Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera

In a forcible entry case, prior physical possession — actual possession de facto, not possession de jure — is the primary consideration, and a party who proves prior possession may recover it even against the owner himself; residence in the disputed property is a manifestation of possession and occupation. Where the winning party in an ejectment case dies during the pendency of the action, the real action survives and the judgment is enforceable by or against his successors-in-interest, but the death extinguishes his usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code, rendering restitution of possession moot while leaving the monetary award of reasonable compensation to accrue to his estate.

Petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises are, respectively, the daughter of respondent Wilfredo Rivera and the business she operates; the dispute concerns two parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas that Wilfredo and his late wife, Loreto Inciong, had acquired during their marriage. Following Loreto's death, the properties were adjudicated by extrajudicial settlement to their daughters Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with Wilfredo waiving his rights but reserving usufructuary rights over the land for his lifetime — an arrangement that left him a usufructuary rather than owner of the property he continued to occupy and use for his furniture business. The controversy proceeded as a forcible entry action, a summary remedy designed to protect actual possession, and it ran alongside a separate action for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights pending before another branch of the Lipa City Regional Trial Court.

During their lifetime, Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22290 and T-30557. On July 29, 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs.

About eleven years later, on March 29, 1993, Loreto's heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor of Evangeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. On September 23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, Batangas cancelled TCT Nos. T-22290 and T-30557 and issued TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredo's usufructuary rights.

Almost a decade later, on March 13, 2003, Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. 0019-03. He claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two parcels of land along C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495, with a building used for his furniture business. According to Wilfredo, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement in September 2002 to take possession and cause the renovation of the building on the property, and in December 2002, with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property.

The petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights dated March 4, 1996, and that another action between the same parties was pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 — an action for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0773. In that proceeding, the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, stated in its March 11, 2003 order that the petitioners had been "occupying the premises since 1997."

The MTCC found no evidence of Wilfredo's prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property, noting his admission that both E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc. occupied the property through lease contracts from Evangeline and her husband Ferdinand. On Wilfredo's appeal, the RTC initially affirmed these findings, but on reconsideration it held that the MTCC had overlooked evidence proving Wilfredo's prior possession and subsequent dispossession, namely: (a) Evangeline's judicial admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence since May 2002; (b) the Lipa City Prosecutor's findings, in a criminal case for qualified trespass to dwelling, that the petitioners are not residents of the property; (c) the affidavit of Ricky Briones, Barangay Captain of Barangay 9, Lipa City where the property is located, attesting to Wilfredo's prior possession and the petitioners' entry to the property during Wilfredo's hospital confinement; and (d) the petitioners' destruction, with the aid of armed men, of the padlock of the building on the property.

The Court of Appeals likewise found that Evangeline's admission of a residence different and distinct from the property rendered improbable her claim of possession and occupation, and that her entry to the property on the pretext of repairing the building during Wilfredo's hospital confinement had been done without his prior consent and through strategy and stealth. Wilfredo died on December 27, 2006, and was substituted by his second wife, Ma. Lydia S. Rivera, and their children, Freida Leah S. Rivera and Wilfredo S. Rivera, Jr.

• Possession Distinguished from Residence: Petitioners submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in equating possession with residence, since possession in forcible entry cases means physical possession without qualification as to the nature of possession, that is, whether or not the party resides in the particular place.
• Contradictory Evidence of Prior Possession: Petitioners contended that the pronouncements of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773, in its March 11, 2003 order, that they have been "occupying the premises since 1997," and Wilfredo's own admission that he padlocked the doors of the building, contradict Wilfredo's claim of prior possession.

• Interlocutory Order Not Conclusive: Respondents countered that the petitioners mistakenly relied on the statements of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 regarding the petitioners' occupation since 1997, because those statements had been rendered in an interlocutory order and should not prevail over Evangeline's admission in her answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence.
• Admissions on Residence: Respondents argued that Evangeline's admitted residence of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas" stood against Wilfredo's admission in his complaint of "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas" as his residence, which is the exact address of the disputed property.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether, between the petitioners and Wilfredo Rivera, the latter had been in prior physical possession of the disputed property, entitling him to recover possession in the forcible entry case.
• Effect of the Winning Party's Death: Whether Wilfredo's death during the pendency of the case rendered the forcible entry action moot, and what disposition should follow with respect to restitution of possession and the monetary award.

• Prior Physical Possession: Yes. Wilfredo had been in prior physical possession of the property and was deprived of it by means of force, strategy and stealth; in forcible entry, prior physical possession is the primary consideration, and possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
• Effect of the Winning Party's Death: No. The forcible entry case was not rendered moot, a real action for recovery of possession not being extinguished by the death of a party; but because death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code, restitution of possession became moot while the monetary award survived in favor of the deceased's estate.

