Rivera vs. Velasco

A Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in a forcible entry proceeding, and the registered owner is entitled to physical possession of the property; the only issue in ejectment is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership, and an ejectment suit is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

Petitioner Eufrocina Rivera and respondent Rolando G. Velasco dispute possession of a 6,397-square meter portion of three parcels of land in Rio Chico, General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, aggregating 27,076 square meters. Petitioner acquired the properties through free patent applications before the CENRO-DENR in Cabanatuan City, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-27012, P-27013, and P-27014 in her name, along with corresponding tax declarations. Respondent claims to have occupied the disputed portion since 1995, prior to petitioner's free patent applications, and filed a Protest before the DENR alleging irregularities in the issuance of petitioner's titles.

Petitioner Eufrocina Rivera is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in Rio Chico, General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, with an aggregate area of 27,076 square meters, covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-27012, P-27013, and P-27014. She acquired these properties through Free Patent Application Nos. 034910-2835, 034910-2835-A, and 034910-2835-B before the CENRO-DENR in Cabanatuan City. The properties were likewise declared in her name for real estate taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 11-08003-03209, 11-08003-03211, and 11-08003-03207.

On June 21, 2014, petitioner discovered that respondent Rolando G. Velasco had, by means of strategy and stealth, possessed and occupied a 6,397-square meter portion of her titled lands by constructing a house thereon, without her consent or permission. Respondent refused to vacate despite demand, and no settlement was reached before the barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for forcible entry before the MTC on October 21, 2014.

Respondent countered in his Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss that he was the lawful owner of the occupied portion, having done so since 1995. He alleged that petitioner had lied in her free patent applications when she stated she had been occupying the subject properties since 2000. On September 1, 2014, respondent lodged a Protest before the DENR against petitioner's free patent titles, asserting irregularities in their issuance.

The MTC found for petitioner, crediting her evidence of prior physical possession since 1992 — supported by a Barangay Certification dated January 26, 2003 and a CENRO Report dated August 25, 2003 — and rejecting respondent's fraud-based defense as a prohibited collateral attack on Torrens titles. The RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. The CA, however, reversed, holding that the controversy involved a complex ownership issue requiring resolution in an accion reivindicatoria cognizable by the RTC, and that respondent's pending Protest before the CENRO and a civil case for Reconveyance of Title before RTC Branch 36 justified dismissal of the ejectment complaint.

• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioner maintained that she had sufficiently alleged and proven her prior physical possession of the subject properties since 1992, as evidenced by the Barangay Certification and CENRO Report, and that respondent's affidavits attesting to their own occupation were a mere afterthought.
• Jurisdictional Facts of Forcible Entry: Petitioner argued that her complaint properly alleged the requisites of forcible entry — prior possession and unlawful deprivation through strategy and stealth — and that the one-year period for filing was counted from the time of discovery of respondent's occupation, not from the time of occupation itself.
• Entitlement to Possession as Titleholder: Petitioner asserted that, as the registered owner of the subject properties under valid Torrens titles, she was entitled to all attributes of ownership including possession, and that respondent's collateral attack on her titles was barred.

• Lawful Ownership and Possession: Respondent argued that he was the lawful owner and possessor of the land in question, having occupied the same since 1995, and that petitioner had lied in her free patent applications about her own occupation.
• Absence of Forcible Entry Elements: Respondent contended that the MTC lacked jurisdiction because the elements of forcible entry were absent, and that the complaint should have been dismissed.
• Collateral Attack via DENR Protest: Respondent alleged irregularities in the issuance of petitioner's Torrens titles and filed a Protest before the CENRO on September 1, 2014, asserting that the controversy could not be fully resolved in an ejectment case and required adjudication in an accion reivindicatoria.

• Jurisdictional Facts: Whether petitioner's complaint sufficiently alleged and proved the jurisdictional facts for a valid action for forcible entry.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Titles: Whether respondent's allegation of fraud in the issuance of petitioner's free patent titles constitutes a prohibited collateral attack on Torrens titles in an ejectment proceeding.
• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint on the ground that the controversy involved ownership issues that could not be resolved in an ejectment case.

• Jurisdictional Facts: Yes. Petitioner's complaint sufficiently alleged prior physical possession and unlawful deprivation through strategy and stealth, and the MTC's factual findings, as affirmed by the RTC, confirmed the veracity of these allegations.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Titles: Yes. Respondent's allegation that petitioner's free patent applications were improvidently granted constitutes a collateral attack on her Torrens titles, which is barred under the Torrens system.
• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the complaint; the only issue in ejectment is physical possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership, and an ejectment suit cannot be circumvented by asserting ownership.

