Roble vs. Spouses Arbasa

In a lump-sum sale of real estate described as having an area "more or less," the vendee does not ipso facto assume the risk of any quantity; the "more or less" designation covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency, and an excess of 644 square meters over the stated 240 square meters is not reasonable and is not included in the sale.

The parties are related by blood: Fidela Roble, the vendor under the deed of sale, and Adelaida Roble-Arbasa, one of the vendees, were sisters, while petitioners Veronica Roble and Lilibeth Roble are the daughters of Gualberto Roble, their deceased brother, and Lilibeth's husband Bobby Portugaliza is a co-petitioner. The land in controversy originated as foreshore land, a category of the alienable land of the public domain that may be disposed of only by lease, with the classification of public lands being a function of the executive branch. These circumstances frame the dispute over whether the reclaimed southern portion passed with the sale or remained public land subject to lease.

On January 2, 1976, spouses Dominador Arbasa and Adelaida Roble-Arbasa purchased from Fidela Roble an unregistered parcel of residential land located at Poblacion, Isabel, Leyte. The deed of sale described the property as "a whole parcel of residential land" covered by Tax Declaration No. 5108-R-5 in the name of Fidela Roble, bounded on the North by Matilde Evangelista, East by Harrison (now Roxas Street), South by the seashore, and West by Cristito Manipes, "having an area of 240 square meters more or less, with improvements thereon." Fidela and Adelaida were sisters; petitioners Veronica Roble and Lilibeth Roble are the daughters of Gualberto Roble, the deceased brother of Fidela and Adelaida, and Lilibeth's husband Bobby Portugaliza is a co-petitioner.

According to respondents, they reclaimed a portion of the sea using stones, sand, and gravel, increasing the original 240-square-meter area to 884 square meters. The expanded parcel was described as bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 036 and 037, East by Roxas Street, South by the Seashore and CAD Lot No. 952, and West by Lot Nos. 024 and 025, with an area of 884 square meters, more or less, and declared in the name of Adelaida Arbasa under Tax Declaration No. 7068-A, later superseded by Tax Declaration No. 67, with an assessed value of P31,870.00. Since 1976, respondents claimed actual, open, peaceful, and continuous possession of the entire parcel in the concept of owners, with the land declared for taxation in Adelaida's name. The sale included the improvements on the land, consisting mainly of Fidela's house, and Adelaida tolerated Fidela's continued stay there. Living with Fidela in the same house were petitioners Veronica Roble and Lilibeth Roble and Lilibeth's spouse Bobby Portugaliza.

Petitioners, for their part, maintained that the total area respondents bought from Fidela consisted only of 240 square meters, located at the northern portion of the property. The land was originally classified as foreshore land; in 1957, through the effort of Ireneo Roble, the father of Fidela, Adelaida, and Gualberto, a portion of the sea was reclaimed and filled up, and this was the property where respondents exercised open, public, and continuous possession in the concept of owner, declared for taxation in the name of Adelaida Roble under Tax Declaration No. 7068. With the issuance of a new tax declaration in Adelaida's name, Tax Declaration No. 5108-R-5, originally registered in the name of Fidela Roble, was cancelled. In the late 1960s, Ireneo, with the help of his son Gualberto, reclaimed an additional portion of the seashore at the southern portion adjacent to the 240-square-meter land earlier reclaimed and declared in Fidela's name. The original 240 square meters thus increased by 644 square meters to become 884 square meters, including the portion sold to Adelaida. The 644 square meters was divided into two lots of equal proportion, evidenced by Tax Declaration Nos. 8141 and 8142 in the names of Fidela and Gualberto, respectively, and payment of taxes on both declarations commenced in 1980.

Three concrete houses were constructed over the 884-square-meter lot. One was located over the 240-square-meter parcel that the Arbasa spouses bought from Fidela; the others belonged to Fidela, on the central portion, and Gualberto, on the southernmost portion. Fidela's house was first declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. 3548 commencing in 1974, later cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5057 covering 1979, and then by Tax Declaration No. 3638 beginning 1985. Gualberto's house was declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 3549 commencing in 1974, later cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5060, then by Tax Declaration No. 5662, with the latest declaration, Tax Declaration No. 226, cancelling the previous ones and commencing in 1989. Petitioners claimed that the two southern lots were owned by their predecessors-in-interest, Fidela (322 square meters) and Gualberto (322 square meters), who had open, public, and continuous possession in the concept of owners, and that these lots were not included in the deed of sale.

