Robiso vs. Ibay

A child entrusted by a parent to an individual is a voluntarily committed or surrendered child under Republic Act No. 9523, so a DSWD certification declaring the child legally available for adoption is a prerequisite to adoption; absent such certification, the petition is insufficient in form and substance and may be dismissed. Notice and publication, in turn, are required only after the court determines the petition's sufficiency in form and substance.

Eleazar R. Robiso is the prospective adopter of Ava Marie Relox, the minor child of Carmina Relox, an unmarried woman who entrusted the child's care to Eleazar and his parents. The adoption petition was governed by Republic Act No. 8552, as amended by Republic Act No. 9523, which requires a DSWD certification declaring a child legally available for adoption as a prerequisite for adoption proceedings involving surrendered, abandoned, neglected, or dependent children. The DSWD Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9523 and Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603 supply the definitional framework for voluntarily committed children, while the 2002 Rule on Adoption governs the petition's form, annexes, and notice and publication. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 11642 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC introduced administrative adoption and allowed withdrawal of pending judicial adoption petitions.

On April 17, 2017, Eleazar R. Robiso filed a Petition for Adoption of the minor Ava Marie Relox under Republic Act No. 8552 before Branch 194, Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 2017-27. Ava Marie, born on April 24, 2016, is the child of Carmina Relox, an unmarried woman. Carmina had turned over the care of Ava Marie to Eleazar and his parents, Atty. and Mrs. Romeo Robiso, and had freely and voluntarily relinquished her parental authority over the child. With respect to Ava Marie's natural father, Eleazar averred that his consent could not be obtained because his whereabouts and personal circumstances at the time of filing remained unknown. Eleazar asserted that Ava Marie was not disqualified by law to be adopted, that he was financially capable of supporting and caring for her, and that he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to adopt—being of good moral character, not convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, and emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for the minor, who is more than 16 years younger than him; he also claimed that the adoption would serve Ava Marie's best interest.

Carmina executed an Affidavit of Consent to Adoption and Grant of Custody of Child to support the petition. She affirmed that she is Ava Marie's natural mother; that because she cannot financially support her child, she entrusted her to the care of Atty. and Mrs. Romeo Robiso and their eldest son, Eleazar; and that consenting to the adoption was for the best interest of the baby. By so stating, she relinquished her parental authority in favor of Eleazar.

The RTC issued an Order on May 9, 2017 dismissing Eleazar's petition. It appeared that the minor subject of the petition was a surrendered child and that the petition failed to attach a Certification from the Department of Social Welfare and Development declaring a child legally available for adoption, which is a prerequisite to the adoption proceeding pursuant to Republic Act No. 9523. Eleazar moved for reconsideration, arguing that a DSWD certification was not required because Ava Marie is not an abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed child. On July 11, 2017, the RTC denied the motion, reasoning that despite the custody of the minor adoptee having been turned over to Eleazar and not to the DSWD or an accredited child-caring agency or institution, the adoptee is considered a voluntarily committed or surrendered child because the child's biological mother had knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority over her through the Affidavit of Consent to Adoption executed in favor of Eleazar. Since Section 4 of the DSWD Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9523 enumerates the cases where the Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption is no longer required, and the circumstances did not fall under any of the three cases, the motion was denied. The RTC later noted Eleazar's Respectful Motion for Reconsideration on November 16, 2017.

Eleazar sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari. He imputed gross error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) determining Ava Marie as a "surrendered child" or a "voluntarily committed child" requiring a DSWD certification declaring her legally available for adoption, and (b) allowing the DSWD IRR of Republic Act No. 9523 to prevail over, modify, or amend the said law by limiting or expanding the scope of its application. The CA dismissed the petition outright on March 5, 2018, holding that because the RTC order had completely disposed of Eleazar's case, his remedy was to file a regular appeal and not a petition for certiorari; there was nothing left to resolve with respect to the merits. The CA denied his motion for reconsideration on August 31, 2018.

