Roa vs. De la Cruz

Where the offended party in a defamation case intervenes in the criminal proceedings as private prosecutor without reserving the right to institute a separate civil action, the final judgment rendered in the criminal case bars a subsequent independent civil action for damages based on the same cause.

Maria C. Roa was the offended party in a criminal case for serious oral defamation filed against Segunda de la Cruz before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Article 33 of the New Civil Code governs the civil liability arising from defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, providing that a civil action for damages may be brought by the injured party independently of the criminal action. The optional character of this remedy — and the consequence of electing instead to intervene in the criminal proceedings — is the legal backdrop against which the propriety of Roa's subsequent separate civil suit was tested.

In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Segunda de la Cruz was charged with serious oral defamation. The offended party, Maria C. Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve her right to institute it separately, but instead intervened through counsel in the prosecution of the offense, acting as private prosecutor. After trial, the court on April 30, 1957 rendered a decision finding Segunda de la Cruz guilty of slight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and costs. The decision made no award as to damages.

About a month later, on May 28, 1957, Roa filed the present civil action in the same court against Segunda de la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas to recover moral and exemplary damages. The cause of action was based on the same defamatory remarks that had been the subject of the criminal action. The aggregate amount sought, including attorney's fees, was P28,000.00.

Instead of filing an answer, the defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that it was barred by prior judgment and that it did not state a cause of action. The court below sustained the motion on the first ground and dismissed the complaint. Roa filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting the present appeal. The criminal court had not entered a judgment for indemnity despite the intervention of the offended party, apparently because Roa failed to submit evidence of her damages. She also did not file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the omission, allowing the criminal decision to become final and executory.

• Prior Judgment Does Not Bar Separate Civil Action: Plaintiff contended that under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, the injured party is not required to reserve her right to institute a separate civil action for damages in defamation cases, and therefore the criminal court's judgment did not bar the subsequent civil suit.

• Res Judicata: Whether the final judgment in the criminal case for defamation bars a subsequent independent civil action for damages based on the same cause, where the offended party intervened as private prosecutor without reserving the right to institute a separate civil action.

• Res Judicata: Yes. By intervening in the criminal proceedings as private prosecutor without waiving the civil action or reserving the right to file a separate civil suit, the offended party elected to have her civil liability determined in the criminal case, making the final judgment therein a bar to the subsequent civil action.

• Res Judicata: Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. The use of the words "may be" indicates that the institution of such a separate suit is optional. Where the offended party does not waive the civil action or expressly reserve the right to institute it separately, the civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings themselves. The right of intervention reserved to the injured party under Section 15 in connection with Section 4 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. By intervening as private prosecutor, Roa could only have been pursuing the civil liability aspect; she did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action. The final judgment in the criminal case therefore constitutes a bar to the present civil action under the principle of res judicata — a judgment on the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, and a party cannot escape that principle by varying the form of action. The fact that the criminal complaint or information contained no claim or allegation of damages is of no legal consequence, because every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and the offended party has the right to prove and claim damages in the criminal case unless a waiver or reservation is made. The criminal court did not award indemnity, apparently because Roa failed to submit evidence of her damages. For that failure she had only herself or her counsel to blame; she could have filed a motion for reconsideration or an appeal but did not, allowing the decision to become final. Under res judicata, that judgment is conclusive not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain the claim, but as to any other admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose.

• Optional Character of Separate Civil Action under Article 33, Civil Code — In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, but the institution of such suit is optional. Where the offended party does not waive the civil action or reserve the right to institute it separately, the civil liability may be determined in the criminal proceedings. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that Roa's intervention as private prosecutor without reservation constituted an election to have civil liability adjudicated in the criminal case.

• Purpose of Intervention by the Offended Party — The right of intervention reserved to the injured party in a criminal case is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. An offended party may intervene personally or by attorney only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately, subject always to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that Roa's intervention could only have been for the purpose of claiming damages.

• Res Judicata in Civil Actions Following Criminal Proceedings — A judgment on the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, brought in a different form of action; a party cannot escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated by varying the form of action. The final judgment in the criminal case is conclusive not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain the claim, but as to any other admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose. The Court applied this doctrine to bar Roa's subsequent civil action.

• "Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor, we hold that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based upon the same cause." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that intervention in the criminal proceedings without reservation of a separate civil action bars a subsequent independent civil suit.

• "The right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused." — This formulation defines the doctrinal purpose of the offended party's right of intervention in criminal proceedings, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on civil liability arising from delicts.

• "The fact that there is no claim or allegation of damages in the complaint or information is no legal consequence. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." — This passage clarifies that the silence of the criminal information as to damages does not extinguish the offender's civil liability, reinforcing the automatic civil liability principle under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 102 Phil. 443 — Followed for the proposition that the civil liability arising from the crime charged may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive or reserve the right to institute a separate civil action.
• Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197 — Followed for the rule that an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of the offense only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it, subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal.
• Gorospe vs. Gatmaitan, 98 Phil. 600 — Followed for the rationale that by waiving or reserving the civil action, the offended party's interest in the criminal case disappears and its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.
• People vs. Orais, 65 Phil. 744 — Followed for the principle that the right of intervention is for the sole purpose of enforcing civil liability born of the criminal act, not demanding punishment.
• Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672 — Followed for the application of res judicata to bar a subsequent civil action where the offended party had elected to claim damages through intervention in the criminal case.
• Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 1 — Followed for the doctrine that a judgment on the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause regardless of the form of action.
• People vs. Oraza, 83 Phil. 633 — Followed for the rule that even if the complaint or information is silent as to damages, the offender is still liable for them and the offended party may prove and claim them in the criminal case unless a waiver or reservation is made.
• Miranda vs. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526 — Followed for the principle that under res judicata, a judgment is conclusive as to any admissible matter that could have been offered to sustain the claim.

• Article 33, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, proceeding independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring only a preponderance of evidence. The Court interpreted the word "may" as making the separate civil action optional, so that the offended party who intervenes in the criminal proceedings without reservation is deemed to have elected to have civil liability adjudicated therein.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The Court cited this provision to hold that the absence of any claim or allegation of damages in the criminal information does not extinguish the offender's civil liability, and the offended party may prove and claim damages in the criminal case absent a waiver or reservation.
• Section 15 in connection with Section 4, Rule 106, Rules of Court — Governs the right of the offended party to intervene personally or by attorney in the prosecution of the offense, provided he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately, subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. The Court relied on this rule to determine the purpose and effect of Roa's intervention.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes (J.B.L.), Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concurred.