Fidela died on June 15, 1989, intestate and without issue; Gualberto had died sometime in December 1986. Shortly after Fidela's death, petitioners Veronica and Lilibeth Roble claimed ownership of the house and the southern portion of the land, with an area of 644 square meters. In January 1990, petitioners had the parcel declared for taxation purposes in the names of Fidela Roble under Tax Declaration No. 8141 and Gualberto Roble under Tax Declaration No. 8142. Efforts to have petitioners vacate the house and desist from claiming the land failed, and the dispute was referred to the barangay authorities for conciliation, which produced no result. On February 27, 1990, the Arbasa spouses filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City an action for quieting of title with damages. At the pre-trial conference on July 4, 1990, the parties defined the issue as whether the deed of sale executed by Fidela Roble in favor of respondents conveyed the entire 884-square-meter parcel, including Fidela's house, or only the 240 square meters located at the northern portion. The trial court found that the deed of absolute sale covered only 240 square meters in favor of respondents and that Fidela's house was not situated on the 240-square-meter parcel and was not included in the sale.

• Scope of the Deed of Sale: Petitioners maintained that the total area respondents bought from Fidela consisted only of 240 square meters, located at the northern portion of the property, as expressly stated in the deed of sale.
• Ownership of the Reclaimed Portion: Petitioners claimed that the 644-square-meter southern portion was reclaimed by Ireneo Roble and his son Gualberto in the late 1960s, was divided into two lots of equal proportion under Tax Declaration Nos. 8141 and 8142 in the names of Fidela and Gualberto, and was never included in the deed of sale.
• Damages and Attorney's Fees: Petitioners claimed they were compelled to hire the services of a lawyer because respondents filed suit which the latter knew was malicious and without basis in law or in fact.

• Reclamation and Possession: Respondents claimed that through their diligent efforts in reclaiming a portion of the sea using stones, sand, and gravel, the original 240-square-meter area increased to 884 square meters, and that since 1976 they had been in actual, open, peaceful, and continuous possession of the entire parcel in the concept of owners, with the land declared for taxation in the name of Adelaida Arbasa.
• Lump-Sum Sale: Respondents' position, sustained by the Court of Appeals, was that where land is sold for a lump sum and not per unit of measure, the boundaries stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area, so that the vendor must deliver all land within the boundaries regardless of whether the real area is greater or smaller than that recited in the deed, especially where the area is described as "more or less."

• Scope of the Deed of Sale: Whether the January 2, 1976 deed of sale executed by Fidela Roble in favor of respondents conveyed the entire 884-square-meter parcel, including Fidela's house, or only the 240-square-meter parcel located at the northern portion.
• Nature of the Disputed Land: Whether the 644-square-meter southern portion is foreshore land requiring determination of its classification.

• Scope of the Deed of Sale: No. The deed conveyed only the 240-square-meter parcel. Under Article 1542 of the Civil Code, a lump-sum sale obligates the vendor to deliver everything within the boundaries, but the "more or less" designation covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency, and a 644-square-meter excess is not reasonable.
• Nature of the Disputed Land: Remand required. The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch, and the dearth of evidence precludes a conclusive classification of the disputed land as foreshore.