During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 11642 was enacted to introduce significant reforms to the Philippine adoption and alternative childcare system, including streamlining and expediting adoption by making it an administrative process and no longer a judicial one. To implement the law, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Guideline No. 5 of which states that petitioners in adoption proceedings may withdraw their petitions to avail of the benefit of the new law. The Court required the parties to manifest any pertinent subsequent developments that would help in immediate disposition or render the case moot and academic. The OSG manifested that it had not received any information that would render the case moot and academic, while no manifestation was received from Eleazar other than a change of counsel by reason of death. There being no manifestation that Eleazar availed of the administrative remedy under Republic Act No. 11642, the Court proceeded to rule on the case, applying the provisions of A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC on the 2002 Rules of Adoption prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 11642. The RTC had determined that Ava Marie was a voluntarily committed or surrendered child based on the allegations of the petition, and the CA found that the RTC order completely disposed of the case.

• Jurisdiction over the Res: Eleazar argued that in an adoption proceeding, the court must fix a date and place of hearing which must be published in a newspaper of general circulation; failing to do so, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the res and its act of summarily dismissing the petition becomes void.
• DSWD Certification Not Required: Eleazar insisted that Ava Marie is neither an abandoned child, a neglected child, nor a voluntarily committed child, so a DSWD certificate declaring her legally available for adoption is not indispensable in the adoption proceeding.
• Injury to Interests: Eleazar contended that the dismissal of the petition is injurious to his and the child's interest as they are being required to obtain such certification although the law itself does not require it.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion and IRR Overreach: Before the CA, Eleazar imputed gross error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in determining Ava Marie as a surrendered or voluntarily committed child requiring a DSWD certification, and in allowing the DSWD IRR of Republic Act No. 9523 to prevail over, modify, or amend the law by limiting or expanding the scope of its application.
• Remedy: Eleazar sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari, imputing gross error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

• Finality and Prohibited Pleading: The OSG stressed that the impugned orders of the RTC had already become final and executory in view of Eleazar's filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading.
• Improper Remedy: The OSG argued that the remedy Eleazar used by elevating the case to the CA was improper and should be dismissed outright.
• Surrendered Child and DSWD Certification: The OSG maintained that Ava Marie is a surrendered child; thus, before the petition for adoption may be considered by the RTC, she must first be declared as legally available for adoption by the DSWD.
• No Mootness: The OSG manifested that it had not received any information that would render the case moot and academic.

• Nature of Adoption and Jurisdiction: Whether adoption is an action in rem, such that the RTC acquires jurisdiction over the res only after the notice and publication of hearing.
• Dismissal Without Notice and Publication: Whether the RTC may dismiss the petition for adoption on the merits without notice and publication of hearing.
• DSWD Certification: Whether Ava Marie must secure a DSWD certification of availability for adoption under Republic Act No. 9523.
• Remedy: Whether, under the circumstances of the case, dismissal may be reviewed through certiorari instead of ordinary appeal.

• Nature of Adoption and Jurisdiction: Yes. Adoption is an action in rem directed at the legal status of the adoptee; jurisdiction over the res is acquired by actual or constructive seizure, such as publication, but under the 2002 Rule on Adoption notice and publication issue only after the court determines that the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance.
• Dismissal Without Notice and Publication: Yes. The RTC may dismiss the petition on the merits without prior notice and publication where the petition is insufficient in form and substance; the required DSWD certification was absent, rendering the petition defective and dismissible motu proprio.
• DSWD Certification: Yes. Ava Marie, having been entrusted by her mother to an individual, is a voluntarily committed or surrendered child under Republic Act No. 9523, read with Presidential Decree No. 603, Article 154, and the DSWD IRR; the DSWD certification is required, and no exception applies.
• Remedy: No. Certiorari was not the proper remedy because the RTC order completely disposed of the case; the proper remedy was ordinary appeal, and the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari.

