Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

The mere filing of a motion to withdraw an election protest, without any action by the electoral tribunal, does not divest the tribunal of jurisdiction over the case; jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted.

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were rival candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st District of Caloocan City in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is a constitutional body vested with sole jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, whose independence and exclusive jurisdiction have been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court. Judicial review of HRET decisions is available only in the exercise of the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a showing that the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

Virgilio Robles and Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st District of Caloocan City in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), alleging that the elections were characterized by electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms — on the day of elections, during the counting of votes, and during the canvassing of the election returns. He prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all 320 contested precincts. Robles filed his Answer on January 14, 1988, raising as affirmative defenses Santos's lack of residence and the late filing of the protest.

On August 15, 1988, the HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988, and directed Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts to be revised first pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET Rules. The revision of ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25%, was terminated on September 7, 1988. The following day, September 8, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision. On September 12, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts. Before the HRET could act on either motion, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest on September 14. Robles opposed this on September 19, treating his opposition also as a motion to cancel the continuation of revision.

On September 19, 1988, the HRET issued a resolution resolving three pending motions: it noted Robles's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and Santos's Motion to Withdraw Protest, and granted Santos's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The HRET directed the resumption of revision on September 26, 1988. Robles sought reconsideration, which the HRET denied on January 26, 1989. Robles thereafter filed the instant petition for certiorari on February 1, 1989, and a Supplemental Petition on February 22, 1989, questioning the HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution denying his motion to defer revision and declaring a partial determination under Section 18 showing Santos had recovered 267 votes from the first 25% of contested precincts. The revision of the remaining precincts was resumed on February 20, 1989 and terminated on March 2, 1989, a fact not rebutted by Robles.

• Loss of Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that when Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, the HRET lost jurisdiction over the case, such that its subsequent order resuming revision was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Due Process: Petitioner alleged he was deprived of due process when the HRET rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET Rules, finding that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first 25% of contested precincts.
• Deferment of Revision: In his Supplemental Petition, petitioner questioned the HRET's resolution denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining 75% of contested precincts until the Supreme Court had finally disposed of the instant petition.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: Whether the HRET lost jurisdiction over the election protest when the protestant filed a motion to withdraw the protest on unrevised precincts, such that its subsequent order resuming revision was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Due Process in Partial Determination: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process when the HRET rendered a partial determination under Section 18 of its Rules showing a recovery of 267 votes by the protestant.
• Mootness of Supplemental Petition: Whether the Supplemental Petition questioning the HRET's refusal to defer revision had become academic.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: No. The mere filing of a motion to withdraw protest, without any action by the tribunal, does not divest it of jurisdiction; jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is terminated, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted.
• Due Process in Partial Determination: No. The partial determination was arrived at by a simple addition of votes adjudicated to each party during the revision, in which both parties were properly represented.
• Mootness of Supplemental Petition: Yes. The Supplemental Petition became academic because the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and terminated on March 2, 1989, a fact not rebutted by petitioner.

• Jurisdiction of the HRET: The Court found that upon Santos's filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action was taken by the HRET until September 19, 1988, when it resolved the motion together with two other pending motions. Contrary to petitioner's claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records showed that the HRET merely noted the motion and instead granted Santos's subsequent Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The Court relied on the principle that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The withdrawal of a protest becomes effective only when the motion is granted by the tribunal; to hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Since the motion to withdraw had not been acted upon before it was recalled, the precincts covered thereby were never effectively removed from the protest, and the granting of the motion to recall did not amount to allowing the refiling of a protest beyond the reglementary period. The Court distinguished Dimaporo vs. Estipona, relied upon by petitioner, because in that case the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution thereon was questioned. The Court further noted that where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders on all questions pertaining to the cause are within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This principle applies with even greater force to the HRET, whose independence as a constitutional body has been consistently upheld, the word "sole" in the constitutional grant emphasizing the exclusive character of its jurisdiction. Judicial review of HRET decisions is possible only upon a showing that the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of due process. No such showing was made here.

• Due Process in Partial Determination: The Court found no basis for petitioner's claim of deprivation of due process. The partial determination under Section 18 of the HRET Rules was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision, during which both parties were properly represented. The Court emphasized that an election protest is impressed with public interest, as the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections, and for this reason private interests must yield to the common good. The Court observed that petitioner's objections centered mainly on procedural technicalities, which overlook the essence of a public office as a public trust — the right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement. It is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words.

• Mootness of Supplemental Petition: The Supplemental Petition questioning the HRET's resolution denying petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining 75% of contested precincts had become academic. The revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and terminated on March 2, 1989, as stated in the private respondent's memorandum, a fact not rebutted by petitioner.

• Jurisdiction Once Acquired Is Not Lost — Jurisdiction, once acquired by a tribunal over a case, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. A party cannot unilaterally divest a tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired by the mere filing of a motion to withdraw; the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted by the tribunal.

• Sole and Exclusive Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals — The use of the word "sole" in the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the HRET emphasizes the exclusive character of that jurisdiction. The power is full, clear, and complete, as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Judicial review of HRET decisions is possible only in the exercise of the Supreme Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a determination that the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, or upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power constituting a denial of due process.

• Public Interest in Election Protests — An election protest is impressed with public interest because the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections. Private interests must yield to the common good. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. The electoral tribunal must be allowed to perform its functions unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words.

• "The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated" — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the central issue: that a unilateral withdrawal does not divest the tribunal of jurisdiction absent the tribunal's own action granting the withdrawal.

• "Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired." — This passage, quoted by the Court from the HRET's own resolution, articulates the controlling principle that a withdrawal's effectiveness depends on the tribunal's affirmative grant, not on the party's unilateral act.

• "judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" — This passage defines the scope and standard of judicial review over electoral tribunal decisions, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent electoral jurisprudence.

• Jimenez vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1 — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378 — Cited for the rule that where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders on all questions pertaining to the cause are within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous, cannot be corrected by certiorari.
• Paramount Insurance Corp. vs. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564 — Cited alongside Santos vs. Court of Appeals for the same proposition on jurisdiction and certiorari.
• Lazatin vs. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988 — Cited for the principle that the word "sole" in the constitutional grant emphasizes the exclusive character of the HRET's jurisdiction, and for the standard of judicial review over electoral tribunal decisions.
• Dimaporo vs. Estipona, G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282 — Relied upon by petitioner but distinguished by the Court, because in that case the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution was questioned, unlike in the case at bar. Also cited for the proposition that an election protest is impressed with public interest.
• Angara vs. Electoral Commission — Cited in Lazatin for the principle that the use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon the electoral tribunal.

• Section 18, Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal — Provides the procedure for partial determination and revision of contested ballots, requiring the protestant to identify a percentage of contested precincts for initial revision. The HRET applied this provision in ordering the revision of the first 25% of contested precincts and in rendering a partial determination showing Santos's recovery of 267 votes.
• 1987 Constitution, Article VI (on the HRET) — vests in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal sole jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. The Court relied on the word "sole" to emphasize the exclusive character of the HRET's jurisdiction and the limited scope of judicial review.

Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, and Felicano, JJ., took no part.