Rocaberte vs. People of the Philippines

An information must allege the approximate time of the commission of the offense as near to the actual date as the information will permit; an averment spanning several years is fatally defective because it deprives the accused of the opportunity to prepare a defense, though the defect is curable by amendment rather than a ground for quashal.

Petitioner Felicisimo Rocaberte and two co-accused, Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario, were charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Tagbilaran City, presided by respondent Judge Andres S. Santos, in Criminal Case No. 3851. The information was filed by an Assistant Provincial Fiscal on June 19, 1984. The properties allegedly stolen belonged to the Philippine Sinter Corporation and were taken from the offshore area of West Canayaon, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was represented by counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora.

On June 19, 1984, an Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed an information before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Tagbilaran City, charging Felicisimo Rocaberte, Florencio Ranario, and Flaviana Ranario with the crime of theft. The information alleged that, "on or about the Period from 1977 to December 28, 1983," at the offshore of West Canayaon, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, the accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to gain and without the owner's consent, willfully and feloniously took, stole, and carried away properties belonging to the Philippine Sinter Corporation. The stolen items included a sledge hammer valued at ₱136.00, an H beam valued at ₱400.00, two cut abrasive steel plates for cargo berth cover protector valued at ₱158.00, and ninety-nine blocks of aluminum alloy anodes valued at ₱371,250.00, totaling ₱371,944.00. The information charged the offense as contrary to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code.

Through counsel de officio Atty. Lilio L. Amora, the accused moved to quash the information on January 2, 1985. They contended that the statement of the time of commission — "from 1977 to December 28, 1983," a period of seven years or approximately 2,551 days — was fatally defective, citing People vs. Reyes for the proposition that so great a gap defied approximation in the commission of a single offense, and invoking People vs. Openia for the principle that the variance violated the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the specific charge and deprived them of the opportunity to defend themselves.

The respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. In the motion for reconsideration, the accused alternatively sought amendment of the information pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that if a motion to quash is based on a defect curable by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. Rocaberte then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a special civil action of certiorari, impugning the denial of the motion to quash and the refusal to direct amendment of the information.

• Defectiveness of the Information's Time Averment: Petitioner argued that the information's statement of time — "from 1977 to December 28, 1983," spanning approximately 2,551 days — was fatally defective because "there was so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense," citing People vs. Reyes, 108 SCRA 203.
• Violation of Constitutional Right to Be Informed: Petitioner maintained that the variance in time was unfair to the accused, violating their constitutional right to be informed before trial of the specific charge against them and depriving them of the opportunity to defend themselves, invoking People vs. Openia, 98 Phil. 698.
• Alternative Remedy of Amendment: Petitioner alternatively prayed that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the court order the prosecution to amend the information to cure the defect in the averment of time.

• Sufficiency of Time Averment: Whether the information's allegation that the offense was committed "from 1977 to December 28, 1983," a period of approximately seven years, is fatally defective for failing to state the approximate time of commission with sufficient definiteness.
• Proper Remedy: Whether the proper remedy for such a defect is a motion to quash, a motion for a bill of particulars, or an order directing amendment of the information.

• Sufficiency of Time Averment: Yes, the information is seriously defective. An averment of time spanning more than 2,500 days imposes an unfair and unreasonable burden on the accused to recall their activities, depriving them of the opportunity to prepare a defense.
• Proper Remedy: The defect is not a ground for quashal but is curable by amendment. The court should order the prosecution to amend the information to state the time with particularity; if the prosecution cannot do so, the case must be dismissed.

• Sufficiency of Time Averment: The Rules of Court require that a complaint or information state the approximate time of the commission of the offense (Section 5, now Section 6, Rule 110). While it is not necessary to state the precise time except when time is a material ingredient, the act must be alleged to have been committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit" (Section 10, now Section 11, Rule 110). A variance of a few months has been tolerated, as where an information set March 25, 1900 for a robbery actually committed on March 5 or 6. However, a variance of several years — as where the information stated 1947 but proof showed 1952 — warranted dismissal, since amendment would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Similarly, a time averment "between October, 1910 to August, 1912" was held fatally defective for depriving the accused of the opportunity to prepare a defense. Applying these principles, the information against Rocaberte, spanning "from 1977 to December 28, 1983," placed on him and his co-accused the unreasonable burden of recalling activities over more than 2,500 days — a burden nobody should be made to bear.

• Proper Remedy: A defect in the averment of time is not among the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 116. Even if it were, a motion to quash on that account would be denied because the defect is curable by amendment; instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the time with particularity (last paragraph, Section 2, Rule 117, now Section 4, Rule 117). The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege time with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars under Section 6, Rule 116 (now Section 10, Rule 116). Accordingly, the prosecution must be directed to make the time of commission more definite and particular; if it cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained and the case must be dismissed.

• Sufficiency of Information as to Time of Commission — A complaint or information must state the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date as the information will permit. A statement of time so general as to span a number of years is fatally defective because it deprives the accused of the opportunity to prepare a defense. A variance of a few months is tolerable, but a variance of several years warrants dismissal if amendment would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
• Defect in Time Averment Not a Ground for Quashal; Curable by Amendment — A defect in the averment of the time of commission is not a ground for a motion to quash under the Rules of Court. Even if it were, the motion would be denied because the defect is curable by amendment; the court shall order the prosecution to amend by stating the time with particularity. The alternative remedy is a motion for a bill of particulars.

• "The information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the information's seven-year time span is fatally defective because it imposes an unreasonable burden on the accused.

• "The public prosecutor must make more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed." — This articulates the Court's directive and the consequence of the prosecution's inability to cure the defect, establishing the practical remedy for an overly broad time averment.

• "the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit." — This is the canonical formulation of the rule on time averments in informations, derived from Section 10 (now Section 11), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

• People vs. Openia, 98 Phil. 698 (1956) — Followed. Where a variance of several years existed between the time stated in the information (1947) and the proof of actual commission (1952), dismissal was sustained because amendment would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
• U.S. vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914) — Followed. A statement of time "between October, 1910 to August, 1912" was held fatally defective because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to prepare a defense.
• People vs. Reyes, 108 SCRA 203 — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that a great gap in time defies approximation; the Court's analysis aligned with this principle.
• U.S. vs. Cardona, 1 Phil. 381; U.S. vs. Tan Guy, 36 Phil. 974; Santos vs. Supt. of Phil. Training School, 55 Phil. 345; U.S. vs. Ramos, 23 Phil. 300 — Cited as authority for the rule that a variance of a few months between the time in the indictment and the proof at trial does not warrant reversal of a conviction.

• Section 5 (now Section 6), Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that a complaint or information state, among other things, the approximate time of the commission of the offense. Applied to find that the information's seven-year span did not satisfy this requirement.
• Section 10 (now Section 11), Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise time of commission except when time is a material ingredient, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date as the information will permit. Applied as the standard against which the information's time averment was measured and found wanting.
• Section 2 (now Section 4), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that if a motion to quash is based on a defect curable by amendment, the court shall order the amendment. Applied as the basis for directing the prosecution to amend the information.
• Section 6 (now Section 10), Rule 116, Rules of Court — Provides for a motion for a bill of particulars to obtain a more definite statement of matters not averred with sufficient definiteness. Identified as the proper remedy against an indictment with an insufficiently definite time averment.
• Articles 308 and 309, Revised Penal Code — The substantive provisions defining and penalizing theft, cited in the information as the legal basis for the charge.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.