• Nature of Adoption and Jurisdiction: Adoption fixes a status—that of parent and child—and recognizes relations of paternity and affiliation between persons not so related by nature; its purpose is to effect this new status, with the child's welfare as primary consideration. Because adoption determines legal status, it is an action in rem directed at the res, binding upon the whole world. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by actually or constructively seizing or placing the thing under the court's custody, which may be through posting and publication, as clarified in Diclas vs. Bugnay. However, Section 12 of the 2002 Rule on Adoption provides that if the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue an order containing the date and place of hearing and directing publication before the hearing at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Notice and publication therefore come only after the court has determined the petition's sufficiency; the RTC did not need to issue notice and publication before assessing sufficiency.
• Dismissal Without Notice and Publication: Section 11 of the 2002 Rule on Adoption enumerates the required annexes to a petition for adoption and originally did not require a DSWD certificate declaring a child legally available for adoption. With the passage of Republic Act No. 9523, such certification became a prerequisite in adoption proceedings. Section 4 of the DSWD IRR of Republic Act No. 9523 applies the rules to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children subject for adoption, and exempts only adoption of an illegitimate child by a biological parent, adoption by a step-parent, and adoption by a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. These exceptions reflect situations where an existing relationship exists between adoptee and adopter. As a general rule, therefore, the certification is required for adoption of surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children; absent it, the petition fails the threshold of sufficiency in form and substance and may be dismissed. The RTC determined from the petition's allegations that Ava Marie was a voluntarily committed or surrendered child, so the missing DSWD certificate rendered the petition defective and subject to dismissal motu proprio.
• DSWD Certification: Republic Act No. 9523 declares as State policy that alternative protection and assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned, surrendered, or neglected. It defines an abandoned child as one who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parents have deserted him or her for at least three continuous months, including a foundling; a neglected child as one whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended or inadequately attended for the same period. The law does not define "surrendered child" but refers to a "voluntarily committed child"—one whose parents or legal guardian knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or institution. The IRR defines a surrendered child alongside a voluntarily committed child. Reading the law as a whole, as required by statutory construction, the Court agreed with the OSG that a voluntarily committed child includes a dependent, abandoned, or neglected child entrusted to the DSWD, a child placement agency, or even to an individual. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9523 refers to Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, which allows the parent or guardian of a dependent, abandoned, or neglected child to voluntarily commit him to the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency or individual. Thus, children surrendered to an individual are deemed voluntarily committed for purposes of requiring a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. When a parent entrusts her child to another's care, the child is legally considered voluntarily committed, and the prospective adopter must first secure the necessary DSWD certification. Ava Marie's mother entrusted her to Eleazar and relinquished parental authority in his favor through the affidavit of consent; no exception under the DSWD IRR applied. The RTC therefore committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with Republic Act No. 9523.
• Remedy: The RTC's dismissal of the petition completely disposed of the case, leaving nothing to resolve on the merits. Consequently, the proper remedy from the final order was ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari. The CA correctly dismissed Eleazar's petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy, and no reason existed to disturb that disposition. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 11642 introduced administrative adoption, and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC allowed petitioners to withdraw pending adoption petitions to avail of the new law; however, no manifestation was received that Eleazar availed of that remedy, so the Court proceeded under the 2002 Rules of Adoption as provided in A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC.

• Adoption as an action in rem — Adoption fixes the legal status of parent and child and is directed at the res, i.e., the adoptee's legal status; its effects bind the whole world. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by actual or constructive seizure, such as publication, but under the 2002 Rule on Adoption notice and publication are required only after the court determines that the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance.
• DSWD certification as a prerequisite under Republic Act No. 9523 — As a general rule, a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption is required in adoption proceedings involving surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children. The exceptions are adoption of an illegitimate child by a biological parent, adoption by a step-parent, and adoption by a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. Absent the certification, the petition fails the threshold of sufficiency in form and substance and may be dismissed.
• Voluntarily committed or surrendered child includes a child entrusted to an individual — Republic Act No. 9523 does not define a surrendered child but refers to a voluntarily committed child. Read with the DSWD IRR and Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, a parent or guardian may voluntarily commit a dependent, abandoned, or neglected child to the DSWD, a duly licensed child placement agency, or an individual. A child surrendered to an individual is therefore deemed voluntarily committed, and the prospective adopter must secure the DSWD certification.
• Statutory construction: read the statute as a whole — Every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference to the context and considered together with the other parts, subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment; particular words, clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions. The Court applied this rule to harmonize Republic Act No. 9523's definitions with the DSWD IRR and Presidential Decree No. 603.
• Certiorari is not a substitute for ordinary appeal — Where an order completely disposes of the case, the remedy is ordinary appeal, not certiorari. The CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari as the wrong remedy.