• Jurisdictional Facts: For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property, and (2) unlawful deprivation through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. Petitioner's complaint alleged that she had been in adverse, continuous prior physical possession since 1992, as evidenced by a DENR Report of Investigation and Barangay Certification, and that on June 21, 2014, she discovered respondent had occupied the property by strategy and stealth through construction of a house without consent. The one-year prescriptive period was counted from the time of discovery, not occupation, rendering the case timely. The MTC's factual findings, affirmed by the RTC, confirmed petitioner's prior possession since 1992 and respondent's entry only in 1995, establishing petitioner's entitlement to possession.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Titles: A Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 48 of PD No. 1529 provides that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. Respondent's allegation that petitioner's free patent applications were improvidently granted by the DENR constitutes a collateral attack, which is prohibited. The Court applied Barcelo vs. Riparip, where a similar collateral attack on a free patent title was rejected in a forcible entry case. Petitioner's valid Torrens titles entitled her to protection from indirect attacks, and the issue of title validity could only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: The only issue in ejectment cases is who is entitled to physical or material possession (possession de facto), independent of any claim of ownership or possession de jure. Even if ownership is raised in the pleadings, courts may pass upon it only to determine possession, and only when inseparably linked — which was not the case here. The CA committed error in allowing respondent's assertion of ownership and pending cases to defeat the ejectment action. An ejectment suit is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership. Since the evidence established petitioner as the registered owner of the land forcibly breached by respondent, and a titleholder is entitled to all attributes of ownership including possession, the MTC correctly ruled in her favor.

• Nature of Forcible Entry — Forcible entry is a summary proceeding under Rule 70 designed to restore physical possession to one illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. The purpose is to prevent breaches of peace by compelling parties to resort to the law rather than force. The complaint must allege and prove two elements: (1) prior physical possession, and (2) unlawful deprivation through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. The one-year period for filing is counted from the time of discovery of the dispossession, not from the time of occupation.

• Indefeasibility of Torrens Titles and Prohibition Against Collateral Attack — A Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, PD No. 1529). A collateral attack — made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the title is made as an incident — is prohibited. The issue of title validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. In this case, respondent's allegation that petitioner's free patent titles were fraudulently obtained was barred as a collateral attack in the ejectment proceeding.

• Possession De Facto as the Sole Issue in Ejectment — In ejectment cases, "possession" means actual physical possession, not legal possession. The only issue is who is entitled to physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership. The question of possession is primordial while ownership is unessential. Even if ownership is raised, courts may pass upon it only to determine possession, and only when inseparably linked. An ejectment suit cannot be circumvented by merely asserting ownership.

• "An ejectment suit is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property." — This passage encapsulates the Court's core holding that the summary nature of ejectment proceedings cannot be defeated by injecting ownership disputes, directly addressing the CA's error.

• "The issue as to the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action." — Quoted from Co vs. Court of Appeals, this passage defines the distinction between direct and collateral attacks on Torrens titles and explains why title validity cannot be litigated as an incident in an ejectment case.

• "Verily, in ejectment cases, the word 'possession' means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants." — Quoted from Spouses Malison vs. Court of Appeals, this passage articulates the canonical formulation of the sole issue in ejectment proceedings.

• Barcelo vs. Riparip, G.R. No. 250159, April 26, 2021 — Controlling precedent directly on point. The Court applied its ruling that a Torrens title obtained through free patent cannot be collaterally attacked in a forcible entry case, and that the titleholder is entitled to possession. The factual parallels — free patent titles, stealthy intrusion, collateral attack via allegations of fraud — made this case dispositive.
• Co vs. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 108 (1991) — Followed for its authoritative distinction between direct and collateral attacks on Torrens titles, establishing that the validity of a title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
• Spouses Malison vs. Court of Appeals, 554 Phil. 10 (2007) — Followed for the canonical formulation that the only issue in ejectment is physical possession de facto, independent of ownership claims.
• Drilon vs. Gaurana, 233 Phil. 350 (1987) — Cited for the philosophical foundation of forcible entry and detainer actions: to prevent breaches of the peace by compelling parties to resort to law rather than force.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Followed for the imposition of 6% legal interest per annum on monetary awards, reckoned from finality of judgment until full satisfaction.

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Applied to bar respondent's challenge to petitioner's free patent titles in the forcible entry case.
• Rule 70, Rules of Court — Governs summary ejectment proceedings, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Applied to confirm that petitioner's complaint properly alleged the jurisdictional facts of prior possession and unlawful deprivation through strategy and stealth, and that the one-year prescriptive period ran from discovery.

Justice Caguioa (Chairperson) and Justice Dimaampao concurred. Justices Inting and Singh were on official business.