• Scope of the Deed of Sale: The sale that transpired on January 2, 1976 between vendor Fidela and vendee Adelaida was one of cuerpo cierto or a sale for lump sum. Pursuant to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price although there be a greater or lesser area than that stated in the contract; the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. This rule admits of an exception: a vendee of land, when sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area, does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land, and the use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. The parties described the land as bounded on the North by Matilde Evangelista, East by Harrison now Roxas Street, South by the Seashore, and West by Cristito Manipes, having an approximate area of 240 square meters more or less, with all improvements thereon. An area of "644 square meters more" is not a reasonable excess or deficiency to be deemed included in the deed of sale. Moreover, at the time of the sale, the only piece of land existing was the 240-square-meter parcel, the subject of the deed; this parcel was originally foreshore land, hence not alienable and disposable, and it was only in 1952 that Fidela applied for and was granted a foreshore lease, with the provincial assessor issuing a tax declaration in her name in 1965. Respondent Adelaida admitted that when the sale took place in 1976, the houses of Fidela and Gualberto, constructed earlier in 1971, were situated on foreshore lands adjacent to the property Fidela sold to her, and that the houses, made of concrete materials and two stories high, could be reached by seawater. This lent credence to petitioners' claim that what was sold was indeed only the 240-square-meter parcel and explained why the deed described the property as bounded on the south by the seashore. As held by the trial court, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successor-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. The Court found no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the deed of sale. Contracts are the laws between the contracting parties and shall be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations; if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent, and its essential elements are (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent — all present in the instant case. The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon, varying the purport of the written contract; when an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement, and whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. The rule is founded on long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them. The rule is not without exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. None of these exceptions finds application, nor did respondents raise the issue at the proceedings before the trial court.
• Nature of the Disputed Land: With regard to ownership over the 644 square meters of land located at the southern portion of the original 240 square meters conveyed to Adela, there is a question regarding the true nature of the land, which has the features of a foreshore land. Even though respondents claim that they were responsible for reclaiming the portion of the foreshore land adjacent to the property they bought from petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, there is no evidence that respondents subsequently filed an application for lease with regard to the 644 square meters of reclaimed land. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise; it is the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide, that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. There is a need, therefore, to determine whether the lands subject of the action for quieting of title are foreshore lands. The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). Due to the dearth of evidence on this particular issue, the Court could not arrive at a conclusive classification of the land involved, and the instant case had to be remanded to the trial court for that determination.

• Lump-Sum Sale (Cuerpo Cierto) and the "More or Less" Exception — Under Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price although there be a greater or lesser area than that stated in the contract; the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. However, this rule admits of an exception: a vendee of land, when sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area, does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land, and the use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. The Court applied the exception, holding that an excess of 644 square meters over the stated 240 square meters is not a reasonable excess or deficiency and is not deemed included in the deed of sale.
• Parol Evidence Rule — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successor-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. The rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon, varying the purport of the written contract; whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. The rule admits of exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. None of the exceptions applied, and respondents did not raise the issue before the trial court.
• Foreshore Land — Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It is the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide; it is that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). Because the disputed 644-square-meter portion bore the features of foreshore land and the evidence was insufficient to classify it conclusively, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for that determination.
• Review of Factual Findings — As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law committed by the appellate court, and the findings of fact of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. This rule is not absolute; among the exceptional circumstances that compel review are (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court applied the exception because the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions were contrary to those of the trial court.

• "An area of '644 square meters more' is not reasonable excess or deficiency, to be deemed included in the deed of sale of January 2, 1976." — This is the ratio decidendi on the scope of the deed of sale, applying the exception to the lump-sum sale rule under Article 1542 of the Civil Code.
• "The use of 'more or less' or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency." — This states the canonical formulation of the exception to the lump-sum sale rule, which the Court applied to exclude the 644-square-meter excess from the conveyance.
• "Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise." — This defines the character of foreshore land and explains why the disputed portion could not be acquired by mere reclamation and why the case was remanded for classification.
• "The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau)." — This explains why the Court could not conclusively classify the disputed land and instead remanded the case to the trial court.

• Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, 708-709 [1997] — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court will not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals; the Court relied on the exception for contradictory findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
• Salvatierra vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 45, 56-57 [1996] — Cited for the rule that contracts are the law between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations.
• Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15, 26 [1996] — Cited for the essential elements of a contract of sale: consent, determinate subject matter, and price certain in money or its equivalent.
• CKH Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 333, 346 [1997] — Cited for the parol evidence rule, which forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence.
• Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, 585 [1996] — Cited for the rationale of the parol evidence rule, founded on the greater certainty and accuracy of written evidence over that which rests in fleeting memory.
• Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 98, 109 [1997] — Cited for the exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
• Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., 303 SCRA 127, 139 [1999] — Cited for the rule that foreshore land is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199, 228 [1998] — Cited for the definition of foreshore land as the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of tide.

• Article 1542, Civil Code of the Philippines — In the sale of real estate made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price although there be a greater or lesser area or number than that stated in the contract. Applied to hold that the vendor's obligation is to deliver everything within the boundaries, but qualified by the exception that the "more or less" designation covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.
• Rule 130, Section 9, Revised Rules on Evidence — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successor-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Applied to hold that the deed of sale was the best evidence of the agreement and that parol evidence could not vary its terms.

Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred. Davide, Jr., C.J., was on official business.