• "The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature." — This passage defines the nature of adoption and explains why adoption proceedings determine legal status, a premise for the Court's holding that adoption is an action in rem.
• "Given that adoption determines a person's legal status, the Court has consistently recognized adoption proceedings as action in rem, or those directed against the thing itself or the res." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of adoption as an action in rem, which frames the jurisdictional analysis over the adoptee's legal status.
• "Thus, as a general rule, a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption is required in cases involving adoption of surrendered, abandoned, neglected and dependent children. Absent such certification, the petition fails to meet the threshold of sufficiency in form and substance and may be dismissed." — This passage states the controlling rule on the DSWD certification requirement and the consequence of its absence.
• "From the foregoing, it is clear that children surrendered to an individual are deemed to be voluntarily committed for purposes of requiring a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption." — This passage supplies the ratio for treating Ava Marie, who was entrusted to Eleazar, as a voluntarily committed child requiring a DSWD certification.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 284-A Phil. 643 (1992) — Cited for the nature and effects of adoption: adoption fixes the legal status of parent and child, the change of surname is an incident rather than the object, the welfare of the child is the primary consideration, and adoption proceedings are actions in rem.
• Diclas vs. Bugnay, 933 Phil. 499 (2023) — Cited for the rule that in an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite, provided the tribunal acquires jurisdiction over the res by actually or constructively seizing or placing the thing under its custody, which may be effected through posting and publication.
• JAPRL Dev't. Corp. vs. Security Bank Corp., 665 Phil. 774 (2011) — Cited to support the characterization of adoption proceedings as actions in rem, or those directed against the thing itself or the res.
• ACT Teachers Rep. Tinio vs. President Duterte, 934 Phil. 212 (2023) — Cited for the statutory construction rule that every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference to the context and considered together with the other parts.
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 744 Phil. 313 (2014) — Cited for the rule that particular words, clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions; the whole statute must be considered to produce a harmonious whole.

• Section 12, 2002 Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC) — Provides that if the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue an order containing the date and place of hearing and shall direct publication before the date of hearing at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Applied to hold that notice and publication come only after the court determines sufficiency.
• Section 11, 2002 Rule on Adoption — Enumerates the required annexes to a petition for adoption. The Court noted that it originally did not require a DSWD certificate declaring a child legally available for adoption.
• Republic Act No. 9523, Sections 1, 2(3), 2(4), 2(6), and 7 — Declares State policy on abandoned, surrendered, or neglected children; defines abandoned and neglected children; refers to a voluntarily committed child as one whose parents or legal guardian knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or institution; and provides for the declaration of availability for adoption of voluntarily committed children. Applied to require the DSWD certification for Ava Marie.
• Section 4, DSWD Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9523 — Applies the rules to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children subject for adoption and lists the adoption proceedings that do not require a Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption: adoption of an illegitimate child by a biological parent, adoption by a step-parent, and adoption by a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. The Court found Ava Marie did not fall under any exception.
• Article 154, Presidential Decree No. 603 — Provides that the parent or guardian of a dependent, abandoned, or neglected child may voluntarily commit him to the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency or individual. The Court used this to hold that a child surrendered to an individual is deemed voluntarily committed for purposes of requiring the DSWD certification.
• Republic Act No. 11642 — The Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, enacted during the pendency of the case, which made adoption an administrative process. The Court noted that no manifestation was received that Eleazar availed of the administrative remedy, so the case proceeded under the prior rules.
• A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Guidelines No. 5 and No. 9 — Guideline No. 5 allows petitioners in adoption proceedings to withdraw their petitions to avail of Republic Act No. 11642; Guideline No. 9 provides that the Rule on Adoption is rendered ineffective except for petitions not withdrawn, in which case the existing Rule on Adoption applies. Applied because no withdrawal was manifested.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.