• Prior Physical Possession: Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved, and the only question courts resolve is who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure; it does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Thus, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership, and possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical possession. In a forcible entry case, prior physical possession is the primary consideration, and a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself; whatever the character of his possession, if he has prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him, and the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. Applying these rules, the Court was convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession and that the petitioners deprived him of it by force, strategy and stealth. The Court of Appeals did not err in equating residence with physical possession, since residence is a manifestation of possession and occupation: Wilfredo had consistently alleged that he resided on "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas," the location of the property, whereas Evangeline has always admitted that she has been a resident of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas," and the petitioners failed to prove that they occupied the property through some other person even if they declared their residence in another area. The Lipa City Prosecutor, in a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, likewise observed that the petitioners did not reside on or occupy the property on December 16, 2002, about three months before the forcible entry complaint was filed on March 13, 2003, and the petitioners themselves alleged therein that they are residents of "J. Belen St., Rosario, Batangas" and not "No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City." The petitioners also failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting to Wilfredo's prior possession and their unlawful entry during his hospital confinement. Their claim of physical possession could not find support in the March 11, 2003 order of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 stating that they "have been occupying the premises since 1997," because that order was a mere interlocutory order on Wilfredo's motion for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities against each other and is basically provisional in its application, subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant; thus, the pronouncement on the petitioners' occupation "since 1997" is not res judicata on the issue of actual physical possession. No reversible error having been found in the decision appealed from, it was affirmed.
• Effect of the Winning Party's Death: The death of Wilfredo introduced a seeming complication into the case and the disposition. The petition involved the recovery of possession of real property, a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party; the judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, and hence is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased. Such a judgment entitles the winning party to (a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorney's fees and costs. The complicating factor was the nature and basis of Wilfredo's possession, as he was holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his death, hand in hand with the de facto possession subject of the present case. Without need of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct was rendered moot by his death, since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprived the heirs of the usufructuary of the right to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. What actually survived under the circumstances was the award of damages, by way of compensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and the Court affirmed; this award was computed as of the time of the RTC decision, roughly about a year before Wilfredo's death, but will now have to take into account the compensation due for the period between the RTC decision and his death. The computation is a matter of execution for the RTC as court of origin to undertake, and the heirs shall succeed to the computed total award under the rules of succession, a matter not within the authority of the Court to determine at that point.

• Ejectment resolves only possession de facto — Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question courts resolve is who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure; it does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Consequently, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership. The Court applied this to confine the inquiry to physical possession despite Evangeline's registered ownership of the property.
• Prior physical possession as the primary consideration in forcible entry — In a forcible entry case, prior physical possession is the primary consideration. Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself; whatever the character of his possession, if he has prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him, and the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. The Court found this rule satisfied by Wilfredo's consistent claim and supporting evidence of prior possession.
• Residence as a manifestation of possession — Residence in the disputed property is a manifestation of possession and occupation. The Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in equating residence with physical possession, since Wilfredo consistently alleged residence at the exact address of the property while Evangeline consistently admitted residence in Rosario, Batangas, and the petitioners failed to prove occupation through some other person despite declaring residence elsewhere.
• Interlocutory orders are provisional and not res judicata — An interlocutory order does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities against each other; it is basically provisional in its application and is subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant. The Court held that the March 11, 2003 order of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, stating that the petitioners had been occupying the premises since 1997, was a mere interlocutory order on a motion for a cease and desist order and therefore not res judicata on the issue of actual physical possession.
• Death of a party in a real action; survival of the ejectment judgment — The recovery of possession of real property is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action and is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased, entitling the winning party to (a) restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorney's fees and costs.
• Extinguishment of usufruct by the usufructuary's death — Under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code, death extinguishes a usufruct. The Court applied this to render moot the restitution of possession, since the development deprived the heirs of the usufructuary of the right to retain or reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution; only the monetary award of reasonable compensation survived and accrued to the deceased's estate, subject to the rules of succession.

• "Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the narrow scope of ejectment proceedings, which allowed the Court to disregard Evangeline's registered ownership and confine the inquiry to physical possession.
• "A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." — This is the canonical formulation of the prior-possession rule in forcible entry, and it is the doctrinal basis for upholding Wilfredo's recovery notwithstanding that title stood in Evangeline's name.
• "It is the nature of an interlocutory order that it is subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant. Thus, the RTC's pronouncement on the petitioners' occupation 'since 1997' is not res judicata on the issue of actual physical possession." — This passage disposes of the petitioners' principal evidentiary argument by defining the provisional character of interlocutory orders and denying them preclusive effect.
• "Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code." — This passage supplies the ground for the modification of the dispositive portion, extinguishing the restitutionary relief while preserving the monetary award in favor of the estate.

• Barrientos vs. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 165 — Cited as the principal authority for the rule that ejectment proceedings resolve only the question of possession de facto and not possession de jure, and that a party's questionable title does not matter.
• Antazo vs. Doblada, G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 586 — Cited for the rule that possession in ejectment cases means actual physical possession, not legal possession, and that prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case.
• Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492 — Cited, together with Antazo vs. Doblada, for the rule that a party who proves prior possession may recover possession even against the owner himself.
• Carbonilla vs. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461 — Cited for the proposition that an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.
• Lee vs. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 522 — Cited for the rule that the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011 — Cited, with Tomacruz-Lactao vs. Espejo, for the nature of an interlocutory order as provisional and subject to modification or reversal by the result of further proceedings.
• Tomacruz-Lactao vs. Espejo, 478 Phil. 755 (2004) — Cited with the foregoing for the provisional character of interlocutory orders and their lack of res judicata effect.
• David vs. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005) — Cited with Barrientos vs. Rapal for the limited scope of the question resolved in ejectment proceedings.
• Arbizo vs. Santillan, G.R. No. 171315, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 610 — Cited with Antazo vs. Doblada for the definition of possession in ejectment as actual physical possession.
• Quizon vs. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 601 — Cited with Lee vs. Dela Paz for the protection accorded to peaceable and quiet possession against force, violence, or terror.

• Article 603(1), Civil Code — Provides that usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary. The Court applied it to hold that Wilfredo's death extinguished his usufructuary right, rendering moot the restitution of possession and depriving his heirs of any right to retain or reacquire the property, while leaving the monetary award to accrue to his estate.
• Rule 42, Rules of Court — The mode by which the petitioners elevated the RTC's April 6, 2005 decision and July 8, 2005 order to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, the RTC having rendered those issuances in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the MTCC.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The mode by which the petitioners brought the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the February 10, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice's certification that the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Jose Portugal Perez
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno issued the certification pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.