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the order denying the recall and to obtain bail; his petition for bail had been denied, and his motion for reconsideration remained undecided.

At the continuation of the preliminary investigation, held after the denial of the bail petition, counsel asked respondent Judge whether in the court's opinion "the evidence of guilt is strong, final and irreversible." The judge answered: "That is final, the said order of the Court states that the evidence of guilt is strong." The order denying bail expressly admitted that it was issued on the basis of Rodil's motion and the opposition of the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal without conducting any hearing on the motion. The judge acted on the mistaken belief that the prosecution's presentation of evidence for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the preliminary examination proper, sufficed to deny bail.

The Solicitor General, commenting for respondent, sought dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not granted to an accused and that the judge's exercise of discretion, considering the evidence of record, sufficed to justify denial of bail. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order and later considered the case submitted for decision.

• Recall and Cross-Examination of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner, through counsel, insisted that the prosecution witnesses be recalled during the preliminary investigation so that counsel could cross-examine them on clarificatory and amplificatory matters; the denial of this request was challenged as grave abuse of discretion.
• Bail: Petitioner sought bail and challenged the denial of his application, which had been issued without a hearing; his motion for reconsideration remained undecided, and he asked respondent Judge whether the evidence of guilt was strong, final, and irreversible.

• No Right to Cross-Examine at Preliminary Investigation: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, contended that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted to an accused.
• Discretion to Deny Bail: Respondent argued that the municipal judge's exercise of discretion, considering the evidence of record, sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail.

• Bail Hearing: Whether respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for bail without conducting a hearing.
• Cross-Examination at Preliminary Investigation: Whether petitioner had a right to recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses during the preliminary investigation, and whether the denial thereof constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Bail Hearing: Yes. The order denying bail was set aside because an application for bail requires a hearing; the hearing may be summary but must not be a sham or pretense, and the accused must not be denied his day in court.
• Cross-Examination at Preliminary Investigation: No. The right to cross-examine is not guaranteed at the preliminary investigation; it depends on the sound discretion of the judge or investigating officer, and denial is a refusal of a privilege, not a deprivation of a right. During the bail hearing, however, counsel may cross-examine witnesses testifying to prove that evidence of guilt is strong.

• Bail Hearing: The respondent judge denied bail on the basis of Rodil's motion and the fiscal's opposition without conducting any hearing. He believed that the prosecution's presentation of evidence for the warrant of arrest and the preliminary examination proper sufficed to deny bail. That was error. In People vs. Sola, an order granting bail without hearing the prosecution was nullified; the present case is stronger because the accused himself, the beneficiary of the constitutional right, was not heard. Ocampo vs. Bernabe teaches that the bail hearing is summary but not a sham or pretense and must not be an exercise in futility; the accused is not to be denied his day in court. Considerations of expediency must give way to the positive constitutional command. The order denying bail was therefore set aside, and a hearing on the application was directed.
• Cross-Examination at Preliminary Investigation: Under the law as it stood, the accused is not guaranteed the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary investigation. Abrera vs. Muñoz and Flordeliza held that an accused is not entitled to cross-examine witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest; the matter depends on the sound discretion of the judge or investigating officer, and denial is not a deprivation of a right but a refusal of a privilege. Dequito vs. Arellano, cited in Abrera, explained that a judge is not a ministerial officer and may permit the recalling and examination of witnesses in the interest of justice, but such permission is discretionary. The denial of the recall request was thus not grave abuse of discretion. With the bail hearing, however, counsel could attain the objective denied him, because he could cross-examine the witnesses when they testify to prove that evidence of guilt is strong.

• Bail Hearing Requirement — An application for bail must be heard; the hearing may be summary in character, but it must not be a mere sham or pretense, an exercise in futility, or a denial of the accused's day in court. The Court applied this doctrine by setting aside the order denying bail because respondent Judge issued it without any hearing on petitioner's motion.
• No Right to Cross-Examine at Preliminary Investigation — An accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him during the preliminary investigation; the matter depends on the sound discretion of the judge or investigating officer, and denial is a refusal of a privilege rather than a deprivation of a right. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the refusal to recall prosecution witnesses for clarificatory and amplificatory cross-examination was not grave abuse of discretion.
• Judicial Discretion in the Conduct of Trial and Recall of Witnesses — A judge is not a ministerial officer; the calling, recalling, and examination of witnesses are matters that may be permitted in the exercise of discretion and in the interest of justice, but they do not vest a right in a party. The Court noted that respondent Judge could have granted the recall request, but the denial did not constitute reversible error.
• Purpose of Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation exists to avoid groundless or vindictive prosecutions, and judges should exercise their discretion in a fair and objective manner to attain that purpose. The Court reminded judges and counsel of this objective while resolving the procedural questions.

• "The procedure to be followed in the hearing on an application for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused is not to be denied his day in court." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on bail: the summary nature of the hearing does not excuse denying the accused an opportunity to be heard.
• "Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the stage of preliminary investigation." — This is the Court's direct holding on the cross-examination issue.
• "In being denied confrontation of the prosecution witnesses, she was not deprived of any right but was merely refused the exercise of a privilege." — Quoted from Abrera vs. Muñoz and Flordeliza and adopted by the Court to characterize the denial of the recall request.
• "That he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong." — This passage indicates that, in the bail hearing, counsel could cross-examine the witnesses when they testify to establish that the evidence of guilt is strong.

• People vs. Sola, G.R. No. 56158-64 (March 17, 1981) — The latest case on bail; the Court nullified an order of a municipal judge granting bail to the accused without hearing the prosecution. It was cited to show that the present case was stronger because the accused, not the prosecution, was denied a hearing.
• People vs. San Diego, L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522 — Cited in People vs. Sola as authority for the rule that bail cannot be granted without hearing the prosecution.
• Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946) — Explained that the hearing on an application for bail is summary but not a sham or pretense; the decision was in favor of petitioner Ocampo, with grave abuse of discretion found in the denial of bail.
• Abrera vs. Muñoz and Flordeliza, 8 Phil. 1124 — The leading case holding that an accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest; denial is a refusal of a privilege.
• Dequito vs. Arellano, 81 Phil. 128 — Cited in Abrera for the proposition that a judge is not a ministerial officer and may permit the recalling and examination of witnesses in the interest of justice.
• Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 — Cited with Dequito and Ramilo for the rule on cross-examination at the preliminary investigation proper.
• People vs. Ramilo, 98 Phil. 545 — Cited for the rule arising from a City Attorney's failure to allow the accused to cross-examine witnesses during a reinvestigation.

• Constitution (right to bail) — The Court referred to the constitutional right to bail and to a "positive constitutional command" requiring the court to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong; this required a hearing before bail could be denied.
• Rules of Court (bail procedure) — The dispositive directed the hearing on petitioner's application for bail to be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court; the text does not cite a specific rule or section.

Aquino, Abad Santos, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., took no part. Conception, Jr., J., is on leave.