Rivera vs. COMELEC

Service of a full term by a proclaimed winner constitutes a full term for purposes of the three-term limit, even if the proclamation is subsequently declared void after the expiration of the term.

Respondent Marino "Boking" Morales was elected and served as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During his second term (1998-2001), his proclamation was contested by petitioner Anthony Dee. The Regional Trial Court declared Morales's proclamation void on April 2, 2001, with the decision becoming final on August 6, 2001, after the contested term had already expired. Morales was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman for six months during the same term. In the May 2004 elections, Morales filed a certificate of candidacy for a fourth consecutive term.

• Morales's Consecutive Terms: Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
• The 1998-2001 Term: Morales was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and assumed office. Petitioner Dee filed an election protest. During this term, the Ombudsman preventively suspended Morales for six months. The RTC voided Morales's proclamation on April 2, 2001, a decision that became final on August 6, 2001, after the 1998-2001 term had concluded.
• The 2004 Elections: Morales filed his COC on January 5, 2004. Petitioners Rivera and De Guzman sought to cancel it. After the COMELEC En Banc allowed his candidacy, Morales won and was proclaimed mayor. Dee then filed a quo warranto petition.

• Violation of the Three-Term Limit: Petitioners argued that Morales had already served three consecutive terms as mayor, rendering him ineligible for a fourth term under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.
• Entitlement to Office: Petitioner Dee argued that as the second-placer in the 2004 elections, he should be declared the duly elected mayor following Morales's disqualification.

• Void Proclamation: Respondent Morales contended that his second term (1998-2001) should not be counted because his proclamation was declared void by the RTC; thus, he served merely as a de facto officer or caretaker.
• Preventive Suspension: Morales asserted that his preventive suspension for six months during the 1998-2001 term interrupted the continuity of his service.
• COMELEC's Rationale: The COMELEC agreed that the voided proclamation meant Morales was not validly elected for the 1998-2001 term, severing the continuity of his service.

• Service Under Voided Proclamation: Whether a local official's assumption of office and service of a full term pursuant to a proclamation, which is subsequently declared void after the term expires, counts as a full term served for purposes of the three-term limit.
• Effect of Preventive Suspension: Whether preventive suspension constitutes an interruption of the three-term limit.
• Succession by Second Placer: Whether a candidate who places second in the election may be declared the winner upon the disqualification of the proclaimed winner.

• Service Under Voided Proclamation: Service of a full term pursuant to a proclamation constitutes full service for the three-term limit, even if the proclamation is voided after the term expires. A court decision voiding a proclamation after the contested term has already expired is without practical and legal use or value. The official exercised the powers and enjoyed the prerequisites of the office for the entire period, which is precisely the scenario the constitutional term limit seeks to prevent.
• Effect of Preventive Suspension: Preventive suspension does not constitute an effective interruption of the continuity of service. Unlike in Lonzanida, where the official involuntarily relinquished the office before the term ended, Morales served the entire 1998-2001 term without being unseated.
• Succession by Second Placer: A second-placer cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. The votes cast for a disqualified candidate who is not declared disqualified by final judgment before the election are not null and void but are considered stray votes. Consequently, a permanent vacancy is created, which must be filled by the vice-mayor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Three-Term Limit Rule — The constitutional and statutory prohibition against serving more than three consecutive terms in the same local government post requires two conditions to concur: (1) the official has been elected for three consecutive terms, and (2) the official has fully served three consecutive terms. Full service is the paramount consideration; an official who serves the entire term exercises the powers and accumulates the prerequisites of the office, triggering the constitutional intent to prevent prolonged stay in office.
• De Facto Officer Doctrine in Term Limits — Serving as a de facto officer or caretaker for the entirety of a term still constitutes full service for purposes of the three-term limit. The characterization of the service does not negate the fact that the official exercised the powers of the office continuously.

• "His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers ... as the duly elected mayor ... coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule." — Quoting Ong v. Alegre, establishing that full service under a proclamation counts toward the term limit.
• "Whether as 'caretaker' or 'de facto' officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him 'to stay on indefinitely'." — Rationale for applying the term limit regardless of the legal characterization of the official's title.

• Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354 (Jan 23, 2006) — Followed. The controlling precedent establishing that service of a full term under a voided proclamation counts as a full term served.
• Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150 (July 28, 1999) — Distinguished. In Lonzanida, the official involuntarily relinquished the office before the term expired due to a failure of election, creating a break in service. In the present case, there was no interruption of service.
• Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495 (Sept 3, 1998) — Distinguished. Borja involved an official who succeeded to office by operation of law for less than a full term, which was not considered a term for limit purposes.
• Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927 (Feb 4, 2002) — Distinguished. Involved an official who won a recall election and served the remaining term, creating a break in service.
• Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 105111 & 105384 (July 3, 1992) — Followed. Reiterated the rule that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner upon the disqualification of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes.

• Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Applied to disqualify Morales from a fourth consecutive term.
• Section 43(b), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for local officials. Applied in conjunction with the Constitution to bar Morales.
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 — Governs permanent vacancies in the office of the mayor, directing the vice-mayor to succeed. Applied to declare the vice-mayor as the rightful successor following Morales's disqualification.
• Sections 6 and 7, Republic Act No. 6646 — Provide the effect of disqualification cases and the procedure for canceling a certificate of candidacy. Applied to cancel Morales's COC and classify votes cast for him as stray.
• Section 211, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Prescribes rules for the appreciation of ballots, including that votes for a person who has not filed a COC are stray. Applied to treat votes for the disqualified Morales as stray.

• Tinga, J. (Concurring Opinion): Emphasized that the full service dimension of the three-term limit rule should bear greater impact than the valid election dimension. A nullification of a proclamation that becomes enforceable only after the expiration of the term is an exercise in futility. Further rejected the application of the Labo obiter dictum regarding the installation of a second-placer, noting the high bar of "spectacular flagrancy" required to prove voters intentionally wasted their ballots.
• Velasco, Jr., J. (Separate Opinion): Argued that the Lonzanida ruling requiring a valid election was modified by Ong. Proposed that a proclamation by the board of canvassers substantially complies with the valid election requirement. Further opined that service of more than two years (66% of the term) should constitute substantial compliance with the full service requirement, preventing circumvention of the term limit by officials who are ousted just before the term ends.
• Other Concurring Justices: Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Nachura.