Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC

An absolute pardon granted by the President restores all civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office and the right of suffrage, even if the pardon does not expressly enumerate these specific rights or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, provided the intent to restore these rights can be inferred from the general grant of "civil and political rights." Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC are procedural requirements of form that do not abridge or diminish the President’s exclusive constitutional pardoning power. Furthermore, "whereas" clauses in a pardon are not operative conditions unless explicitly made so in the dispositive portion of the grant.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada was convicted by the Sandiganbayan on September 12, 2007, for the crime of plunder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted him executive clemency, stating in the dispositive portion that he was "hereby restored to his civil and political rights." The pardon’s third "whereas" clause noted that Estrada had publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position. Estrada accepted the pardon and subsequently ran for President in 2010. After losing that election, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Manila in the 2013 local elections.

• On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of plunder (Criminal Case No. 26558) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification.
• On October 25, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted Estrada executive clemency. The pardon’s dispositive portion stated: "He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." The pardon contained a third "whereas" clause stating that Estrada "has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
• On October 26, 2007, Estrada accepted the pardon by affixing his signature and a handwritten notation of acceptance.
• On October 2, 2012, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
• On January 24, 2013, petitioner Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification (SPA No. 13-211) with the COMELEC, arguing that Estrada was disqualified under Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) and Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) because his conviction involved moral turpitude and his pardon did not expressly restore his right to hold public office or remit his perpetual absolute disqualification under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
• The COMELEC dismissed the petition, relying on its 2010 rulings in similar cases involving Estrada’s presidential bid, which held that the pardon was absolute and unconditional and had restored his right to seek public office.
• During the pendency of the petition before the Supreme Court, the May 13, 2013 elections were held, and Estrada was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Manila.
• Alfredo S. Lim, who placed second in the mayoralty race, filed a motion for leave to intervene, praying that he be declared the rightful winner if Estrada was disqualified.

• The pardon granted to Estrada was conditional, not absolute, as evidenced by the third "whereas" clause stating his commitment not to seek elective office and his express acceptance of the pardon.
• Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC require that the restoration of the right to hold public office and the remission of perpetual absolute disqualification must be expressly stated in the pardon; the general phrase "civil and political rights" is insufficient.
• The crime of plunder involves moral turpitude, disqualifying Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC and Section 12 of the OEC.
• The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on its 2010 rulings, as the principle of res judicata does not apply because the parties and subject matter were different.
• (Lim) As the second placer, he should be declared the winner if Estrada is disqualified, citing Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC.

• (COMELEC/OSG) The issue of the pardon’s effect had already been settled in the 2010 disqualification cases; the pardon was absolute and restored Estrada’s right to run for office. Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC cannot limit the President’s constitutional pardoning power.
• (Estrada) The COMELEC’s factual findings on the absoluteness of the pardon and his eligibility are binding on the Supreme Court. The pardon complied with Articles 36 and 41, as the restoration of "civil and political rights" includes the right to seek public office. The "whereas" clause is not an integral part of the pardon and cannot restrict its effectivity. Disqualifying him would disenfranchise the voters of Manila.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on its 2010 rulings to dismiss the petition.
  • Whether Alfredo S. Lim’s intervention was procedurally proper.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the pardon granted to Estrada was conditional or absolute.
  • Whether the pardon restored Estrada’s right to seek public elective office and remitted his perpetual absolute disqualification despite not expressly stating so.

• Procedural:
  • The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Its 2010 rulings on the effect of Estrada’s pardon had become final and executory and were binding on the parties under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment (res judicata), as the issue of pardon and its effects was identical.
  • Lim’s intervention was procedurally improper because he filed his motion only after the case reached the Supreme Court and after he had conceded the election; he was not a party in the COMELEC proceedings and failed to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC, a prerequisite for certiorari.
• Substantive:
  • The pardon was absolute. The third "whereas" clause regarding Estrada’s commitment not to seek office was merely a statement of fact or a preamble, not an operative condition, as conditions must appear in the dispositive portion of the pardon.
  • The phrase "He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement under Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC for express restoration of the right to hold public office and remission of accessory penalties. The right to seek public elective office is a political right, and its restoration is subsumed in the general grant.
  • Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC are procedural prescriptions of form that do not abridge or diminish the President’s plenary constitutional power to grant pardons. The pardon removed the disqualification under Section 40 of the LGC and Section 12 of the OEC.

• Presidential Pardoning Power — The power to grant pardons is a plenary executive prerogative vested in the President by Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. It cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g., impeachment cases, election law violations without COMELEC recommendation).
• Absolute Pardon — An absolute pardon totally extinguishes the criminal liability of the individual, restores civil and political rights, and remits the principal and accessory penalties, unless the pardon expressly excludes specific rights or penalties.
• Conditional Pardon — A conditional pardon imposes obligations or restrictions on the grantee and must be accepted to be effective. Conditions must be clearly stated in the dispositive portion of the pardon; "whereas" clauses are merely preambular and do not form part of the operative act.
• Effects of Pardon — Pardon implies guilt and does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime or the moral stain; it involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness. It relieves the offender from the punitive consequences of the criminal act, including disqualifications based on the finding of guilt.
• Res Judicata (Conclusiveness of Judgment) — A final judgment or order of the COMELEC on the merits, not restrained by the Supreme Court, is conclusive upon the parties and their privies in subsequent suits involving the same issue, even if the subject matter or cause of action is different.

• "The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action."
• "Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness."
• "The phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada 'is hereby restored to his civil and political rights' substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration."
• "Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute."
• "To say, however, that the offender is a 'new man', and 'as innocent as if he had never committed the offense'; is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal."

• Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. — Established that pardon removes disqualifications arising from conviction but does not erase guilt or entitle the grantee to automatic reinstatement; repudiated the "forgive and forget" doctrine of Ex Parte Garland.
• Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections — Discussed the interplay between Section 40 of the LGC and Article 41 of the RPC regarding perpetual absolute disqualification.
• Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino — Held that the pardoning power cannot be restricted by legislative action.
• Pormento v. Estrada — The 2010 case dismissed by the Supreme Court for mootness after Estrada lost the presidential election.
• Maquiling v. COMELEC — Cited by the dissent regarding the rule on succession when a winning candidate is disqualified.

• Article VII, Section 19 (1987 Constitution) — Grants the President the power to grant pardons, reprieves, commutations, etc., after conviction by final judgment.
• Article IX-C, Section 5 (1987 Constitution) — Requires a favorable recommendation from COMELEC for pardons involving election law violations.
• Article 36, Revised Penal Code — States that pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office or suffrage unless expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
• Article 41, Revised Penal Code — States that the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall be suffered even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
• Section 40, Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) — Disqualifies persons sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude from running for local elective positions.
• Section 12, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Disqualifies persons sentenced by final judgment for crimes involving moral turpitude unless given plenary pardon or amnesty.
• Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act) — Defines civil and political rights to include the right to vote and be elected.

• Justice Arturo D. Brion — Agreed that the pardon was absolute and restored Estrada’s rights. He extensively discussed that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in relying on its 2010 rulings because the principle of res judicata (conclusiveness of judgment) applied. He also argued that Lim’s intervention should have been dismissed as untimely and procedurally defective.
• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. — Joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the acceptance of a pardon does not make it conditional and that the "whereas" clause was not a condition.

• Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen — Dissented, arguing that Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC require an express and specific restoration of the right to hold public office and remission of perpetual absolute disqualification, which was absent in the pardon. He interpreted the third "whereas" clause as a condition that Estrada breached. He concluded that Estrada was disqualified and that Alfredo Lim should be declared the winner.